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INTRODUCTION
For almost one hundred years, America's nonprofit hospitals have enjoyed nearly automatic exemption from federal income taxation. During this time, nonprofit hospitals
transformed themselves from resting places of last resort for the
sick poor into centers of high-technology intervention for all income groups. The financing of their services evolved in parallel,
from primary dependence on the generosity of religious orders
and charitable donors, to almost exclusive reliance on payments
for services rendered. Meanwhile, the exemption's doctrinal underpinnings were repeatedly reinvented to accommodate change
in the hospital industry's financial structure and social role.
When Congress first enacted a charitable exemption to the income tax, including hospitals within its reach seemed an unexceptional instance of the exemption's availability to entities
engaged in relief of the poor. Well into the 1950s, the Treasury
Department continued to expect exempt hospitals to offer some
free care to the poor, although it interpreted this requirement
with increasing laxity. By the end of the 1960s, however, exemption of hospitals had lost all of its doctrinal moorings to
either charitable giving or care for the poor.
In 1969, a landmark Internal Revenue Service ruling formally decoupled hospitals' eligibility for exemption from any obligation to provide free care for the poor. With only minor
modifications, nonprofit hospitals today enjoy virtually per se
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federal exemption. This per se exemption has been sharply criticized by advocates of charity care requirements and those who
would prefer to put an end to tax exemption of hospitals altogether. Yet the exemption persists, protected politically by the
interests that have come to depend on it and legally by the
weight of decades of administrative and judicial precedent.
Moreover, the prospect of a large expansion in the exemption's scope now looms. The health care industry has entered a
period of extraordinary change, marked by the rapid emergence
of managed care networks that integrate the financing and provision of services. For the most part, insurers have driven this
transformation by organizing such networks as a market response to employers' growing medical cost sensitivity. However,
nonprofit hospitals have begun to develop competing integrated
systems, perhaps looking both to lock in buyers for their services
and to capture risk-bearing premiums traditionally taken by insurers. Not surprisingly, some of these nonprofit systems have
sought tax exemption for their financial risk-bearing activities.
Whether the exemption accorded to hospital services will be expanded to encompass financial risk bearing remains an unsettled question.
This Article examines the conceptual underpinnings of the
federal tax exemption accorded to hospitals' and considers its
1. Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) sets forth the exemption's statutory
basis. This provision exempts corporations "organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific ... or educational purposes .... no part of the
net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual ... ." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994). Exemption of health care institutions
under this provision has long rested on the claim that they serve "charitable"
purposes. This Article focuses on this basis for exemption. I do not address the
possibility, unsupported by IRS or judicial precedent, that some health care institutions (e.g., hospitals operated by religious orders or universities) could
qualify for § 501(c)(3) exemption solely because they serve "religious," "scientific," or "educational" purposes. Absent IRS and judicial willingness to construe medical care as an entirely "religious," "scientific," or "educational"
endeavor, this theoretical possibility would appear to be barred by the
§ 501(c)(3) exclusivity requirement.
Nor do I address the separate question of private inurement, because private inurement issues, typically arising from compensation and joint venture
arrangements between nonprofit hospitals and staff physicians, have recently
become a mAjor focus of IRS attention. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 21,
1991), reprintedin IRS Pos. (CCH) 2327 (Dec. 6, 1991) (announcing new, more
demanding private inurement and benefit standards, including the requirement that exempt health care providers adhere to federal Medicaid and Medicare anti-kickback laws). Although vexatious, these issues represent problems
of application, distinct from the prior question of whether medical services
merit exemption absent private benefit.

302

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:299

future evolution. 2 It evaluates a variety of approaches to understanding the exemption, both in its current form and as an entitlement refashioned along more restrictive lines. 3 Some of the
approaches that I explore have been vigorously articulated elsewhere by academic commentators and interest group representatives. Others have been less well developed and I reformulate
them here in order to assess their merits without pursuing possible straw men. Still others are set forth herein for the first
time.
Some of these approaches represent efforts to explain the
exemption's current form, while others are avowedly normative
in thrust. Still other approaches straddle this line more or less
awkwardly. The primary focus of this Article is the exemption
accorded to hospital services. It also examines, however, the exemption's application to risk bearing performed by vertically integrated networks that both finance and deliver medical care.
A major purpose of this Article is to contribute to a deeper
understanding of the federal exemption's actual and potential
roles as an instrument of health care financing policy. Based on
the understanding developed herein, I offer some recommendations about the form that the exemption ought to take. Beyond
this, I propose a broader lesson about the limits of functionalist
explanation and justification of legal arrangements that are tied
to embedded patterns of economic and social reliance.
Part H of this Article sets up the problems of explanation
and justification posed by the per se exemption by briefly tracing
the IRS's failure to develop a plausible rationale for hospital exemption. Part III considers several alternative rationales for
per se exemption of nonprofit hospitals. First, I assess the
Treasury Department's recent claim that the exemption functions as a social welfare-enhancing quid pro quo for nonprofit
hospitals' production of positive externalities. After finding this
line of argument wanting, I construct a case for per se exemption based on Henry Hansmann's model of charitable exemption
2. Although many of the arguments considered below also bear upon state
and local tax benefits available to hospitals (e.g., exemptions from sales and
property taxes), I do not address these benefits because they raise differing constellations of issues.
3. In so doing, I treat the economic benefits bestowed by the exemption as
a bundle, though they could in theory be decoupled from each other. These benefits include, in order of decreasing fiscal significance, the ability to issue exempt debt instruments (the nonprofit hospital industry's most important source
of capital financing), exemption from federal corporate income tax, and access
to tax-deductible gifts.
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as a capital subsidy. I contend that this case is more plausible
than many might expect, but founders on the shortcomings of
hospital earnings as an indicator of capital need. Part MI concludes by considering a sharply different, non-utilitarian rationale: the notion that nonprofit hospitals deserve tax exemption as
recognition for their inherent virtues. After attempting to present this rationale in its best light, I argue that it fails as a justification for per se exemption, although it plausibly supports a
scaled-back exemption when tied to hospital donors' contributions of time and money.
Part IV explores the possibility of a reformulated exemption, contingent upon the provision of below-cost medical care or
community services. After criticizing the notion that such services can plausibly be regarded as charitable, I contend that a
credible case can nevertheless be stated for an exemption constructed along these lines. Indeed, I suggest, this case can be
made more effectively than proponents of such an exemption
have done thus far. The failure of Congress to provide for universal health insurance in 1994 and the rising number of uninsured Americans lends urgency to this case. Even so, I argue,
the case for a contingent exemption is deeply problematic on the
grounds of efficiency, equity, and morality.
Part V derives some conclusions from the exemption's persistence in the face of our inability to either explain or justify it
in functionalist terms. I also offer recommendations about the
exemption's future, with respect to hospital services and to risk
bearing performed by vertically integrated health care networks. These recommendations reflect an attempt to come to
terms with both the absence of a persuasive functionalist justification for the exemption and the patterns of economic and social
reliance that its persistence has engendered. I urge an approach
that takes into account the costs entailed by the disruption of
these patterns, and one that operates to forestall the development of new, socially undesirable patterns of reliance. Finally,
and more generally, I suggest that closer attention to such patterns of reliance would deepen our insight into myriad legal arrangements that, like the federal tax exemption of hospitals,
defy scholarly efforts to infer purpose.
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I. THE ILL-CONCEIVED DECISION TO EXEMPT
NONPROFIT HOSPITALS PER SE
A. A NEw QUESTION OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The proper scope of the charitable exemption from federal
taxation has been a matter of dispute since the origins of the
income tax. The exemption's drafters did not anticipate modern
nonprofit hospitals, which largely serve paying patients, and
whether they ought to qualify for the exemption. The currently
prevailing understanding of the exemption holds that the terms
of the exemption were taken from the common law that excepted4
charitable trusts from limits imposed on trusts in general.
"Charitable" in this sense encompassed a broad range of activities "beneficial to the community," including "the promotion of
health."5 In 1894, when Congress enacted its first charitable ex4. E.g., Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 21, 1991) reprinted in IRS Pos.
(CCH) 2327 (Dec. 6, 1991) (explaining how a charitable organization is viewed
under the common law); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 588
(1983); Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1287 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), rev'd on othergrounds, 426 U.S. 26 (1976). The legislative history of
the charitable exemption is indeterminate as to its scope, and disputes persist
over whether the exemption should be limited to "relief of poverty" or made
more broadly available to activities of "public benefit," even if they do not entail
almsgiving. James B. Simpson & Sarah D. Strum, How Good a Samaritan?:
FederalIncome Tax Exemption for Charitable HospitalsReconsidered, 14 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 633, 639-41 & n.35 (1991). Prior to 1959, the IRS construed the statutory criterion of "charitable purpose" to require a commitment
to relief of the poor. I.T. 1800, 11-2 C.B. 152, 153 (1923). The agency's justification was purely formalistic: the statute's enumeration of multiple exempt purposes (such as "scientific" and "educational") precluded reading the word
"charitable" to incorporate other exempt purposes not specifically included. Cf.
WiLmAm N. ESKRIDGE & PHILIP P. FmcKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 641-42 (1988) (criticizing

premises underlying the interpretive maxim of inclusio unis est exclusio alterius or "inclusion of one thing indicates exclusion of the other").
When, in 1959, the IRS discarded the relief of poverty requirement in favor
of a broad public benefit standard imported from the common law of charitable
trusts, the agency simply switched from one unrevealing maxim to another:
statutory terms drawn from the common law should be construed in accordance
with their common law meaning. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)1(d)(2) (1959). Considered together, without other interpretive rationale, these canons of statutory
construction are contradictory and indeterminate. See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401-06 (1950)
(characterizing classic canons of statutory construction as a shell game where
conflicting canons provide the interpreter with diplomatic language for maneuvering toward an outcome preferred on exogenous grounds).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 358 (1959) (describing the creation
of charitable trusts by will); 4 AusTIN W. SCOTT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS 2853 (3rd
ed. 1967) (discussing which purposes are considered charitable).
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emption from federal tax,6 nonprofit entities (chiefly hospitals)
organized for "the promotion of health" operated primarily on
behalf of the poor. 7 The transformation of the hospital into a locus for the treatment of paying patients had not yet occurred,
and there was no evidence that the charitable exemption's legislative creators had anticipated such a change.8 Hence, even if
the charitable exemption did incorporate the common law of
charitable trusts, it cannot plausibly represent a decision made
by its drafters to exempt nonprofit hospitals that function essentially as commercial enterprises. 9
The rise of such enterprises in the 20th century thereby
posed a new question of statutory interpretation: whether the
"promotion of health," divorced from any relief for the poor, still
merited a charitable exemption. Initially, the IRS and the
courts responded with a pragmatic compromise, permitting hospitals that served paying patients to retain their charitable exemptions so long as they provided a substantial amount of free
or below-cost care to the poor. 10 The IRS adhered to this compromise through the first half of the century. 1 In the late
6. Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556 (1894) (exempting organizations "organized and conducted solely for charitable, religious, or educational
purposes" from corporate income tax). The same basic formulation was repeated in subsequent income tax enactments. See Simpson & Strum, supra
note 4, at 639 nn.29-30 (providing a list of subsequent income tax enactments).
7. ROSEMARY STEVENS, IN SicKNEss AND IN WEALTH 17 (1989) (stating
that late 19th century nonprofit hospitals functioned largely as homes for the
care of the sick poor).
8. See Kenneth Liles & Cynthia Blum, Development of the Federal Tax
Treatment of Charities,39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 6 (1975) (presenting a historical account of the charitable exemption's evolution); cf Boris I. Bittker &
George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizationsfrom FederalIncome Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 302 (1976) (elaborating on congressional failure to develop a rationale for the charitable exemption).
9. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE
L.J. 835, 862-68 (1980) [hereinafter Hansmann, Nonprofit Enterprise](classifying hospitals, nursing homes, and other nonprofit firms that generate revenues
almost exclusively through the sale of goods or services as "commercial
nonprofits).
10. E.g., Davis Hosp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C.M. (CCH) 312 (1945)
(holding that hospital's provision of free care to 30-40% of its patients qualified
it for charitable exemption).
11. The interpretation was codified in Revenue Ruling 56-185 which stated
that a qualifying hospital must operate "to the extent of its financial ability for
those not able to pay." Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956 C.B. 203. This ruling forbade
qualifying hospitals from refusing to accept patients because of their inability
to pay, but it promised that even hospitals with "relatively low" charity-care
levels could meet the "financial ability" standard. In practice, hospitals that
provided free care to fewer than five percent of their patients risked losing their
exemptions under the "financial ability" standard, while facilities that gave free
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1960s, however, the agency encountered growing pressure from
the nonprofit hospital industry to abandon the charity care requirement entirely. 12 By then, many nonprofit hospitals had
been providing only minimal free and below-cost care. The industry argued that the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid
(in 1965) would soon precipitate a national health insurance program, making charity care an anachronism.1 3 The industry's
advocates presumed that this argument supported a reconceived
exemption, based on "promotion of health" grounds alone. They
failed to acknowledge the possibility of their argument supporting the conclusion that the exemption itself was an
anachronism.
These political circumstances 14 confronted the IRS with the
need to decide clearly whether the "promotion of health" by itself
(unaccompanied by assistance for the poor) constituted a "charitable purpose." Presented with a question of statutory construction not considered by the exemption's drafters, the agency could
have pursued numerous plausible, interpretive strategies. The
IRS could have taken a fiscally cautious tack by declining to
read the exemption statute to confer a benefit from the federal
treasury without express textual evidence that the statute's
drafters had anticipated and resolved this issue. 1 5 This apcare to six percent or more of their patients easily qualified. T. J. Sullivan & V.
Moore, A CriticalLook at Recent Developments in Tax-Exempt Hospitals,23 J.
HEALTH & Hosp. L. 65, 67 (1990).
12. Hearings on Tax Reform, 1969, Part IV, Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1425, 1433 (1969) (statement by American Hospital Association representative advocating exemption for any hospital
"so long as its earnings do not inure to the benefit of any private individualwithout regard to any test measuring the amount of free patient care").
13. Id. at 1427 (discussing government and nonprofit hospital "partnership" in providing care to the poor).
14. The industry also tried to persuade Congress to abolish the charitycare requirement by statute. This effort culminated in a 1969 House vote to
eliminate the requirement, but concern in the Senate Finance Committee about
marginal income and Medicaid-ineligible families' access to care led to the legislation's demise. Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer, Tax Administration as
Health Policy: Hospitals, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Courts, 16 J.
HEALTH POL. PoL'y & L. 251, 264-65 (1991) (discussing concerns of the Senate
Finance Committee regarding marginal income families).
15. E.g., United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351,357 (1988) (finding that if Congress wanted to create a broad tax exemption it would have created it "notoriously"); see also CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE

169 (1990) (courts should

protect the Treasury by declining to infer tax exemption in the absence of statutory language expressly creating it, reflecting the textualist principle that Congress carefully monitors the revenue process and is in good position to create
exemptions when it wants to allow them). This approach would have com-
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proach would have led the agency to deny exemption to hospitals
which did not provide substantial free and below-cost care.
Alternatively, the IRS could have sought (or at least purported to seek) to reconstruct the basic premises of the exemption's drafters, striving to divine how they "would have wanted
it applied to situations they did not foresee." 16 This classic interpretive method, conservative in connotation but indeterminate in practice, 17 would have directed the agency's attention to
the "values and attitudes"18 of the turn-of-the-century legislators who crafted the charitable exemption 19 and to whom the
concept of a nonprofit hospital not primarily devoted to the poor
was unknown. How these legislators would have reacted to the
rise of the commercial nonprofit hospital and the divergence of
"promotion of health" from "relief of the poor" would have been
the central, perhaps unanswerable, question.
ported with the more generally conservative, textualist principle that courts
should refrain from "gap-filling" when a statute's drafters have not expressly
planned for the particular case at issue; courts adhering to this principle should
decide such cases as though the statute were not present. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 533, 544 (1983) ("domain of [a]
statute should be restricted to cases anticipated by its framers and expressly
resolved in the legislative process"). Cf Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form
and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 859, 863-64 (1982) (reviewing
BoRis I. BrrrKR, FEDERAL TAXATION oF INcoME, ESTATES AND GiFTs (1981),
contending that courts exercise particular scrutiny of transactions with results
unfavorable to the Treasury).
16. RicHARD A. PosNnR, THE FEDERAL CourTS: CRisis AND REFORM 286-87
(1985) (advocating interpretation of statutes via "imaginative reconstruction" of
enacting legislators' 'essential premises").
17. Indeterminacy arises in part from this method's ambiguous stance toward change in social and legal norms. The method leaves interpreters free to
characterize such changes as pertinent to statutory construction (by representing these changes as circumstances that enacting legislators "did not foresee")
or as insignificant (by representing such changes as irrelevant to the circumstances not foreseen).
18. PosNER, supra note 16, at 287.
19. Another source of indeterminacy arises from the fact that the charitable exemption was repeatedly reenacted, albeit with minimal textual change, as
part of successive tax reform packages through the 20th century. See Simpson
& Strum, supra note 4, at 639 & nn.29-30 (detailing successive tax reform packages). This raises the question of which enacting legislators' basic premises
ought to be the subject of interpretive attention. Interpretive focus on the Congress that most recently reenacted the exemption could lead to the conclusion
that the transformation of nonprofit hospitals into enterprises that mainly
served paying patients was well-understood. On the other hand, the paucity of
legislative history surrounding the successive reenactments suggests that they
occurred without reassessment of the meaning of "charity" in general or the role
of nonprofit hospitals in particular. If so, attention to the premises of the legislators who originally enacted the charitable exemption would seem most
appropriate.
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More plausibly, the IRS could have envisioned its interpretive task as a quest for the charitable exemption's rational public purpose in the late 1960s, a search not imprisoned by the
time-bound preferences of enacting legislators. 20 This approach
would have liberated the agency to respond to textual ambiguity
by formulating a policy that served some defensible conception
of contemporary public purpose. Interpretive inquiry along
these lines might have sought to identify and balance the public
values served and sacrificed 21 by the options the IRS faced:
maintaining the charity care obligation in some form, abandoning it, or eliminating the charitable exemption altogether for
commercial nonprofit hospitals.
B.

Ti

IRS's

IMPLAUSIBLE ANSWER

The IRS followed none of these approaches. In issuing the
portentous 1969 revenue ruling that did away with the charitycare requirement, 22 the agency construed the charitable exemption much more broadly than the statutory text expressly required. The IRS acted without a semblance of an effort to divine
how the exemption's framers might have applied it to the critical
development they did not anticipate: the evolution of the nonprofit hospital from a place for the sick poor to a center for the
care of paying customers. The IRS merely declared that the exemption's original drafters had incorporated the common law of
charitable trusts, which, in cases involving hospitals devoted to
20. See HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, Tax LEGAL PROCESS 1415
(1958) (advocating interpretive presumption, barring unmistakable evidence to
the contrary, that statutes were enacted by "reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably"). Hart and Sacks pioneered in elaborating this
approach, but Ronald Dworkin's recent version of the idea is more sensitive to
the influence of myriad historical contingencies upon the inference of rational
purpose. RONALD DwoRmKN, LAWS EMPIRE 313-54 (1986) (broadly discussing
legislative intent); cf. William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,
135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987) (arguing that the "best" interpretation of a statute evolves with changing social, cultural, and legal context).
21. See Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HARv. L. REV. 405, 494-96 (1989) (where circumstances have changed greatly
since a regulatory statute's enactment, it should be construed in a public-regarding manner, in accordance with the principle that its social benefits should
be proportional to its social costs).
22. Rev. Rul. 69-545,1969-2 C.B. 117 (nonprofit hospital that provides care
to all persons in its community who are able to pay, and that operates an emergency room open to all persons, qualifies for charitable exemption on ground of
"promotion of health" even if it provides minimal free or below-cost care).
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caring for the destitute, 2 3 held that "promotion of health" was a
charitable purpose. This claim begged the question of whether
the drafters, for whom hospital-based "promotion of health" was
a form of relief for the poor, would have viewed the promotion of
health for a fee as a charitable purpose. The IRS offered no basis for inferring that the exemption's drafters would have made
this leap.
The IRS also failed to mount a credible search for a currently rational public purpose. The agency based its decision to
abandon the charity-care requirement on the implausible conclusion, impressed upon the IRS staff by the hospital industry,
24
that inability to afford medical care was a problem of the past.
This conclusion was the unsurprising outgrowth of an agency
decision-making process poorly designed to identify and reflectively balance public values, discover relevant information, and
achieve coordination and consistency with policies generated
elsewhere in government.
The IRS conducted its inquiry into the charity-care requirement out of public view and in response to industry representatives' persistent calls for its abandonment. 25 The agency inquiry
that formed the basis for its ruling solicited plentiful ex parte
input from nonprofit hospital officials but none from representatives of the poor.26 While industry advocates hovered closely
23. See Simpson & Strum, supra note 4, at 642 n.42 (citing 19th century
decisions upholding trust instruments that endowed hospitals for "sick and indigent females," "aged, decrepit, and worn-out sailors," and "foundlings").
24. The IRS's announcement of the decision, in Revenue Ruling 69-545,
supra note 22, made no mention of this conclusion; Revenue Ruling 69-545 purported to rest the decision exclusively upon the doctrinal formalism that the
charitable exemption statute, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), incorporated the common law
of charitable trusts. But the IRS officials who developed and issued the ruling
later acknowledged having accepted the hospital industry's contention that
charity care had become an anachronism. Fox & Schaffer, supra note 14, at
252-54, 263 (discussing the basis of IRS policy); see also Robert S. Bromberg,
The CharitableHospital, 20 CATH. U. L. REv. 237, 257 (1970) (explaining defense of this position by IRS attorney principally responsible for drafting Rev.
Rul. 69-545). The Treasury Department took this position in litigation, and a
finding that the need for free care had "largely disappeared" was central to the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals' holding that Revenue Ruling 69-545 was
"founded on a permissible definition of the term 'charitable.'" Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1288-90 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
granted, 421 U.S. 975 (1975), and vacated, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
25. See Fox & Schaffer, supra note 14, at 263-71 (discussing IRS response
to Congress and judicial action on the issue of charitable exemptions).
26. Id. at 271 (discussing the lack of input by the poor in IRS policy decisions and discussing Judge Skelly Wright's argument in Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org.); Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 506 F.2d at 1291 (Wright, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that the poor were not
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about the process, pressing their concerns, the poor were nowhere to be seen. 2 7 Furthermore, the IRS failed to coordinate
its reassessment of the charity-care requirement with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which bore responsibility for implementing Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal
health care programs. The thesis that government programs
were turning medical indigency into a relic of the past remained
untested via a deliberative process that received input from
those most affected or knowledgeable.
A serious inquiry conducted by the IRS into the health
needs of the poor would have quickly revealed the tragically in2
complete medical safety net woven by government programs. 8
Millions of medically indigent Americans were ineligible for government-funded health care, and forced to rely on the willingness of private hospitals to provide free and below-cost care.
The expressed premise behind the 1969 ruling, that Americans'
need for free care was vanishing, was pure fantasy.
Moreover, exemption of nonprofit hospitals that serve only
paying patients fits poorly with IRS treatment of other nonprofit
health care organizations. The agency's determination that the
"promotion of health" constitutes a charitable purpose when hospitals are at issue conflicts with the IRS's continuing insistence
that other health care enterprises must provide free or belowcost services to qualify for exemption.2 9 With respect to nonprofit clinics, pharmacy cooperatives, and other outpatient servgiven notice of IRS's proposed interpretive change, while the IRS, not an expert
in health care delivery needs of the poor, denied itself access to important information by failing to follow informal, notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures set forth in Administrative Procedure Act § 553).
27. The process exemplified the paradigm of administrative decision-making in which wealthy, tightly-organized, and regulated interests exercise sustained influence while economically disadvantaged and poorly-organized
potential beneficiaries fail to make themselves heard. See William N. Eskridge,
Polities Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory
Interpretation,74 VA. L. REV. 275, 290, 317 (1988) (invoking "public choice" theory to model tendency of administrative decision-making to discount concerns of
diffuse interests).
28. GEORGE SmvER, A Spy IN THE HOUSE OF MEDMINE 45-56 (1976) (discussing the rise in medical demand); ROSEMARY STEVENS, AMERICAN MEDICINE

& PUBLIC INTEREST 496-509 (1971) (examining the federal government's relationship to the health care system); see also Orro KERNER T AL., REPORT OF
1, 137 (1968) (providing statistical analysis of family expenditures for medical care and percentage
of population making medical visits).
29. E.g., Federation Pharmacy Servs. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 687, 690
(1979), aff'd, 625 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1980) (determining that a pharmacy was
not tax exempt under the Internal Revenue Code).
THE NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMMIssIoN ON CIL DISORDERS
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ices, the IRS (with judicial acquiescence) has maintained its
compromise stance toward hospitals before 1969: to obtain exempt status, an entity must provide a substantial amount of free
or below-cost service.3 0 Neither the IRS nor acquiescing appellate court judges have
proposed a plausible rationale for this
31
patent inconsistency.
II. ALTERNATIVE RATIONALES FOR PER SE
EXEMPTION
The IRS's failure to formulate a plausible rationale for the
per se exemption of nonprofit hospitals has encouraged efforts
by others to construct persuasive accounts. These accounts invoke several influential models of the charitable exemption's
general contours. In this section, I consider three such models:
exemption as a quid pro quo for nonprofit firms' production of
positive externalities, exemption as a subsidy that compensates
nonprofits for their inability to raise capital in equity markets,
and exemption as recognition for virtue. None of these approaches, however, is convincing as a basis for exempting nonprofit hospitals per se.
A.

PosITiVE EXTERNALITmS AND MARKET FAiLURE

The Treasury Department has in recent years based its defense of the nonprofit hospital sector's per se exemption3 2 upon
30. Id. In acquiescing to this inconsistency, courts presented with appeals
from non-hospital entities have baldly acknowledged it by citing, as authority,
pre-1969 decisions (superseded in the hospital context by Rev. Rul. 69-545) imposing charity-care obligations on hospitals. E.g., FederationPharmacyServs.,
625 F.2d at 807 (citing Sonora Community Hosp. v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 519
(1966) and Hassett v. Associated Hosp. Serv. Corp., 125 F.2d 611 (1st Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 672 (1942) (holding that hospitals are not tax exempt when requiring a fee as a prerequisite to service)).
31. The only judicially-suggested distinction is a question-begging one:
whether the activity at issue is "normally pursued by commercial [for-profit]
enterprises." Federation Pharmacy Servs., 625 F.2d at 808. The question
begged is why the status of an activity as charitable should depend on the prevalence of the for-profit form, particularly if the nonprofit firms that engage in
the activity survive by selling services at or above cost. The fact that nonprofit
firms outnumber for-profits in the hospital industry does not by itself demonstrate that hospital care is any less "commercial" than, for example, manufacture of pharmaceuticals, an activity conducted almost exclusively by for-profit
firms.
32. During the Bush Administration, the department supported Revenue
Ruling 69-545 and opposed legislation that would have conditioned nonprofit
hospitals' eligibility for exemption upon their provision of threshold levels of
charity care. Tax-Exempt Status of Hospitals, and Establishment of Charity
Care Standards:Hearing before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d
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the oft-repeated assertion that nonprofit hospitals perform better than for-profits as suppliers of services that produce positive
externalities. These services include biomedical research,
clinical teaching, care for the poor, and an array of health-promoting community programs. 3 3 They are "not provided or...
inadequately provided by for-profit hospitals," in the department's view, because "market prices ... do not reflect the benefit
[these services] confer on the community as a whole."3 4 Hence,
the per se exemption constitutes an indirect form of government
provision of these services.3 5 Instead of supplying them itself,
the federal government subsidizes their provision by the private
sector.3 6 By channeling this subsidy selectively to nonprofit hospitals, the government ideally achieves maximum leverage because nonprofits are less responsive to market forces and
therefore possess a greater tendency than for-profits to produce
services with positive externalities.
This rationale superficially resembles Burton Weisbrod's
model of voluntaristic, nonprofit enterprise as a response to the
market's failure to generate a socially optimal supply of "public
goods," 3 7 possessing positive externalities from which "free ridCong., 1st Sess. 34-37 (1991) [hereinafter Treasury Statement] (statement of
Michael J. Graetz, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury). In 1991, however, the IRS indicated its intention to apply Revenue
Ruling 69-545 in a manner that would require nonprofit hospitals to provide
some free and below-cost care. Id. at 109-10 (statement of John E. Burke, Assistant Commissioner, Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations, IRS). Acute
care general hospitals, the agency said, will be expected to admit Medicaid patients without discrimination. (In most states, Medicaid reimburses hospitals
at rates well below actual cost.) Moreover, general hospitals will be obliged to
operate emergency rooms to maintain their exemptions. Id. Federal "antidumping" legislation requires hospitals with emergency rooms to treat all patients with unstabilized emergency conditions or in active labor, regardless of
ability to pay. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1) (1994).
33. Treasury Statement, supra note 32, at 41-43 (statement of Michael J.
Graetz, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury).
34. Id. at 41-42.
35. This position is a variant of the rationale most commonly articulated by
courts as the justification for charitable exemption: eligible organizations relieve government of the burden of providing some social services (e.g., medical
care for the poor), thereby meriting tax exemption as a quid pro quo. See Mark
A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The CharitableStatus of Nonprofit Hospitals:Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REv. 307, 345-63 (1991)
(reviewing and critiquing the quid pro quo theory as applied to hospitals).
36. The Treasury Department has been silent on the question of whether
subsidization of private hospitals via the per se exemption generates greater
production of positive externalities than would an equal expenditure in the
form of direct government provision of hospital services.
37. Weisbrod's model, which has considerable explanatory power as a portrayal of American voluntarism, postulates that communally-oriented actors
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ers" cannot be excluded. 38 However, Weisbrod's model, which
interprets the tax exemption of nonprofit firms as a means to
with high demand for such goods attempt to satisfy this demand by making
donations to private organizations that produce them. BURTON WEISBROD, THE
VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR: AN ECONOMIC ANA ysIs 52-61 (1977). In theory, a well-functioning majoritarian political process will lead to government
provision of a public good at a socially optimal level if demand for that good is
homogeneous. If demand for the good varies among citizens (due to heterogeneous desires and ability to pay for the good), then majoritarian politics will lead
to government provision of the good at the median demand level. Government
provision of the good at a level higher or lower than median demand will be
rejected by a majority of citizens. Id. at 52-57.
Government provision at the median demand level will leave above-median
demanders unsatisfied. Some of them will turn to the voluntary sector, joining
with fellow high-demanders to support additional production. Free-rider
problems will leave some above-median demand unsatisfied by such voluntary
activity. Free-rider difficulties are reduced, however, by two countervailing influences: social pressures to contribute and government subsidies to voluntary
institutions and their supporters. Tax exemption is one such subsidy. BURTON
WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 25-31 (1988) [hereinafter WEISBROD, THE
NONPROFIT ECONOMY]; WEISBROD, THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra,

at 51-76 (describing the role of the nonprofit sector in a three-sector economy).
One might object that above-median demanders, if sufficiently wealthy to
support voluntary enterprise, could readily translate their wealth into disproportionate influence on the political process and thereby induce government
production levels in excess of median demand. The more responsive the political process to activity by well-financed and well-organized minorities, the easier (cheaper) it will be for a group of high demanders to exercise
disproportionate influence. The financial leverage available through access to
the public fisc would seem to make such an investment in political influence
very appealing. This effect is surely felt to some extent; it probably accounts for
federal support of myriad commercial, scientific, literary, and artistic endeavors. Actors at the high end of a public good's demand distribution, however, can
pursue their preference with greater certainty and control by supporting private, voluntary enterprise.
38. Pure "public goods" are not consumed by use and cannot be supplied to
one user without making them available to all. The classic example is a lighthouse warning beacon. Widely-published, easily-accessible research results are
another example. Use of public goods by one individual does not diminish the
quantity available to others, and non-paying users cannot be excluded except at
a prohibitive cost. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

49-80 (2d ed. 1976). Some goods are incom-

pletely "public" in this sense. They are consumed in part by use, and nonpayers are excluded from some of their benefits. Incompletely public goods can
be described alternatively as private goods with positive externalities-aspects
that are neither consumed by use nor possible to limit to paying customers.
Formal education is an example. Much of its benefit for students (e.g., enhanced economic opportunity) does not accrue equally to persons outside schoolroom walls, but some of what students learn may enrich our communal cultural
and political life. In the Treasury Department's view, nonprofit hospital services are another example. The Department's rationale for nonprofit hospitals'
per se tax exemption is grounded on the belief that their activities produce important positive externalities.
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stimulate voluntary contributions,3 9 is only minimally relevant
to an understanding of nonprofit hospitals. Nonprofit hospitals,
as a rule, are not voluntaristic enterprises; they derive virtually
all of their revenues from the sale of services to consumers for a
price. Voluntaristic contributions account for at most
one to two
40
revenues.
sector's
hospital
nonprofit
the
of
percent
The Treasury Department's argument does not rest on an
outmoded portrayal of nonprofit hospitals as voluntaristic institutions. Rather, it posits that even in the face of market pressures, nonprofit hospital managers are more inclined than their
for-profit counterparts to provide services with "public good"
characteristics. 4 1 All else being equal, the Department views
nonprofit hospitals as producing more of such services than forprofits.42 As a corollary to this argument, government subsidi39. Government subsidies, including tax exemptions, counterbalance the
free rider problem's dampening effect upon potential donors' willingness to contribute. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (noting the reduction in freerider difficulties).
40.

GERALD F.

ANDERSON ET AL., PROVIDING HOSPITAL SERVICES: THE

CHANGING FINANCIAL ENvmoNmENT 47-48 (1989) (reporting that "philanthropy
represented less than 1.3 percent of funds used for hospital care" in 1985). Invoking the Weisbrod model, Hall and Colombo have proposed that the all-ornone approach represented by the per se exemption be replaced by a more flexible exemption, available selectively to activities within a hospital that receive
high levels of donative support. Hall & Colombo, supra note 35, at 405-10.
41. The literature lends some support to this claim. See DENNIS R. YOUNG,
IFNOT FOR PROFIT, FOR WHAT? 16-17 (1983) (arguing that nonprofits attract
managers with less profit-oriented and more community-minded values than
managers attracted by for-profits). See also WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT EcoNoMY, supra note 37, at 31-33 (discussing the phenomenon of managerial sorting,
which prompts managers to gravitate toward those types of organizations most
compatible with their values and personal preferences). Two studies of managerial career choice have found differences in personality, values, and behavior
between students planning careers in nonprofit and for-profit organizations.
Those opting for nonprofits put a premium on being cheerful, forgiving, and
helpful, whereas their for-profit counterparts attached more importance to financial prosperity, ambition, neatness, obedience, and dependability. James R.
Rawls et al., A Comparison of ManagersEntering or Reentering the Profit and
Nonprofit Sectors, 18 AcAD. MGmT.J. 616, 618-20 (1975).
42. Nonprofit hospital advocates assert that there are several reasons why
this form is more likely to produce services with "public good" characteristics.
David Seay and Bruce Vladeck offer a number of overlapping arguments to this
effect. They contend that since most boards of trustees are comprised of members of the local community, nonprofit hospitals are responsive to the needs of
the community. Thus, the values of the community permeate the hospital.
This tie, so the theory goes, makes it more likely that the hospital will have a
long-term commitment to the community and will not relocate at the first sign
of financial trouble. Furthermore, Seay and Vladeck contend, without the requirement of maximizing profits, the trustees can manage the trust in a way
consistent with the charitable intentions of the donors. J. David Seay & Bruce
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zation at a given level will generate a larger increment of public
goods production if directed to a nonprofit facility than to an
otherwise equivalent for-profit. These propositions presume
some willingness on the part of health care payers to absorb additional costs incurred by hospitals to produce public goods.
Moreover, the Department's reliance upon these propositions to
justify the per se exemption presumes that a given government
expenditure will generate more public goods if channeled to nonprofit hospitals via the exemption than if used to finance government provision or purchase of these goods.
These propositions are highly suspect. To begin with, the
Department's assertion that nonprofit hospitals as a rule produce more biomedical research, teaching, care for the poor, and
community services than do for-profits poorly characterizes the
relevant data. A comprehensive assessment of the abundant evidence bearing on the comparative performance of nonprofit and
for-profit hospitals is beyond the scope of this article. 4 3 A brief
review, however, shows that this evidence does not support the
Treasury Department's generalization.
The generalization's basic flaw flows from the fact that nonprofit hospitals display remarkable heterogeneity in their production of biomedical research, education, indigent care, and
community service. This heterogeneity is greatest for research,
a classic public good. In proportion to its market share, the nonC. Vladeck, Mission Matters, in IN SIcKNESS AND INHALTH 1, 13-18 (J. David
Seay & Bruce C. Vladeck eds., 1988) (written by two senior executives of a foundation sponsored by nonprofit hospitals in New York City).
Proof that nonprofit hospitals behave in a less commercial manner than
their for-profit counterparts and thereby produce public goods at higher levels
would not suffice to rationalize the per se exemption of nonprofits. Cf. Hall &
Colombo, supra note 35, at 373 (noting that "why nonprofits exist is a fundamentally different question than whether they should be exempt"). A justification based on the public goods model would require the establishment of a
causal link between per se exemption and the nonprofits' greater production of
public goods. Without such a link, the exemption would merely represent an
after-the-fact payment for behavior that would have occurred anyway, as a
product of the pursuit of private preferences. Were such a link to be established, it would raise the question of whether provision of an equivalent subsidy
to for-profit hospitals would prompt them to produce public goods at higher
levels. An afrmative answer would undermine the public goods rationale for
the current per se exemption unless it could be shown that subsidizing for-profits to an equal extent would induce less production of public goods than does the
exemption.
43. See BRADFORD H. GRAY, THE PROFiT MoTrIv AND PATIENT CAE: THE
CHANGING AccouNTABILIT OF DoCToRs AND HosPIALs 90-110 (1991) (conducting a thorough review of empirical studies on the differences between performances of nonprofit and for-profit health care institutions).
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profit hospital sector does perform more research than the forprofit sector.4 However, a small number of elite teaching hospitals staffed by medical school faculty conduct the vast majority
of this research. 4 5 The more typical nonprofit hospital, a community facility staffed by local medical practitioners, performs
little or no biomedical research. 4 6 Thus, the nonprofit form does
not appear per se to engender the production of more research
than the for-profit form.
The distribution of medical education, less plainly a public
good, 47 poses the same problem for the Treasury Department's
generalization. The nonprofit sector provides disproportionately
more medical training than do for-profit hospitals as a group.
But medical training, like research, is concentrated in elite, university-affiliated teaching hospitals. The typical community
hospital, whether nonprofit or for-profit, does not function as 48a
major training center, although some educational activities
are spread more widely among community hospitals than is
medical research. Thus, nonprofit status in itself has not been
shown to induce the provision of more medical education than
for-profit status.
The comparative performance of the nonprofit and for-profit
sectors in providing free and below-cost care to the poor (an activity with some public good attributes) 49 is a bitterly disputed
44. See M. Gregg Bloche, CorporateTakeover of Teaching Hospitals, 65 S.
1043 (1992) [hereinafter Bloche, Corporate Takeover of
Teaching Hospitals].
45. Id. at 1076-78, 1117.
46. The average nonprofit community hospital is similar in this regard to
the typical for-profit hospital in that neither conducts much research. Only a
small minority of for-profit hospitals, either affiliated with medical schools or
otherwise designated by investor-owned hospital chains as major tertiary care
centers, generate considerable research. Id. at 1040.
47. Exclusion of nonpayers from medical training poses little difficulty.
Moreover, medical education is "consumed" by those who receive it, especially
when training takes the form of small-group experiences of clinical apprenticeship. On the other hand, the diffusion of medical knowledge through society via
medical education may produce positive externalities in the form of social benefits (e.g., the spread of knowledge about healthy eating or living) not consumed
by use, and from which exclusion of nonpayers is difficult.
48. Examples include nursing schools and residency training for new medical school graduates. In 1989, the American Hospital Association (AHA), the
principle trade association representing nonprofit hospitals, had 6720 member
hospitals. Of these, 1235 (18%) had residency training programs and 157 (2%)
had professional nursing schools. AMmcAN Hosprrr ASSOCIATION, HosprriAL
202 (1990).
STATisTICs: A COMPREHENSIVE SUmmARY OF U.S. HosPITALs
49. Bloche, Corporate Takeover of Teaching Hospitals, supra note 44, at
1090-91 (noting that although clinical benefit to indigent patients who receive
care is a private good, gratification derived by society from the knowledge that
CAL. L. REv. 1035,
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subject. 50 As a group, nonprofit hospitals appear to provide
more uncompensated care, measured in proportion to their operating expenses, than do for-profit facilities. 51 The distribution of
uncompensated care, however, like that of research and education, is highly uneven. Uncompensated care performed by the
private sector is concentrated in major urban teaching hospitals,5 2 almost all of which are nonprofits. By contrast, many
community hospitals, nonprofit and for-profit alike, provide minimal amounts of free and below-cost care. Indeed, the nonprofit
hospitals that benefit most from the tax exemption, those with
needy persons are obtaining medical care is a public good or positive externality). More tangible benefits accruing to society from improving the health of
poor people, such as enhanced economic productivity, can also be characterized
as public good attributes or positive externalities.
50. GRAY, supranote 43, at 90-110 (comparing the performance of for-profit
and nonprofit health care organizations).
51. See LEwiN & ASSOCIATES, SErrING THE RECORD STRAIGHT: THE PRoviSION OF UNCOMPENSATED CnA By NoT-FOR-PROFrr HosprIrTS § 3.1 (1988)
(study commissioned by the ARA). This study's comparisons of nonprofit and
for-profit hospitals' aggregate shares of statewide uncompensated-care burdens
in five states showed that in each state, as a proportion of operating expenses,
the nonprofits provided more uncompensated care than did the for-profits.
National comparisons of uncompensated care provided by the nonprofit and
for-profit sectors indicate that they bear approximately equivalent shares of
this burden. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NONPROFIT HosprrALs:
BErER STANDARDS NEEDED FOR TAx EXEMPTION 12 (May 1990) [hereinafter
GAO Report] (report to the Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives Select
Committee on Aging) (according to data from the AHA's Annual Survey of Hospitals, American nonprofit hospitals provided uncompensated care valued at
4.8% of total revenue in 1988 while for-profit hospitals provided uncompensated
care worth 5.2% of their revenue).
As the Lewin & Associates study notes, however, national comparisons can
be misleading. For-profit hospitals are concentrated in southern and western
states with stricter-than-average Medicaid eligibility requirements and poorer
Medicaid coverage (except in the case of California), greater proportions of uninsured patients, and lesser availability of public hospitals. The need for uncompensated care is thus higher in states where for-profits have a strong
presence. Citing data from several such states (Florida, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia) which indicate a contrast between for-profit uncompensated-care burdens close to the national average and nonprofit burdens that are
50 to 100% higher, Lewin & Associates note that national averages obscure
these differences by incorporating the generally lower uncompensated-care
loads borne by nonprofits in other states (where for-profits are less common).
LEWIN & ASSOCIATES, supra, § 2.9. Any systematic tendency of nonprofit hospitals to deliver more free and below-cost care than for-profits provide would be
masked in national figures by this statistical effect.
52. E.g., GAO Report, supra note 51, at 21-23 (noting that nine teaching
hospitals in New York City, with 16% of New York State's hospital beds, accounted for 38% of the uncompensated care provided statewide by nonprofit
hospitals in 1987).
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the highest percentage levels of operating income, 53 tend to provide the lowest rates of uncompensated care. 54 Studies of comparable nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, matched on the basis
of community demographics and patient characteristics, have
not shown a significant difference in rates of uncompensated
care. 55 Thus, the proposition that the nonprofit form itself generates more free and below-cost care than the for-profit form is
inconsistent with the available data.
In short, the Treasury Department's reliance on the proposition that nonprofit hospitals produce public goods at higher
levels than do for-profits appears misplaced. Likewise, the Department's professed belief that a given government subsidy will
generate more public goods production if directed to the nonprofit sector than to for-profits is not well-supported. If the nonprofit form per se does not induce hospitals to commit a higher
proportion of their resources to the provision of public goods
than do for-profits, then it is unlikely that nonprofits per se will
be more inclined than for-profits to apply the benefits of tax exemption (or any other unrestricted subsidy) toward the production of public goods.
Nor is it clear that the per se exemption generates more of
these public goods than would an equal federal expenditure to
provide or purchase these goods more directly. On the contrary,
the poor match between the exemption's value to individual hospitals and their levels of research, teaching, and free care suggests that government could generate more of these activities at
53. These hospitals receive a double benefit from the exemption. They pay
no income tax, and their incomes enhance their credit-worthiness and thus
their ability to take advantage of tax-exempt debt financing.
54. GAO Report, supra note 51, at 25-26, 50 (showing that low-uncompensated care hospitals had higher profit margins than high-uncompensated care
hospitals in California (1986), Florida (1985), Iowa (1987), Michigan (1987), and
New York (1987)).
55. Frank A. Sloan et al., Identifying the Issues: A Statistical Profile, in
UNCOMPENSATED HosPrrAL CARE: RIGHTs AND RESPONSIBILITIES 16, 21-22
(Frank A. Sloan et al. eds., 1986); Robert V. Pattison & Hallie M. Katz, Inves-

tor-Owned and Not-For-ProfitHospitals:A Comparison Based on California
Data, 309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 347, 350-51 (1983); Frank A. Sloan & Robert A.
Vraciu, Investor-Owned and Not-For-ProfitHospitals:Addressing Some Issues,
2 HEALTH AFF. 25, 34 (1983). Lewin & Associates criticize such studies for eliminating "some of the very factors," including hospital "size, teaching status, and
location," that "distinguish" nonprofit and investor-owned hospitals. LEwIN &
AsSOCIATES, supra note 51, §§ 2.14, 2.2. Controlling for these factors is essential to any empirical effort to determine whether the nonprofit form per se engenders the provision of uncompensated care at higher levels.
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the same cost by directly providing or paying for them.5 6 In particular, evidence that many tax-exempt hospitals provide no
more indigent care than do similarly situated for-profit hospitals 5 7 invites the inference that per se exemption is enormously
wasteful, measured by its capacity to induce production of public
goods. As a subsidy for the private provision of medical research, education, and care for the poor, the per se exemption
thus seems much less desirable than direct government provision or payment for these services.

B. CONSTRAInTS

ON CAPITAL FORMATION

Henry Hansmann has proposed that the income tax exemption of nonprofit firms be understood as a crudely-targeted but
easily-administered capital subsidy. 58 Hansmann disclaims the
applicability of his explanation to the hospital industry, which
he contends has no need for such a subsidy. 59 But a case can be
made on behalf of this explanation's relevance for hospitals, in
part because of changes that have occurred in the organization
of American medicine since Hansmann proposed it.
56. Government can either perform such services directly or subsidize their
provision by private actors. The latter might be done through contracts, grants,
or tax credits or deductions made contingent on provision of the desired
services.
In limited circumstances, government subsidization of nonprofit firms may
be a cheaper way to produce services with a public good aspect than direct provision of such services by government. For example, Estelle James has argued
that constraints on the government's ability to employ factors of production at
market prices can make it more expensive for the government to produce such
goods itself than to subsidize their production by nonprofit firms. Estelle
James, The Nonprofit Sector in Comparative Perspective, in THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR:

A RESEARCH

HANDBoOK

397, 410-12 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987).

It seems doubtful, however, that James' argument can explain the per se
exemption of nonprofit hospitals, given the absence of evidence that the exemption generates public goods production at a level even close to the exemption's
value. Moreover, available evidence suggests that the costs of government-run
hospitals are lower than those costs at private facilities. See A~mEicAN HospiTAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 48, at 7 (stating that in 1989 the average cost per
inpatient-day for state and local government-owned community hospitals was
$582.15, compared to $642.45 for nonprofits and $707.90 for for-profits). On the
other hand, the quality of care at government hospitals may be lower than at
private facilities.
57. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
58. Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from CorporateIncome Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 72 (1981) [hereinafter
Hansmann, Rationale].
59. Id. at 89.
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1. Hansmann's Capital Subsidy Model
Hansmann's rationale for the exemption builds, on the
premise that nonprofit producers operate more efficiently than
for-profits when purchasers of goods or services lack the information they need to monitor the output of producers. When purchasers are well-informed about the output of competing
producers, classical economics holds that for-profit firms, driven
by the imperative to generate income for their owners, will perform more efficiently than their nonprofit competitors. 60 When
purchasers are poorly informed about the quality or volume of
producers' outputs, however, for-profit firms are driven by their
income-seeking imperative to exploit purchasers, either by
overcharging or by making unobservable reductions in the quality or quantity of outputs. 6 ' By contrast, nonprofit firms' inability to distribute revenues that exceed expenses (what
Hansmann terms the "non-distribution constraint") reduces the
62
propensity of nonprofits to exploit poorly-informed purchasers.
Hence, when purchasers lack sufficient information to impose ef60. ESTELLE JAMEs & SUSAN ROSE-AcKERMAN, THE NONPROFIT ENTERPRISE
IN MAR= ECONOMCs 20-21 (1986).

61. This information gap and the consequent possibility of cheating by producers creates the condition Hansmann terms "contract failure," a situation in
which potential purchasers fail to strike Pareto-desirable deals with producers
because the purchasers fear that their ignorance will be exploited. Hansmann,
Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 9, at 837-45. David Easley and Maureen
O'Hara have developed a closely-related model: where purchasers are unable to
monitor output or managerial effort, the managers and owners of for-profit producers will tend to cheat for personal gain. Hence, potential purchasers refuse
to contract with these producers. By contrast, according to Easley and O'Hara,
nonprofit producers require their managers to make a minimum observable effort for a fixed rate of pay, insuring that the rest of the contract price is put to
productive use on purchasers' behalf. Under these conditions potential purchasers are willing to contract. David Easley & Maureen O'Hara, OptimalNonprofit Firms, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONROFiT NsTrrTiONs: STUDIES IN
STRucTuRE AND PoLicy 85 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986) (explaining a potential purchaser's inclination to contract with a nonprofit hospital); David Easley & Maureen O'Hara, The Economic Role of the Nonprofit Firm, 14 BELL J.
ECON. 531, 536-38 (1983) (explaining the relative merits of contracting with a
nonprofit firm).
62. Potential purchasers, Hansmann writes, are poorly informed, and
therefore vulnerable to exploitation, if they:
have difficulty in (1) comparing the quality of performance offered by
competing providers before a purchase is made, or (2) determining, after a purchase is made, whether the service was actually performed as
promised. As a result of such conditions, ordinary market competition
may be insufficient to police the performance of for-profit firms, thus
leaving them free to charge excessive prices for inferior service. In
such circumstances consumers often turn to nonprofit providers,
which, owing to the nondistribution constraint, have less opportunity
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fective market discipline on producers, the nonprofit form may
be more efficient than the for-profit organization. 68 The non-distribution constraint's efficiency advantage in such circumstances derives both from producers' diminished64propensity to
exploit and purchasers' enhanced sense of trust.

The non-distribution constraint, however, carries a large
disadvantage. Nonprofit organizations are not able to distribute
profits to contributors of capital, diminishing their ability to
raise capital,6 5 and thus to grow. 66 This reduces a nonprofit
firm's ability to achieve its efficiency-enhancing potential when
purchasers have poor information about producers' outputs.
Hansmann justifies the per se income tax exemption of nonprofit
firms as a sensible way to compensate for this handicap. 67 He
argues that it is rational for government to subsidize capital formation by a nonprofit firm if the subsidy's cost is less than the
efficiency gain it induces. 68 To be rational in this sense, a capital subsidy should be linked to nonprofit firms' potential for efficiency-enhancing growth-e.g., the government should
subsidize only growth that adds to social welfare. In a crude
and incentive to exploit consumers than do for-profit firms, and thus
serve as fiduciaries of a sort for their consumers.
Hansmann, Rationale, supra note 58, at 69.
63. Strictly speaking, the nonprofit form is more efficient than the forprofit form when the efficiency gain resulting from the non-distribution constraint's reduction of exploitative incentives is greater than the efficiency loss
resulting from the non-distribution constraint's adverse effect on productivity
incentives. By dampening a firm's impetus to pursue profits, the non-distribution constraint facilitates productivity-reducing exploitative behavior by managers and staff, such as inefficiency or organizational slack
64. Hansmann, Nonprofit Enterprise,supra note 9, at 847. Hansmann appears ambivalent about which of these two effects is most important and about
how much weight, in the calculus of efficiency, should be accorded to trusting
feelings alone, apart from economic behaviors that may or may not merit trust.
Id.
65. The non-distribution constraint prevents nonprofit firms from raising
capital by selling equity shares to investors. Thus, nonprofit firms must rely on
debt, donations, and retained earnings (past and present net income) to meet
their capital needs.
66. Theorists frequently posit this handicap as an explanation for the proprietary hospital sector's large market shares in regions that exhibit fast-growing economies, expanding populations, and a rapidly-increasing demand for
hospital care. E.g., Bruce Steinwald & Duncan Neuhauser, The Role of the ProprietaryHospital, 35 LAW & CoNTEmp. PROns. 817, 835-38 (1970) (setting forth
the first published statement of this theory).
67. Hansmann, Rationale, supra note 58, at 74.
68. Id. This efficiency gain, Hansmann's model holds, results from the substitution of nonprofit for for-profit production as nonprofits take advantage of
capital subsidies to grow and displace for-profits in industries characterized by
purchaser ignorance about outputs. Id.
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way, Hansmann contends, the income tax exemption meets this
69

test.

Hansmann notes that the exemption's value to a firm in a
given year depends on the firm's earnings. 70 The firm's earnings, he argues, are "likely to be proportional" to the extent de71
mand for the firm's output exceeds the firm's supply capacity,
since excess demand empowers the firm to set prices at greaterthan-equilibrium levels.7 2 Excess demand, Hansmann assumes,
signals that growth (and new capital investment) is socially desirable as long as nonprofit organizations in the firm's industry
possess the aforementioned efficiency advantages. 73 Therefore,
a nonprofit firm's earnings are a good measure of its need for a
capital subsidy, making income tax exemption a sensible way to
provide such a subsidy.7 4
69. Id.
70. Id. at 71. The exemption yields a direct subsidy only when a firm generates positive earnings, and would therefore owe income taxes absent the exemption. The exemption's value to a firm in a given year, however, is only
roughly proportional to the firm's earnings. This is so because the exemption's
indirect benefits, access to tax-deductible donations and ability to sell tax-exempt debt instruments, are not likely to accrue to a firm in exact proportion to
its net earnings.
71. Id. at 74. Hansmann's attribution of nonprofit firms' earnings exclusively to excess demand presumes that nonprofits do not exploit purchasers'
ignorance about outputs by charging excessive prices or skimping on quality.
The non-distribution constraint, Hansmann appears to assume, takes away a
firm's incentives to engage in such exploitation. The validity of this assumption
is doubtful. The importance of retained earnings as a source of capital gives
nonprofit managers powerful reason to take advantage of opportunities to increase their organization's income. Nonprofit managers seek income to pursue
myriad goals, altruistic and selfish, that are not barred by the non-distribution
constraint. See YOUNG, supra note 41, at 15-16 (noting that nonprofit actors
sometimes manipulate their status toward selfish ends). Exploitation of purchasers in service of these goals is to be expected, especially in industries characterized by purchaser ignorance about outputs. Thus, nonprofit earnings are
least likely to stem exclusively from excess demand in those industries in which
Hansmann expects nonprofits to perform more efficiently than for-profits.
72. Id. at 77. At competitive equilibrium in a perfect market, a nonprofit
firm's prices would yield zero earnings. The firm's revenues would exactly cover
the costs of labor, supplies, interest on debt, and depreciation.
73. Id. at 74-75.
74. Under excess demand conditions, Hansmann's model predicts that, all
else being equal, income taxation of nonprofits would reduce the rate at which a
firm could grow toward equilibrium as well as the firm's equilibrium output
level. Id. at 79. He predicts reduced growth because taxation shrinks the pool
of accumulated earnings available to finance expansion, and reduced output
levels because managers blessed with excess demand have the option of using
income from the sale of output, produced at costs less than the market price, to
pay for the production of additional output at marginal costs greater than the
market price. In the extremes, a firm can either sacrifice all potential profits in
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Relying on this rationale, Hansmann would make the exemption available to those nonprofits that are, owing to purchasers' inability to evaluate output, likely to be more efficient than
for-profits in the same industry.7 5 In theory, he notes, the exemption should not be available to subsidize growth that employs capital less productively than do other economic
activities.7 6 However, the difficulties involved in measuring the
productivity of nonprofit firms' investments7 7 make him reluctant, absent a clear case, to deny exemption on this basis. 78 He
therefore recommends that eligibility for the exemption turns
"primarily" on whether there is "convincing evidence" that purorder to maximize current production or forego all production with marginal
costs greater than the market price in order to maximize current earnings,
thereby accumulating investment capital. Income taxation makes it less attractive for a firm to forego current production in order to accumulate earnings to
invest in future production. Tax-paying nonprofits will therefore tend to stop
accumulating earnings (and investing in future production) at lower output
levels than will tax-exempt nonprofits, all else being equal. Id. at 77-80.
75. Id. at 86-87.
76. Id. at 86. The exemption, Hansmann suggests, could be denied to nonprofit firms that have expanded to the point at which the productivity of their
invested capital drops below the pre-tax rate of return on capital invested in
other industries. Id.
77. Hansmann, Rationale,supra note 58, at 86 n.90 (noting the difficulty of
determining a nonprofit's marginal rate of return on a new investment).
Hansmann does not discuss the reasons for these difficulties. They appear to
arise primarily from the impossibility of objectively valuing outputs in many
industries populated by nonprofits. Beneficiaries' subjective experience greatly
influences the values of myriad goods and services that nonprofits supply. It is
impossible to directly measure this influence. Even when beneficiaries pay
market prices to nonprofit producers in exchange for goods or services, objective
valuation of nonprofit output does not thereby become possible, because market
failures tend to make price a poor surrogate for value.
The impossibility of objectively valuing nonprofits' output raises a more
fundamental problem for Hansmann's theory of the exemption. Hansmann's
approach rests on the premise that policymakers can identify those nonprofits
that, owing to purchasers' lack of information about outputs, are likely to be
more efficient than their for-profit competitors. Such identification, however, is
impossible without a way to measure efficiency, and measurement of efficiency
is not possible without a way to value outputs. If outputs cannot be valued in
an objective and generally-accepted manner, then measurements of efficiency
are bound to be the subject of continuing dispute, and Hansmann's test of eligibility for the exemption is, by itself, indeterminate. Hansmann himself illustrates this problem by being less than clear about the weight he would accord to
purchasers' sense of trust as part of a nonprofit firm's output. See supra note 64
and accompanying text (noting that Hansmann does not quantitatively or relatively measure consumer trust). Without case-by-case decisions about what aspects of output should count for how much, Hansmann's approach to eligibility
for the exemption cannot render decisive answers.
78. Id. at 86.
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an efficiency
chasers' inability to monitor output gives nonprofits 79
advantage over for-profits in the industry at issue.
2. The Market for Hospital Care and the Case for a Capital
Subsidy
According to Hansmann, nonprofit hospitals probably do not
meet this test and should "arguably" not be exempted. 80 Hospital patients, he concedes, lack the necessary information (medical knowledge) to meaningfully evaluate the services they
receive. He points out, however, that patients do not buy hospital care on their own;8 1 they rely upon their physicians to function as clinical purchasing agents. Because physicians are
knowledgeable about hospital services, Hansmann asserts that
they can competently monitor the outcomes of the purchasing
decisions they make on their patients' behalf.8 2 Because physicians act as fiduciaries to their patients, Hansmann explains,
physician expertise renders patients able, in effect, to monitor
outputs and to thereby impose market discipline upon hospitals.8a Thus, Hansmann concludes, nonprofit hospitals probably
advantage over for-profits that would justify
lack the efficiency
84
exemption.
tax
a. Medical Ignorance, InstitutionalAuthority, and the
Calculus of Efficiency
Hansmann's disinclination to extend the exemption to nonprofit hospitals may reflect a misplaced confidence in the ability
and inclination of physicians to act as knowledgeable and loyal
purchasing agents for their patients.8 5 A strong case can be
79. Hansmann, Rationale,supra note 58, at 87.
80. Id. at 89.
81. Hansmann, Nonprofit Enterprise,supra note 9, at 866 & n90.
82. Id. at 866.
83. See id. at 866-68 (explaining that patients, with physicians as their
purchasing agents, are not necessarily at the mercy of for-profit hospitals).
84. Hansmann, Rationale, supra note 58, at 89.
85. Hansmann is hardly alone in his belief that patients can rely upon physicians to function as well-informed and loyal fiduciaries on their behalf. Kenneth Arrow's classic study of consumer ignorance in the medical marketplace
presumed a high level of physician knowledge about medical outcomes and concluded that the medical profession had evolved an ethic of unselfish commitment to patients' interests in response to patients' fears that their medical
ignorance might be exploited. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare
Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. EcoN. REv. 941, 949-51 (1963). Arrow's
premise of medical altruism echoed Talcot Parsons' earlier depiction of physician behavior as driven by a patient-oriented "collectivity orientation." TALCOT
PARsoNs, THE SocrL.A SYSTEM 428-47 (1951). More recently, Arnold Relman, a
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made for the proposition that the medical profession is today
neither able nor adequately motivated to protect patients from
exploitation by hospitals. Several strands of reasoning support
this proposition.
First, there is good reason to doubt the assumption that
physicians possess sufficient knowledge about the outcomes of
clinical interventions to act as well-informed purchasing agents
for their patients. Popular perceptions of modern medicine as
rigorously grounded in science8 6 contrast starkly with healthservices researchers' growing realization that most diagnostic
and treatment measures are not well-supported by empirical evidence of efficacy.8 7 Contemporary medical expertise enables
physicians to make reasonably good ex post assessments of their
patients' responses to clinical interventions. However, the paucity of empirical data on the probable results of diagnostic and
treatment measures from an ex ante perspective, leaves physicians ill-prepared to make well-informed clinical recommendations and decisions. 8 As a result, medical decisions are more
former editor-in-chief of the New England Journal of Medicine and an outspoken opponent of hospital efforts to influence physicians' clinical decision-making via financial incentives, has sought to reconstruct the fiduciary commitment
as a bulwark against patients' vulnerability to the economic pressures that now
confront health care providers. Arnold Relman, The New Medical-Industrial
Complex, 303 NEw ENG. J. MED. 963, 969 (1980). In an earlier article, I expressed confidence that the medical profession's fiduciary ethic could confer
such protection. Bloche, Corporate Takeover of Teaching Hospitals, supra note
44, at 1099-1101. I am now more skeptical. See infra notes 88-113 and accompanying text (describing numerous structural obstacles that often prevent physicians from acting as their patients' loyal fiduciaries).
86. See, e.g., Judy Foreman, Medical Opinions Called PartArt, Part Science, BOSTON GLOBE, May 15, 1993, at 15 (noting that while most patients expect certainty and objectivity from their doctors, "Medicine is both art and
science, an endeavor loaded with hidden value judgments").
87. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., ASSESSING
THE EFFICACY AND SAFETY OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES

7 (1978) (reporting that

only 10 to 20 percent of medical procedures have been empirically shown to be
efficacious); John E. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Procedure Variations,
HEALTH AFF., Summer 1984, at 6, 30-31 (discussing "ambiguous or incomplete
scientific evidence on the value of specific services").
88. This realization has inspired a surge of interest in medical outcomes
research as a way to rationalize clinical decision-making. See Wennberg, supra
note 87, at 31 (noting that physicians have responded favorably to medical outcomes research). The federal government has thrown its support behind the
new outcomes research movement, creating a new agency to oversee and finance such research. See Lynn Wagner, Outcomes Research Gets Budgetary
Blessing, 19 MOD. HEALTHCARE 45 (Nov.-Dec. 1989) (describing financial allocations for outcomes research projects); Charles Marwick, New Health Care Research Agency Reflects Interest in Evaluating Quality, 263 JAMA 929 (1990)
(describing the structure and functions of this new agency). At least in the
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susceptible to non-rational influences, including the blandishments of hospital administrators,8 9 than would be the case were
medical judgment informed by comprehensive empirical data
about clinical outcomes. Abundant evidence that treatments for
many illnesses vary according. to clinical settings 90 underscores
the potential significance of these influences on medical judgment. For most such variations, the current state of medical
knowledge does not support a preference for one option over
others. 9 1
Hospital managers are increasingly able and inclined to exploit this opportunity to influence clinical care. New reimbursement schemes, enhanced administrative authority, and
emerging tort doctrines that hold hospitals liable for staff physicians' negligence now give hospital managers unprecedented
power and incentive to influence physician judgment.
By paying hospitals on the basis of diagnosis, irrespective of
the inpatient services actually ordered by physicians, the 1983
short term, it is unlikely that outcomes research will transform medical decision-making into a largely scientific endeavor. The vast diversity of clinical situations renders the scientific validation of medical practice an enormous
undertaking. This undertaking will be further complicated by the need to exclude many real-life clinical circumstances from a clinical trial in order to define
a sample sufficiently homogenous to generate meaningful results, the difficulty
of developing reliable inclusion criteria for clinical trials, and related uncertainty about whether particular clinical circumstances that arise in practice are
sufficiently like those studied in an experimental trial to warrant predictions
about efficacy based on trial results. See generally William H. Havener et al.,
ClinicalDecision Making: Theory vs. Practice,264 JAMA 1533, 1533-34 (1990)
(raising potential problems and shortcomings of medical outcomes research).
The high cost of clinical trials poses another barrier to the scientific validation
of medical practice.
89. Other non-rational influences include deference to authority (see Eric
Marcus, The Role of Liaison Psychiatry in the ClinicalTrainingof Medical Students: A PsychoanalyticApproach, in CONSULTATION-LIAISON PSYCIATRY: CuRRENT TRENDs ANDNEW PERSPECTIVES 267, 267-84 (Jerry B. Finkel ed. 1983)
(detailing the fear, shame, and intimidation most medical students feel upon
their entry into a clinical setting)), the charismatic influence of senior teachers
and practitioners (see Lester S. King, Listening to a Different Drummer, 261
JAMA 2691 (1989) (illustrating the role of influential contacts in guiding career
choices)), cultural biases such as Americans' favorable attitudes toward high
technology (STANLEY J. REISER, MEDICINE AND THE REIGN OF TECHNOLOGY 22930 (1978) (describing the influential power of technology)), and the promotional
activities of pharmaceutical firms and medical equipment companies.
90. Wennberg, supra note 87, at 9-15.
91. John E. Wennberg, The Paradoxof Appropriate Care, 258 JAMA 2568
(1987) (describing a study which found "little" relationship between variations
in procedure and appropriateness).
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Medicare reimbursement reforms 92 inspired new efforts by hospital officials to reduce physicians' utilization of services. Such
efforts have included the monitoring of physician practice patterns with an eye toward requiring more costly providers to account for their behavior, 93 and the payment of bonuses to staff
physicians who turn annual "profits" for their hospitals by keeping Medicare patients' costs below their diagnosis-based revenues. 94 Some private insurers have adopted similar, diagnosisbased hospital reimbursement schemes, 95 heightening the pressure on hospitals to induce physicians to practice more cheaply.
Medical practice within Health Maintenance Organizations
("HMOs"), which are financed on a capitation basis, 9 6 is even
more susceptible to managerial influence. Staff physicians at
HMO-owned hospitals are typically HMO employees. Many
HMOs pay their physicians in a manner expressly designed to
create financial incentives to order fewer services.9 7 Even when
92. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65,
149-72 (1983) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1305). These reforms changed Medicare
reimbursement from a retrospective, cost-based process to a prospective payment mechanism tied to diagnostic categories. See generally Gilbert S. Omenn
& Douglas A. Conrad, Implications of DRGs for Clinicians,311 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1314 (1984) (explaining the reforms and projecting their affect on the
medical industry).
93. A study of 42 Massachusetts hospitals found that when medical staff
organizations became involved in clinical decision-making, costs were significantly restrained. The medical staff as a group would devise cost standards and
monitor individual practitioners to limit variations. Omenn & Conrad, supra
note 92, at 1315.
94. The Paracelsus Healthcare Corp. of Pasadena, California, which operated a chain of for-profit hospitals, created an incentive program for physicians
that has since been made illegal. Under the old incentive plan, a hospital that
profited on a Medicare or Medicaid patient during any month would give the
attending physician a cut of the profit. New Legislation Forces Paracelsusto
Rework Incentives, HosprrALs, Dec. 5, 1987, at 22. A federal statute enacted in
1986 prohibited hospitals from making incentive payments to physicians to reduce services to Medicare or Medicaid beneficiaries. Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100
Stat. 2003 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a).
95. Janet Firshein, PediatricHospital Group Lobbies for Children'sDRGs,
HosPITALS, Oct. 20, 1986, at 28 (reporting that by 1986, seven Blue Cross plans
had created DRG-based hospital reimbursement schemes).
96. HMOs finance hospital care via fixed annual prepayments from members (individuals or families). HMO managers thus have a powerful incentive
to press physicians to hold down their utilization of hospital services.
97. Typical mechanisms include capitation payments to individual primary
care physicians, bonus payments to individual or groups of physicians who
spend less than the amount budgeted to them for the services they order, and
the withholding of some portion of physicians' anticipated income so that annual adjustments, upward or downward, can be made based on physicians' ordering behavior. Alan L. Hillman et al, HMO Managers' Views On Financial
Incentives and Quality, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1991, at 207, 210.
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management does not openly pay its physicians more for doing
less, 9 8 organizational imperatives usually influence HMO-employed physicians to restrain inpatient spending. 9 9
Hospital managers have moved aggressively during the last
ten years to assert authority over medical decision-making. In
some cases, they have changed hospital bylaws to permit consideration of physicians' clinical spending patterns in determining
medical staff privileges.1 0 0 They have developed "educational"
programs to persuade physicians to weigh hospital financial concerns when making clinical decisions, while attempting to establish and enforce protocols for frugal practice. 10 1 Indeed, some
scholars of health policy have encouraged such developments
and urged that legal barriers to managerial control over medical
discredecision-making be broken down, pointing to physician
02
tion as a primary factor in rising health care costs.'
98. See Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal
Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 431, 483-93

(1988) (discussing individual and group incentives that are likely to withstand
legal scrutiny).

99. See Alain Enthoven & Richard Kronick, A Consumer-Choice Health
Plan for the 1990's: UniversalHealth Insurance in a System Designed to Promote Quality and Economy, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 94, 95-96 (1989) (arguing
that the financial success of HMO's and other prepaid plans will depend in
large measure on their ability to develop collaborative relationships with participating physicians).
100. Average length of stay, charges per patient, and frequency of insurer
refusal to pay for hospital services are among the measures of physician economic performance that hospital administrators have sought to weigh. Leonard
E. Cantrell, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Flick, PhysicianEfficiency and Reimbursement:A
Case Study, HosP. & HEALTH SERVICES ADiVN. 43, 45-46 (1986). Hall, supra
note 98, at 486 n.194 (reporting on use of spending patterns as one of the factors
with which to construct a physicians efficiency index). In some states, hospital
officials may be legally barred from changing medical staff bylaws without obtaining medical staff consent. See, e.g., St. John's Hosp. Medical Staff v. St.
John Regional Medical Ctr., Inc., 245 N.W.2d 472, 475 (S.D. 1976) (bylaws
adopted by medical staff and approved by hospital governing body constitute a
contract, binding both governing body and medical staff). On the other hand,
courts have permitted hospitals to deny staff privileges to physicians based in
part on physicians' economic performance. See, e.g., Knapp v. Palos Community Hosp., 465 N.E.2d 554, 560 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (physician's unusually long
lengths of stay and unusually high hospital costs held relevant to hospital decision to deny staff privileges).
101. Hall, supra note 98, at 480-83.
102. Id. at 488-93. There are two main types of legal constraints on financial incentives created by hospitals for physicians. One focuses on the splitting
of fees between hospitals and referring physicians as an inducement to treat.
The other focuses on fee splitting as an inducement not to treat. The MedicareMedicaid fraud and abuse statute exemplifies the former restriction on referral
fees by providing penalties of up to five years in prison and a maximum $25,000
fine for physicians who receive such fees. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
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Hospital authority over medical decision-making has been
reinforced by a series of recent court decisions holding hospitals
responsible for the clinical actions of independent physicians
with staff privileges. The institutional liability of hospitals has
grown to encompass failure to exercise reasonable care in conferring staff privileges, 10 3 failure to perform periodic review of staff
physicians' competence,1 0 4 and the failure to supervise inpatient
treatment provided by staff physicians. 10 5 In expanding hospital liability along these lines, courts have endorsed a model of
medical decision-making that casts the hospital as an active participant, in contrast to Hansmann's portrayal of the hospital as
a passive supplier of services ordered by physicians.
Cost-conscious third-party payers are also constraining physicians' clinical decision-making. During the last decade, insurance companies and self-insuring employers that pay for care on
a per-service basis have adopted increasingly restrictive utilization review and managed care programs.' 0 6 Third-party payers
now commonly require physicians to obtain approval from utilization reviewers before proceeding with hospital treatment.
Other strategies for controlling hospital costs make use of "gatekeeper" physicians 10 7 or insurance company "case managers"
who possess the authority to approve or deny payment for inpatient stays. An increasing number of insurers are contracting
with physicians, who agree to cooperate with an insurer's
1990 (OBRA 90), 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b) (1992). Another federal statute exemplifies the latter restriction by mandating penalties of up to $2000 against a
hospital that provides incentives to limit services to Medicare or Medicaid patients. OBRA 90, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (1992).
103. Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156, 174 (Wis.
1981) ("[A] hospital owes a duty to its patients to exercise reasonable care in the
selection of its medical staff and in granting specialized privileges.").
104. Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 341-42 (1982) (holding that the hospital owed a duty of care which included periodic review of physicians' competency before reappointments and before renewal of staff
privileges).
105. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253,
261 (111. 1965) ("[]t was the duty of the hospital to supervise the competence of
its staff members.").
106. Elizabeth W. Hoy et al., Change and Growth in Managed Care, HEALTH
AFF., Winter 1991, at 18, 22-23.
107. Gatekeeper physicians are typically primary care clinicians who agree
to abide by an insurer's utilization management program. Insurers employing
this strategy, known as a point-of-service plan, require each subscriber to select
a gate-keeping physician. The gatekeeper controls access to specialized and inpatient care. Whether paid on a capitated or fee-for-service basis, gatekeepers
are given financial incentives to discourage specialty referrals and utilization of
hospital services.
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clinical practice protocols and utilization management program
in exchange for status as "preferred providers." In turn, such
insurers offer patient-subscribers financial incentives to choose
preferred provider physicians. Many third-party payers now
monitor the practice patterns of physicians with an eye toward
persuading high spenders to change their behavior. Some insurers use practice pattern data to exclude high-spending physicians from preferred provider lists.,08
Such management strategies are transforming the conditions of medical practice. Between 1987 and 1990, the portion of
insured employees covered by conventional plans' 0 9 without
utilization management programs dropped from forty-one to five
percent.1 10 During the same period, the percentage of insured
employees covered by conventional plans with utilization management rose from thirty-two to fifty-seven, and the percentage
covered by insurer-administered managed care systems. 1 - rose
from twenty-seven to thirty-eight." 2 The growing influence of
third-party payers on physician judgment does not necessarily
further the interests of hospitals at patients' expense."13 It does,
however, contribute to the erosion of physicians' clinical independence, and can operate to put physicians' interests into
heightened conflict with those of their patients.
In view of medical ignorance about clinical outcomes and
mounting pressure on physicians to compromise the interests of
their patients, Hansmann's belief in physicians' ability to act as
effective purchasing agents for patients appears unwarranted.
The role of hospital managers in decision-making about the use
of clinical services is well established and likely to expand.
Without well-informed purchasing agents committed to acting
as fiduciaries, patients lack the capacity to evaluate clinical op108. Amy Goldstein, Area Doctors Rated by Cost: Blue Cross to Use Data to
Refuse Patients,WASH. POST, July 10, 1992, at Al. Blue Cross and Blue Shield
created a health care network for federal employees in the Washington, D.C.,
area, offering preferred status to physicians with lower costs. Id.
109. Conventional health insurance plans provide cost-based or chargebased payments to hospitals and fee-for-service payments to physicians.
110. Hoy et al., supra note 106, at 19.
111. Insurer-adminitered managed care systems include point-of-service
plans, HMOs, and preferred provider organizations (PPOs).
112. Hoy et al., supra note 106, at 19.
113. Where insurers pay hospitals on a cost or charge-based basis, insurers'
efforts to discourage physicians from using inpatient services operate contrary
to hospitals' interests. Moreover, one might argue that cost-conscious insurers
and patients ex ante the onset of illness have similar interests, since reductions
in insurers' costs redound, at least in part, to the benefit of those who pay insurance premiums (beneficiaries and their employers).
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tions and outcomes. They are therefore unable to impose meaningful market discipline on hospitals. A strong case can thus be
made for the efficiency-enhancing significance of the nonprofit
form as a safeguard against the exploitation of patients by hospital managements.
Whether this efficiency-enhancing effect is large enough to
justify the per se income tax exemption of nonprofit hospitals is
a distinct question lacking an easy answer. Hansmann's capital
subsidy rationale for the exemption requires that efficiency
gains from the non-distribution constraint's real or perceived
protection against exploitation outweigh the advantages classical economics finds inherent in the for-profit form by virtue of its
need to generate income for its owners. Unfortunately, a determinate valuation of the countervailing efficiencies that derive
from the non-distribution constraint and the for-profit form is
impossible.
Production costs, it is true, can be measured in dollar
amounts. 114 Moreover, some aspects of clinical output can be
valued quantitatively-data on the years of life saved by particular diagnostic and treatment measures are a primary example.
However, much about medical care cannot be evaluated objectively. 15 Individual patients' experiences of illness, disability,
and treatment are intensely subjective, highly variable, and not
open to quantitative assessment. 116 Feelings of trust or suspicion engendered by a hospital's organizational form are difficult
114. This presumes a decision not to "count" emotional and moral costs,
such as psychic distress and affronts to important moral commitments, incurred by service providers under alternative organizational forms. Cf. Gumo
CALABREsi, IDEALs, BELIEFS, ATTTrruDs, AND THE LAW 69-86 (1985) (offering arguments against accounting for psychic and moral harms).
115. By objectivity, I do not mean to exclude normative bias, which is built
into the design of every empirical inquiry. Normative selectivity enables systematic empirical study, allowing the willingness, whether open or implicit, to
disregard unframed issues, unasked questions, and unobserved parts of reality.
The weaker form of objectivity I refer to entails the choice of variables that can
be assayed "reliably" (as statisticians use this term), meaning a measurement
with consistent results, deriving from visible facts and shared biases.
116. The Oregon Health Services Commission made an attempt at quantifying attitudes toward different illnesses in 1989. The governor of Oregon appointed a group of 11 health professionals and lay people to prioritize health
services for funding. It used community meetings and a telephone survey of
1001 individuals to assign numerical scores to various sets of health symptoms.
See Harvey D. Kievit et al., Prioritizationof Health Care Services: A Progress
Report by the Oregon Health Services Commission, 151 Anc-Es IN .ENAL
Man. 912, 912-16 (1991) (reporting on Oregon experience with quantitative assessment of people's attitudes toward illnesses and discussing difficulties involved in such assessments).
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to trace and impossible to tally. The efficiencies associated with
the non-distribution constraint thus cannot be assayed directly
and objectively, as long as patients' subjective experience is
deemed to matter.
In view of this practical difficulty, the market behavior of
patients arguably merits some weight in evaluating the efficiencies that derive from the nonprofit form. Contrary to the predictions of some in the early 1980s, 117 nonprofit hospitals continue
to dominate the market for inpatient care. 1 18 This suggests that
patients may perceive value in the non-distribution constraint
as a safeguard against exploitation of their medical ignorance.1 1 9 Whether nonprofit dominance might reflect patients'
preferences is a disputed question. Some skeptics dismiss nonprofit dominance as the product of self-interested physicians'
control over hospital selection, 120 but the image of servile patients who play no part in the choice of a hospital squares poorly
117.

In 1985 Frost & Sullivan, Inc., a New York City-based market research

firm, predicted that for-profit hospitals would increase their 14% market share
of beds to 30% by 1990. This figure represented both acute care general-hospital and specialty-hospital beds, although Frost & Sullivan expected the latter to
multiply more rapidly. Glenn Richards, Study Projects Major Growth for ForProfits, HosPITALS, Nov. 16, 1985, at 29.
118. AMEicAN HosPITAL ASsOCIATION, HosPrrAL STATISTICS 20 (1994-95
ed., 1994) (reporting that in 1993, nonprofit hospitals had 157,827,023 days of
inpatient care while for-profit hospitals had only 18,410,447 days).
119. Hansmann dismisses the continued market dominance of nonprofit
hospitals as a mere historical artifact, irrelevant to the present-day calculus of
efficiency. Hansmann, Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 9, at 867. His skepticism about this market outcome as a metric of efficiency contrasts with his
usual deference to market measures of the nonprofit form's value, especially his
assumption that nonprofit firms' retained earnings and net income reflect past
and present excess demand. See supra text accompanying notes 71-74 (discussing conditions of competitive equilibrium in the health market).
120. Physicians, this argument holds, prefer the nonprofit form because forprofit hospital managers exert firmer control over clinical care, thereby holding
down physicians' fees. By contrast, physicians influence, even control, nonprofit
hospital managements, enjoying greater freedom to pursue higher incomes. AS
a result, these critics claim, the medical profession steers unknowing patients
to nonprofit hospitals, thereby maintaining nonprofit dominance. E.g., Robert
Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARv. L. REv.
1416, 1441-47 (1980) (arguing that income maximizing physicians exploit the
not-for-profit form, benefitting from the increased power in decision-making);
Mark Pauly & Miichael Redisch, The Not-for-Profit Hospital as a Physicians'
Cooperative, 63 Am. EcoN. REV. 87, 87 (1973) (proposing an economic model for
not-for-profit hospitals in which the physician emerges as a traditional income
maximizing agent).
Advocates of this view have produced no evidence to show that for-profits
exercise more control over clinical care than nonprofits, or that physicians who
admit patients to for-profit hospitals charge less than those who send patients
to nonprofits. Their argument carries even less weight today, in light of the
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with the recent emergence of patients as active participants in
other decisions about their care. Moreover, even if patient preferences for the nonprofit form reflect illusory notions about the
protection it affords, these preferences merit a place in the
calculus of efficiency, as long as trust is considered important in
medical care.
b. Are Nonprofit Hospitals Over-Capitalized?
The case for the efficiency advantage of the non-distribution
constraint over the for-profit form in the hospital industry is less
than compelling. Yet it is stronger than Hansmann's work recognizes. Perhaps aware of this, 12 1 Hansmann also argues that
nonprofit hospitals fail his other criterion for exemption-the
ability to employ new capital more productively than what is average for other economic activity.12 2 Although he finds the administration of this criterion too difficult to feasibly
apply in
most cases, he contends that nonprofit hospitals are overcapitalized, and thus unable to achieve high enough productivity from
new investments to justify the capital subsidy that the exemp12 3
tion provides.
In asserting the overcapitalization of the nonprofit hospital
industry, Hansman relies upon congressional pronouncements
to this effect.' 2 4 Critics of the American hospital industry commonly argue that the industry is overbuilt 12 5 and too technology-intensive.' 2 6 They usually attribute this to market failure
mounting pressure on nonprofit hospitals to influence physician decision-making. See supra text accompanying notes 100-105.
121. Hansmann tentatively expressed disbelief in the non-distribution constraint's efficiency advantage. See Hansmann, Rationale, supra note 58, at 89
(suggesting that hospitals "arguably fail" this criterion and that market flaws
resulting from patients' medical ignorance "do not seem important" for most
hospital services).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 60-68.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 66-79.
124. Hansmann, Rationale, supra note 58, at 89 n.102 (citing findings that
inpatient facilities were in excess supply, contained in Senate committee reports accompanying the National Health Planning and Development Act of
1974, and the 1979 amendments to this Act).
125. See, e.g., Dennis B. Dorsey, The Other Health Care Revolution, 110
ARcInVEs PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY MED. 264, 265 (1986) (stating that many
hospital administrators have built physical plants that are "indistinguishable
from luxury hotels"). In 1989, American hospitals operated at an average occupancy level of only 69.6%. The average occupancy rate has remained below 80%
since 1971. AmERmAN HosprrAL Ass'N, supra note 48, at 2.
126. U.S. hospitals often receive criticism for premature adoption of unproven technologies. See, e.g., Charles A. Sanders, Adoption of New Technologies in Hospitals, in CRITIcAL ISSUES IN MEDIcAL TECHNOLOGY 25, 25-36

334

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:299

arising from third-party payment of most inpatient expenses.
Insulated by third-party payers from the actual cost of care, hospital patients purchase clinical services with little regard for
price. This price insensitivity, the classic argument holds, leads
to artificially high demand, often termed "moral hazard."12 7 To
be authentic, demand must reflect the market choices of consumers who themselves bear the cost of the services they
purchase.1 28 Because demand (and willingness to "pay" by passing costs to third parties) is artificially high, hospitals overinvest
relative to what they would do in a well-functioning market
populated by self-paying consumers.
This account privileges the imagined outcome of a hypothetical marketplace populated by uninsured, self-paying consumers.1 29 American mechanisms of third-party payment, however,

are themselves products of the marketplace. They have been
shaped not only by such distorting factors as the personal income tax exemption for employer contributions toward workers'
health insurance, 130 but also by consumers' anxieties and fears.
As the economist Rashi Fein has noted (and as many health
economists fail to acknowledge), people buy more health insur(Barbara J. McNeil & Ernest G. Cravalho eds., 1982) (describing how the unproven technology of gastric freezing was prematurely accepted, used abundantly, then discarded when researchers found it to be ineffective).
127. The term "moral hazard," often used to describe the propensity of thirdparty payment to increase demand, conveys economists' traditionally dim view
of the effects of insulating consumers from purchase prices. The term reflects
concern that consumers, so insulated, might demand services that would not be
provided by a well-functioning market because their true costs outweigh their
benefits.
128. ALAIN ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO
THE SOARING COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE xvi (1980) (stating that since the benefits
of health care are difficult to quantify, the best way to measure the value is to
have the recipients pay for it with their own current funds to insure that the
services are "worth the cost"). See also Gavin Mooney & Alistair McGuire, Economics and Medical Ethics in Health Care:An Economic Viewpoint, in MEDICAL
ETHICS AND EcONOMIcs IN HEALTH CARE 5, 8-9 (1988) (arguing that only the
patient can attach value to a potential improvement in health status).
129. To avoid flagrant unfairness, this account must also presume that each
of these hypothetical, uninsured consumers has enough wealth to afford care
when its benefits outweigh its costs.
130. See Employee Benefit Items: Eliminationof Tax Subsidies for EmployerSponsored Health Insurance Could Reduce Health Care Costs, 8 TAX MGMT.
FIN. PLAN. J. 261, 261 (1992) (blaming the health insurance tax exemption for
medical overspending because it hinders the free-market incentive to limit
costs); see also Martin & Kathleen Feldstein, Cut the Health InsuranceSubsidy,
WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1992, at A27 (arguing that by subsidizing health insurance provided by employers, the current tax system creates an incentive for
individuals to overinsure themselves).
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ance than makes actuarial sense, given their premiums,
31
probabilities of illness, and abilities to bear financial loss.
Whether they obtain coverage independently or through the
workplace, Americans seek not only protection from catastrophic
financial loss, but also freedom from the need to balance their
own or their loved2 ones' health against the cost of care, should
13
illness threaten.
It is thus not obvious that one should take the hypothetical
choices of imaginary uninsured, self-paying customers as the
correct measure of market demand, and hence as the proper basis for determining the optimal level of capital investment. Actual consumers' decisions to insure against the need to put a
dollar value on health should illness strike represent an alternative measure of market demand. "Moral hazard," in other
words, can represent a circumstance chosen by consumers in the
marketplace. From this perspective, the extra demand for medical care induced by third-party payment becomes a product of
market choice rather than market failure, and the added investment generated by this extra demand can be accepted as
appropriate.
One need not adopt this alternative perspective to acknowledge its plausibility. It cannot be dismissed in favor of the market failure perspective without an independent argument to the
effect that the level of medical spending now engendered by
third-party payment is too high.13 3 Absent such an argument,
one can defend the nonprofit hospital industry's overall capitalization as a reflection of consumer preferences.1 3 4 This makes it
131. Fein persuasively argues that the actuarial irrationality of consumers'
health insurance purchases cannot be fully explained by federal tax subsidies.
One must also consider the welfare gains associated with peace of mind. Rashi
Fein, Social and Economic Attitudes Shaping American Health Policy, 58
MLBANK MEMoRuL FUND Q. 349, 378 (1980).
132. This latter concern is distinct from financial risk aversion. Financially
risk-averse individuals place disproportionate weight on the prospect of economic loss, relative to its actual probability. Persons who wish to avoid making
explicit choices between their own or their family's health and their bank balances are averse to open valuation of their own and their loved ones' well-being
in dollar terms. This latter aversion is akin to Guido Calabresi's "cost of costing," the affront to human dignity that flows from explicitly valuing lives in
dollars. GuiDo CALABREsI & PHILn BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHoicEs 32 (1978). It is,
however, more personal, for it entails an affront to one's feelings of self-worth or
love and commitment to others.
133. Such an argument must assert a preference among competing resource
uses: between inpatient care and other medical services, or between health
care more generally and myriad other social needs.
134. Although criticism of American health care spending levels has become
commonplace, consumers continue to show their willingness to sacrifice greatly

336

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:299

problematic to characterize new hospital investment as insufficiently productive (compared to investment in other economic
activity) to warrant tax exemption based on Hansmann's capital
13 5
subsidy rationale.
3.

Medical Need and Per Se Exemption as a Capital Subsidy

Nonprofit hospitals, in short, can make a plausible claim for
exemption as a subsidy to capital formation based on the efficiency advantages of the non-distribution constraint and the
productivity of their capital investments. This presumes, however, that nonprofit hospitals' earnings are an adequate measure of excess health care need (which Hansmann equates with
demand) 13 6 and thus of unmet capital need. 13 7 This presumption glosses over two more serious problems for the capital subsidy rationale.
First, when information problems reduce purchasers' ability
to evaluate the quality of a good or service, the non-distribution
constraint offers imperfect protection against the exploitation of
purchasers' ignorance. Because the non-distribution constraint
applies only to financial emoluments, 138 it gives free rein to nonto maintain insurance that assures their access to costly, state-of-the-art technology. So long as individual Americans are so inclined, medical spending is
likely to rise. Cf.Daniel R. Waldo et al., Health Spending Through 2030: Three
Scenarios, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1991, at 231 (projecting that health care expenditures will reach 26.1% of GNP by the year 2030 if current programs, regulations, and practices continue).
135. See supra notes 60-79 and accompanying text (describing Hansmann's
capital subsidy model).
136. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text (describing Hansmann's
theory that one can equate a nonprofit firm's earnings with demand).
137. See supra 65-68 and accompanying text (describing how the non-distribution constraint handicaps a nonprofit firm's ability to raise capital).
138. This restriction is hardly airtight: nonprofit firms commonly distribute
financial rewards to senior executives in the form of high six-figure salaries and
luxurious perquisites. See Joan Lampert & David Bjork, Annual Survey: Executive Compensation Under Fire, HosprrALS, Sept. 5, 1992, at 24, 27 (citing a
survey putting average compensation for chief administrators in large nonprofit
hospitals at $235,800 annually); see also Elizabeth Hudson, United Way in
Texas Feels Backlash from Scandal,WASH. PosT, Mar. 22, 1992, at A16 (reporting on controversy that erupted when United Way revealed that William
Aramony received an annual salary of $390,000 as president of United Way of
America).
Until recently, the IRS tolerated such salaries, but a shift toward greater
skepticism may be underway. The IRS has begun to compare for-profit and
nonprofit entities with an eye toward whether exempt organizations overcompensate its executives. Among the stratagems that have become the foci of IRS
attention is the division of executive compensation among several subsidiaries
to obscure actual totals. Health Care, GCMs Being Developed by IRS to Resolve
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profit executives and trustees intent on using institutional resources to pursue personal, non-financial ends. In particular,
nonprofit hospital managers are not prevented from pursuing
major capital projects, for example, new construction and technology acquisitions, that yield personal prestige even when the
clinical benefits are dubious. 13 9 Such projects require investment capital, which must come either from retained earnings or,
more typically, new debt made possible by investor confidence in
hospitals' future revenue prospects. 140 This tempts hospital
managements to enhance revenues by exploiting market information problems. To the extent that hospitals do this, their
earnings are a flawed measure of unmet medical and capital
14 1
need.
The importance of this problem is contingent upon where
one locates society's "decision" to proceed with such capital-intensive projects. To avert financial failure, such projects must
win the acceptance of patients and third-party payers. If responsibility is attributed to ambitious hospital executives, and if
purchasers' willingness to underwrite architectural indulgence
and unproven technology is ascribed to poor information, then
income accrued by hospitals bent on expansion seems a flawed
measure of clinical and capital need. 14 2 Alternatively, the willingness of patients and third-party payers to bear the cost of
new construction and novel technologies reflects a popular faith
Open HMO-Related Issues, Sullivan Says, DAILY REP. ExscuriEs, Oct. 20,
1992, at 203.
139. One can characterize this self-serving tendency, sometimes referred to
as the "edifice complex," e.g., Hall & Colombo, supra note 35, at 370, alternatively as wasteful (when discernable clinical benefit is doubtful) or as an economically rational response to the satisfaction that patients and society derive
from advanced medical technology and the delivery of care in physical settings
that evoke the aura of leading-edge science.
140. Private donations are today an insignificant source of capital for non-

profit hospitals.

ANDERSON ET AL.,

supra note 40, at 147-48.

141. To some extent, countervailing (downward) influences on nonprofit hospital earnings cancel this effect. These include high salaries paid to senior executives, see supra note 138 and accompanying text, and the indirect benefits
derived by independent physicians with staff privileges, for whom hospital employees perform myriad clinical and administrative tasks. Pauly & Redisch,
supra note 120, at 88-89.
142. Strictly speaking, additional income generated (by exploiting purchasers' ignorance) to support expansion of service intensity in excess of what purchasers would want in the absence of information problems, is a spurious
indicator of capital need. In practice, agreement regarding how much of a hospital's income can be so described will probably be impossible, since the preferences of hypothetical purchasers not shackled by information problems are
susceptible to conflicting understandings.
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in the healing power (or aura) of technology. 143 Understood this
way, income accrued by hospitals to finance capital expansion
more accurately signals clinical and capital need, since such income reflects purchasers' preferences. 144
A second problem is more troubling. The notion that hospital earnings are an adequate measure of unmet clinical and capital need rests on the premise that patients' willingness and
ability to pay for hospital care accurately reflect the national
need for inpatient care. To the degree that some Americans'
ability to pay for medical care is diminished, this premise is
flawed. The harsh truth that more than 70 million Americans
are either uninsured or poorly insured1 4 5 suggests that this flaw
is profound. These persons have unmet medical needs that they
cannot express as buyers in the marketplace. Hospital earnings
reflect neither these medical needs nor the capital requirements
that these needs create. The capital subsidy rationale thus fails
to take account of the needs of persons who are financially unable to obtain hospital care.
Moreover, the capital subsidy model deals perversely with
the capital needs of hospitals that provide high levels of uncompensated care. This perversity arises because the burden of uncompensated care falls unevenly upon the nonprofit hospital
industry. Facilities located in impoverished inner city and rural
areas care for much higher proportions of non-paying patients
than do other nonprofit hospitals. 146 Hospitals in such areas
thus confront more difficult financial conditions. Their net earnings tend to be lower than those of similarly-sized nonprofit hos143. To some degree, this analysis reinterprets consumer knowledge as consumer preference. Instead of focusing on health care purchasers' "poor information" (and thereby portraying them as pushed along passively by others'
decisions), it emphasizes the cultural and other biases that influence purchasers' information-gathering efforts and ultimate medical decisions. It thereby
casts health care purchasers as active medical choosers.
144. This assumes that the preferences of purchasers (patients and thirdparty payers) are the appropriate measure of medical need. This assumption is
open to challenge. See, e.g., Charles A. Sanders, Technology and the Hospital,
in MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY: THE CuLPRIT BEHIND HEALTH CARE CosTS?, 57, 61,
71-72 (Stuart H. Altman & Robert Blendon eds., 1977) (contending that the
specialized knowledge of physicians and researchers puts them in the best position to decide what new technologies need to be developed). Another problematic assumption is that the aggregate reimbursement behavior of patients and
third-party payers is an appropriate measure of their preferences.
145. Tom Morganthau et al., Health Care:Down to the Brass Tacks, NEwsWEEF, May 17, 1993, at 36, 37.
146. See supra note 52 (describing the disproportionate number of nonpaying patients served by inner-city facilities).
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pitals in prosperous areas. In recent years, many have suffered
large operating losses, and increasing numbers have been forced
47
to shut down.'
Not surprisingly, these facilities are less capable of generating needed capital 48 than are hospitals with lower proportions
of non-paying patients. They are less able to accumulate equity
capital in the form of retained earnings, and they have weaker
borrowing power because ability to borrow is a function of one's
current balance sheet and future revenue prospects. Such hospitals are therefore more in need of a subsidy for capital formation than are hospitals with high earnings and low indigent care
burdens. However, the income tax exemption gives them a
lower capital subsidy than it confers upon high-earning facilities
that are less in need of a subsidy. 14 9 This mismatch between
relative capital need and the distribution of the exemption's
value further undermines the capital subsidy explanation.
In short, the case for the per se exemption as a capital subsidy is ultimately unpersuasive. Its unpersuasiveness derives
primarily from the poor connection between a hospital's income,
which determines the value of its exemption, and a hospital's
clinical and capital needs.
C.

VOLUNTARISM AND VIRTUE

An older justification for the per se exemption rests on a
premise not readily cognizable in economic terms. The nonprofit
form, this argument holds, merits special tax treatment because
voluntarism is inherently virtuous. In contrast to the "public
goods" and capital subsidy rationales, this argument is deontological in spirit. It presents tax exemption not as the price paid
by society to obtain the benefits of voluntarism but instead as
symbolic recognition and affirmation of voluntarism's virtues.' 50
147. See Sam Roberts, Metro Matters: BreathingLife Into a Hospital, N.Y.
Tn s, Dec. 28, 1992, at B3 (describing a number of hospitals that have either
closed or nearly closed in recent years).
148. This discussion assumes a conception of medical need not derived exclusively from the marketplace, a conception that incorporates clinical benefits
and preferences that the market fails to translate into demand, typically because of some consumers' poor medical purchasing power. The discussion applies whether one understands medical need as objectively discernable, as
socially and culturally constructed, or as mere private preference.
149. Hospitals that suffer operating losses benefit from the exemption only
to the extent that they are nevertheless able to sell tax exempt debt instruments and to attract donations.
150. See STEvFNs, supra note 7, at 40-41 (describing state recognition of the
benevolence of voluntaristic trustees and donors).
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These virtues, the argument holds, can be neither produced nor
purchased by the state. They are unique to voluntaristic organizations, and the best that government can do to encourage these
virtues is to reward voluntarism as it occurs.
This argument has its roots in the "scientific charity" movement of the late 19th century.' 1 It has been articulated in varying forms by nonprofit sector advocates since the advent of the
progressive era. 15 2 Since the late 1980s, however, advocates for
the nonprofit hospital sector have pressed this argument with
increasing vigor in response to growing skepticism about the
special tax treatment of nonprofits. Confronted with criticism of
tax subsidies from both the right and the left, nonprofit hospitals have sought to distinguish their missions from those of the
15
for-profit and government-run rivals.
1.

Four Claims to Virtue

As articulated by contemporary advocates, the voluntaristic
virtues of nonprofit health care appear to fall into four categories: community solidarity, regard for religious and social diversity, preservation of personal freedom, and moral elevation of
the healing role. Nonprofit hospitals are said to nurture community solidarity by providing common channels for giving and receiving. Although nonprofits today derive minimal operating
and capital support from charitable sources,' 5 4 the donations
they do receive represent important symbols of their commitment to community. Along with the time contributed by community members, from trustees to candy stripers, this voluntarism
is said to tie us together by symbolically affirming our moral du151. Id. at 19.
152. In permitting nonprofit hospitals to retain their property tax exemptions as they rapidly increased their percentages of paying patients, progressive
era judges endorsed the voluntaristic ideal as an end in itself. The judiciary
presumed that the benevolence of wealthy donors and voluntaristic trustees
was worthy of state recognition, including property-tax exemption, regardless
of how much service the hospitals in question provided to the poor. Id. at 41.
The progressive-era ideology of voluntarism unabashedly proclaimed the importance of private benevolence for sustaining social acceptance of capitalism and
America's uneven distribution of wealth. This paradox-laden ideology proclaimed the wealthy to be society's best stewards of public resources, even as it
celebrated the insulation of hospitals and other voluntary institutions from
"vulgar materialism." Id. at 18, 40.
153. E.g., Seay & Vladeck, supra note 42, at 4-5, 33-34 (advocating tax subsidies and other public support for nonprofit hospitals on the basis of their distinctive "voluntary" mission).
154. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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ties to neighbors. 1 55 Proponents of the voluntaristic virtues insist that the strength of this affirmation is not diminished by the
fact that recipients of this voluntarism tend to be paying patients. On the other hand, they point with pride to the free care
nonprofits do provide as a further expression of the moral significance of community.
The community solidarity ideal has undeniable evocative
appeal. Yet as a virtue intrinsic to nonprofit status, it rings
hollow. The self-satisfaction of the voluntaristic derives more
from the act of giving than from an empathic relationship with
the recipient. 15 6 Such self-satisfaction risks edging over into
self-righteousness and even contempt. 157 To the extent that this
occurs, the relationship between recipient and voluntaristic can
take on an unpleasant aura of disdain
and resentment, corrod58
ing any shared sense of community.1
In addition, the case for nonprofit-hospital care as an affirmation of community solidarity is undermined by the gap between voluntaristic symbolism and coercive reality. In the name
of voluntarism and the pursuit of its virtues, nonprofit hospitals
have benefited from mandatory "contributions" by some of society's least advantaged members. Until the 1940s, the doctrine
of charitable immunity required victims of inpatient negligence
to, in effect, subsidize nonprofit hospitals by sacrificing their tort
claims. 159 Until 1983, the federal government did not require
155. Seay & Vladeck, supra note 42, at 8-9 (arguing for the significance of
voluntarism in the "social fabric of America life").
156. Early 20th century voluntaristic ideology made this psychology explicit,
where the virtues associated with giving accrued principally to the volunteer,
not the recipient. See STEVENS, supra note 7, at 25-26.
157. Cf Seay & Vladeck, supra note 42, at 26 ("A self-righteous indifference
to those being served is a failing to which voluntary institutions may have been
all too prone in the past.").
158. Cf. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES oF JusTIcE 92 (1983) (contending that
private charity "breeds the familiar vices of dependence: deference, passivity,
and humility on the one hand; arrogance on the other").
159. Some courts used implied contract theory to justify the doctrine of charitable immunity. The view was that the patient waived her right to legal action
in exchange for free medical services. See President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 811-27 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (recounting
the history and development of the charitable immunity). By the 1940s, this
premise of voluntary waiver began to be rejected as fictitious. See id. The demise of charitable immunity is now almost complete. E.g., Wilson v. Lee Memorial Hosp., 65 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1953) (abolishing immunity for hospitals in
Florida); Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n., 260 P.2d 765 (Wash.
1953) (abolishing immunity for hospitals in Washington); see also, CIRL.s R.
TREMPER, RECONSIDERING LEGAL LL4BiLIrY AND INSURANCE FoR NONPROFIT OR-
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nonprofit hospitals to enroll their workers in Social Security. 1 60
In addition, until 1974, nonprofit hospital employees, many of
whom were and continue to be among the nation's lowest paid
workers, 16 1 were not able to unionize under the protection of
162
federal law.
Today, these legal immunities have largely disappeared.
However, voluntary contributions no longer support the charity
care that nonprofit hospitals provide; insured and self-paying
patients now supply most of the financing. These patients have
little influencd on hospital prices, which are set sufficiently high
to subsidize the provision of free care. 163 This approach to financing "charity" is not merely compulsory; it is highly regressive. The percentage of personal income spent by insured
Americans in this manner to support free hospital care is much
higher for those with low incomes than for the upper-middle
class and the wealthy.' 6 4 Were this reality behind hospital
charity to become more widely appreciated, dissatisfaction over
its distributive impact could undermine hospital charity's community-affirming symbolic power.
Nonprofit hospitals have a stronger claim to virtue based on
their traditional responsiveness to religious and social diversity.
America's nonprofit hospitals developed largely in response to
the yearnings of myriad groups for medical facilities of their
own. During the 19th and early 20th century, leaders of ethnic,
racial, and religious groups founded hospitals to serve their constituencies' particular cultural and spiritual needs.' 6 5 The importance of spiritual concerns and cultural affinity to patients
GANIZATIONS 187-201 (1989) (summarizing state statutes and court decisions

abolishing the charitable immunity doctrine).
160. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 102, 97 Stat.
65, 70-71 (1983) (codified as amended in various sections of U.S.C. Titles 26 &
42) (declaring Social Security taxes mandatory for nonprofit organizations, except schools, on the same basis as for businesses).
161. See Rhonda Ferrero-Patten, Collective BargainingUnits in the Health
Care Industry: The NLRB and Rulemaking, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 133, 136-37
(1991) (noting low wages and poor working conditions prior to Congress amending the National Labor Relations Act to remove the exemption for nonprofit
hospitals).
162. Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 152 (1988)) (amending National Labor Relations Act to extend its coverage to employees of nonprofit hospitals).
163. See infra text accompanying notes 242-46.
164. See infra text accompanying notes 282-90.
165. See CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, Ti CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RisE OF
AMEICA's HosPITAL SYSTEM 109-11 (1987) (discussing the growth of Catholic
hospitals during 19th century).
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contemplating hospitalization was thereby affirmed and addressed by American voluntarism.' 6 6 In recent decades, however, sectarian hospitals with disparate origins have come to
offer convergent patient care experiences, spurred by clinical
standardization and the homogenization of Americans' expectations about inpatient care. 1 67 Today, the technology-intensive
experience of contemporary hospital treatment does not differ
substantially according to a facility's religious or ethnic origins.
The typical nonprofit hospital now draws an ethnically and religiously heterogeneous patient population. Geography, academic affiliation, and ability to pay have become more important
than ethnic or religious ties as influences on the sorting of patients among hospitals.168 Many sectarian hospitals maintain
their spiritual commitments, 1 6 9 but they provide their patients
with access to clergy of many faiths. The importance of social
and religious particularity is much diminished today in the eyes
of patients.
A more recent rendition of the nonprofit hospital's claim to
virtue builds on the theme of personal freedom. In the late
1970s and throughout the 1980s, some advocates of nonprofit
hospital care sought to recast voluntarism in free enterprise
terms, drawing a dichotomy between state-mandated and entrepreneurial solutions to the problems of health care access and
166. This responsiveness to particularistic concerns had its ugly side, such
as widespread racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination in patient admissions, hiring, and the selection of medical staff. Until the civil rights revolution
of the 1960s, many nonprofit hospitals functioned openly as instruments of
apartheid, banning black patients, physicians, and staff. See id. at 301-02
(describing the practice of segregating patients according to race).
167. The development of nationwide norms of hospital care and administration, as well as the eclipse of religious faith and ethnic affinity by esteem for
medical science as a determinant of patients' expectations, have driven this process. Id. Cf STEVENS, supra note 7, at 26 (noting that ethnic and religious
affiliations with hospitals have weakened to the point that most religious hospitals are distinguishable from nonsectarian ones in name only).
168. Legal barriers also exist to insure that racial and religious affiliation do
not affect access to health care. Racial discrimination by a hospital receiving
funds under any HHS-administered program is prohibited. Sana Loue, Access
to Health Care and the Undocumented Alien, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 271, 279 n.48
(1992) (citing DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVIcEs, GUIDELINES TO
TITLE VI or THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964); see also Title IV of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
169. E.g., Watkins v. Mercy Medical Ctr., 364 F. Supp. 799, 803 (D. Idaho
1973) (holding that Catholic hospitals can refuse to perform abortions or sterilization procedures on basis of religious repugnancy of those medical services),

af'd., 520 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1975).
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cost. 170 This transformed vision of voluntarism fit the increasingly commercial character of the nonprofit hospital industry. It
emphasized the virtue of private inventiveness as an alternative
to state coercion, and it decoupled the voluntaristic ideal from
the ideal of charity. It empowered nonprofit hospitals, often in
coalition with for-profits, to resist such governmental incursions
as the Carter administration's bid to introduce hospital budget
ceilings. In so doing, however, it undermined the nonprofit sector's claim to moral superiority over the for-profit sector, as investor-owned hospitals had at least an equal claim on the
entrepreneurial virtues.
A fourth claim to virtue rests heavily on the viability of the
previous three just discussed. Daniel Wilder contends that the
moral goodness of medical care providers is of central importance because health care occupies such an intimate place in our
lives. 17 1 This importance, Wilder argues, is both intrinsic and
instrumental. Health care providers, in Wilder's view, need to
have high moral standing because persons and institutions to
whom we expose ourselves intimately should be worthy of our
trust.'7 2 Moreover, the moral goodness of clinical caretakers inspires patient trust, which contributes to the efficacy of medical
care. To the degree that nonprofit hospitals achieve the virtues
of community solidarity, sensitivity to social and religious diversity, and preservation of personal freedom, they acquire moral
standing that merits and invites patient trust. And to the extent that they are better able than for-profit hospitals to act on
their patients' behalf in the face of market pressures, their
trustworthiness is enhanced.
Wilder's argument incorporates this intuition, deeply felt by
many clinicians, that the trustworthiness of medical caregivers
plays an important role in the effectiveness of the care they pro170. STEVENS, supra note 7, at 319.
171.

Daniel Wikler, The Virtuous Hospital:Do NonprofitInstitutionsHave a

Distinctive Moral Mission?, in IN SicKNESS AND iN HEALTH: THE MISSION OF
VOLUNTARY HEALTH CARE INSTrrUTIONS 127, 136-138 (J. David Seay & Bruce C.

Vladeck eds., 1988) (arguing that health care is of the "highest personal importance" in an individual's life). Intimate exposure by patients to their doctors
takes many forms. These include revelation of private life details, extraordinary physical exposure, and openness to professional advice regarding highly
personal choices. For a discussion of the concept of intimacy and its relation to
the broader issue of privacy, see generally ANrTA L. ALLEN, UNEASY AcCESS:
PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SocIETY 19 (1988) (describing the nature of inti-

macy as associated with the larger concept of privacy).
172. Wikler, supra note 171, at 136-37 (contending that personal nature of
the patient-provider relationship and professional status of providers require

"virtuous" health care providers).
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vide. 173 His argument is akin to Hansmann's case for the nondistribution constraint as a safeguard against the exploitation of
market information problems. 174 Like the non-distribution constraint, the moral standing of clinical caregivers signals patients
that caregivers are disinclined to exploit patient ignorance and
powerlessness.1 75 This moral signaling is less logical and more
symbolic or connotative in content than the non-distribution
constraint, which Hansmann sees as a rational basis for sometimes preferring the nonprofit form on efficiency grounds.
Wikler's moral signaling relies instead on the tendency of persons, correctly or incorrectly, to form generalized impressions of
goodness and trustworthiness in response to more particular indications of virtue.
Wilder's argument has some force, especially if one believes
that patients' trust in their clinical caretakers enhances the
therapeutic effectiveness of medical care. Yet its force is limited
by the previously discussed weaknesses in the nonprofit hospital's other claims to virtue, since the argument depends heavily
upon them. To the extent that Wikler's argument rests upon the
merits of these claims in themselves, as opposed to patients' subjective impressions of the nonprofit form's virtues, it is undermined by these weaknesses.
Further problems arise from a disconnect between Wikler's
institutional worthiness argument and the daily experience of
patients. This disconnect afflicts both the intrinsic and instrumental wings of the argument. The claim that nonprofit hospitals as institutions are intrinsically worthy of being intimately
trusted by patients does not capture patients' actual experiences
of intimate exposure, which occur in relationship to individual
caregivers. The notion that care-giving persons should possess
sufficient virtue to merit the honor of being intimately trusted is
173. Across cultures and throughout history, normative writings on medical
ethics have instructed physicians to aspire to high standards of virtue, not only
in the clinic but also in their personal lives. Such writings frequently draw
connections between a clinician's reputation for virtue, credibility in patients'
eyes, and effectiveness as a healer. E.g., Lucille F. Newman, History of Medical
Ethics: Primitive Societies, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIoETHIcs 877, 877-78 (Warren. T. Reich ed., 1978) (noting the relevance of belief in a doctor's power to heal
in primitive medicine).
174. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
175. Wilder notes that medical practice at its current stage of development
is ripe with possibilities for exploitation because it cannot be distilled down to
"formulas and schedules that would more naturally be governed by contracts."
Wilder, supra note 171, at 136-37. Rather, clinicians must continually make
individualized, subjective judgments of a sort not susceptible to comprehensive
prior specification.
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intuitively appealing. However, the idea that organizations,as
distinct from individuals, should or could be worthy in this way
is more difficult to grasp. One might plausibly claim that organizational virtue can engender moral worthiness in individual
caregivers, perhaps as a product of institutional culture or incentives. There are reasons for skepticism, however, about
whether the nonprofit form accomplishes this in the hospital industry to a greater degree than does the for-profit organization
form. There are no proven differences in the ways that nonprofit
and for-profit hospitals pay or administer their clinical employees.1 7 6 Nor are there evident differences in their economic or
legal relationships with staff physicians who practice independently.17 7 Nonprofit sector advocates commonly claim that differences exist in staff commitment to community, clinical
excellence, or the needs of the poor, 178 but these claims remain
undemonstrated.
Wikler's instrumental argument 17 9 suffers from the same
failing. To the extent that patient trust is the product of individual staff members' clinical behavior, the nonprofit form's purported advantage in encouraging patient trust would have to
arise from its influence on the character of individual caregivers.
This influence is unproven and open to doubt. On the other
hand, a measure of patient trust may flow from patients' generalized good feelings about an institution. If such feelings are
more closely associated with the nonprofit form than with forprofits, Wikler's instrumental claim may thereby deserve some
weight. However, to the extent that patients' positive feelings
about the nonprofit form are rooted in assumptions about non176. Both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals employ their non-physician staff
(nurses, laboratory technicians, dieticians, housekeepers, administrators, etc.)
on a salaried basis. Both pay certain physicians, most typically pathologists
and radiologists, on a salaried basis. Staff physicians, however, are more typically paid directly by patients and insurers. The principal exception is the
HMO-operated hospital which, in both its nonprofit and for-profit variants, employs physicians on a salaried basis.
177. Although hospital influence on physician decision-making is clearly increasing, see supra text accompanying notes 100-05, for-profits have not appeared more aggressive than nonprofits in this regard. The emerging state
common law governing hospitals' responsibility for the behavior of staff physicians makes no distinction between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. Likewise, neither federal statutes and regulations nor the private accreditation
process administered by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations ("JCAHO") impose different requirements on nonprofits and forprofits with respect to physician-hospital relations.
178. See supra note 32-36 and accompanying text.
179. See Wikler, supra note 171, at 137-38.
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profit hospitals that do not square with institutional realities,
such feelings cannot fairly be said to reflect institutional worthiness or virtue.
2. Virtue and the Exemption
The nonprofit hospital industry's claim to virtue, in short, is
less than compelling. Yet the above analysis does not completely contravene the belief that nonprofit status retains some
moral significance as a symbol of commitment to community and
sensitivity to social and religious diversity. Indeed, the nonprofit form may retain residual potential to evoke patient trust,
although that potential rests on popular assumptions that do
not fully reflect market-driven reality. While the case for the
moral superiority of nonprofit hospitals per se is weak, the nonprofit form may possess some symbolic virtues.
Whether these symbolic virtues justify per se income tax exemption cannot be determined in a purely utilitarian fashion,
via a balancing of benefits and burdens, without doing injustice
to the spirit of the virtue argument. Proponents of the virtue
argument do not contend that the tally of exemption-related
benefits outweighs the exemption's costs; they assert that the
exemption represents a public affirmation of the nonprofit hospital's moral significance.1 s0 The exemption's utilitarian calculus,
in their eyes, is beside the point.
Taking this argument on its own terms, there is good reason
for skepticism. Monetary rewards for virtuous behavior do not
obviously express moral significance. On the contrary, pecuniary rewards arguably undermine appreciation of virtue by inviting the perception that the things rewarded are being purchased
for a price. 1 8 ' Indeed, in the early years of the charitable exemption, leaders of some charitable organizations took the position that tax subsidies encouraged "mercenary motives" and
corroded private benevolence.' 8 2 Moreover, the belief that these
concerns are unfounded and that public money is apt recognition
for privately-occurring virtue encounters a problem of limits. If
180. See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
181. Cf. Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARv.L. REv. 1849,
1905-06 (1987) (contending that things that play an important part in our ideals about personhood cannot be exchanged for money without devaluing these
ideals).
182. National Conference on Charities and Correction, The Divisionof Work
Between Public and Private Charities,inPROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE

ON CHAnmrs AND

supra note 7, at 44.

CORRECTION 128-29 (1901), quoted in STEVENS,
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such virtue by itself merits payment from the public fisc, how
are we to determine whose virtues shall go unrewarded? Surely,
many individuals (and even some for-profit firms) from time to
time display virtues akin to those considered above. Why, then,
restrict public rewards to nonprofit organizations? 8 3 The traditional virtue argument for tax exemption proves too much.
The virtue argument would be rendered more selective and
thus more plausible were it to be recast in a narrower form.
This could be accomplished by reconnecting the argument to its
roots-the goodness of voluntaristic giving-and discarding its
reliance on the symbolism just discussed, which has grown stale
with the commercialization of the nonprofit hospital sector. To
recognize voluntaristic giving, one might limit the availability of
the exemption by tying it to actual donations of time and money.
Instead of exempting all clinical activities, regardless of their
sources of support, the IRS (or Congress) could fashion a fractional exemption, linked to the value of the voluntaristic contributions received by each hospital.- 4 Such an approach would
both preserve the deductibility of private gifts and exempt that
fraction of each hospital's income traceable to the value of monetary gifts and volunteered labor.' 8 5
In its present form, however, the exemption cannot be justified by nonprofit hospitals' claims to virtue. Neither the questionable symbolic virtues reviewed in this section nor current
levels of voluntaristic giving to nonprofit hospitals are persua183. One might answer this question with a rule-utilitarian response, for
example, by arguing that the detection of virtue on a case-by-case basis is difficult and that nonprofit organizations are on the whole more likely to act virtuously than are individuals or for-profit firms. Given the reluctance of the virtue
argument's proponents to make their case in consequentialist terms, this selective use of utilitarian reasoning would seem too clever by half.
184. Cf Hall & Colombo, supra note 35, at 389-411 (proposing an income
tax exemption limited to institutions receiving donations or "donative support,"
and designed to compensate for free rider effect's depression of donative behavior-a proposal derived from Burton Weisbrod's model of charitable giving as
an inadequate response by supramedian demanders to the undersupply of a
heterogeneously-desired public good).
185. The exempt portion of a hospital's net income could be calculated as
follows: EI = NI (VG + VL) / (TR + VG + VL), where El = exempt income, NI =
net income, VG = value of gifts, VL = value of donated labor, and TR = total
revenues (e.g., reimbursement received from insurers, self-paying patients, or
government entities that contract for care for the medically indigent) derived
from the sale of services. The hospital's non-exempt income, or NI - El, would
be taxable. Supporters of this approach would need to work out many further
details which go beyond the scope of this Article. For example, one would require methods to assign a value to voluntaristic labor, and to amortize the value
of capital gifts over many fiscal years.
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sive as a basis for the per se exemption's $4.5 billion annual
claim on the public fisc.' 8 6 Even if one eschews cost-benefit bal-

ancing as unresponsive to the metaphorical force of the virtue
argument, the greater urgency of other claims on our public resources is difficult to resist. The moral force of myriad unmet
social needs and the indecency of burdening future generations
with the cost of today's unprecedented federal fiscal imbalance
render the virtue argument almost embarrassingly weak by
comparison.
III. THE EXEMPTION AS CARROT AND STICK
Over the past 10 years, the per se exemption of nonprofit
hospitals has come under increasing attack from another quarter: public officials unhappy with private hospitals' indigent
care performance. Scholarly portrayals of nonprofit hospitals as
market-driven institutions 8 7 have been paralleled in journalistic accounts of hospital managers' efforts to avoid the provision
of uncompensated care.' 8 8 State and local officials caught between ballooning health care budgets and unsympathetic taxpayers have complained that private hospitals are not bearing
their fair share of the indigent-care burden.1 8 9 Critics of the
186. Multiple methodological problems preclude precise calculation of the
exemption's cost to the Treasury, but this cost was recently estimated as follows: $1.7 billion in tax exempt debt, $1.6 billion in income tax, and $1.2 billion
in deductible charitable contributions (totaling $4.5 billion). John Copeland &
Gabriel Rudney, Federal Tax Subsidies for Not-For-ProfitHospitals, 46 TAX
NOTEs 1559, 1565 (1990). According to Copeland and Rudney, nonprofit hospitals accrue another $4.0 billion in benefits from their combined state and local
tax exemptions (sales tax, $2.4 billion; property tax, $1.2 billion; income tax,
$0.4 billion). Id.
187. See, e.g., STEVENS, supra note 7, at 335-40 (identifying the businessoriented nature of nonprofit hospitals in the late twentieth century); Robert C.

Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1416, 1417, 1473 (1980) (finding that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals do not

differ relevantly in practice).
188. See, e.g., Melinda Beck, State of Emergency:HospitalsAre Seeking Radical Solutions to Ease Walk-in Patient Overload, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 14, 1991, at
52 (reporting that emergency rooms, which are often the only health care available to indigents, are diverting people to community service centers); Tom Paulson, Hospitals Face Day of Reckoning on Care of Poor, SATTLE PosTINTELUGENCER, July 10, 1991, at Al; see also Michael Specter, Emergency

Rooms in Crisis; Overcrowding Said to Peril U.S. Health Care, WASH. POST,
Sept. 14, 1989, at Al (describing overcrowded emergency rooms, and reasons

for the shortage of beds and physicians).
189. E.g., Hospital Charity Careand Tax Exempt Status, Restoring the Commitment and Fairness,Hearings Before the Select Comm. on Aging, House of
Representatives, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 84-86, 88-90 (1990) (statement of Mary
0. Boyle, Commissioner, Cuyahoga County, Ohio, and Chair, National Ass'n of
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non-profit sector's indigent care performance identify three main
failings: insufficient provision of charity care to the uninsured
poor; 190 reluctance to treat Medicaid patients, for whom reimbursement rates typically fail to cover costs; 19 1 and inadequate
provision of health promotion, clinical screening, education, and
other outreach services to needy communities. These perceived
failings, along with taxpayer antagonism toward new public
spending, have inspired a search for legal means to make private hospitals do more for the poor without billing the
19 2
government.
Counties Taxation and Finance Subcommittee on Bonds, Representing the National Ass'n of Counties) (testifying to the concern shared by county governments, who are largely left with the burden of providing indigent health care,
that private hospitals are not providing a significant share of charity care).
190. See, e.g., GAO Report, supra note 51, at 34-35 (revealing private hospital's reluctance to expand poor people's access to care).
191. In 1989, according to American Hospital Association data, the Medicaid
program's payments to hospitals covered 78% of Medicaid patients' costs nationwide. Medicaid payments equaled or exceeded patients' costs in only three
states (Arizona, Maryland, and New Jersey). PROsPECTRVE PAYMENT AssEssMENT COMMISSION, OpTIoNAL HosPrrAL PAYMENT RATES: CONGRESsIoNAL RE-

(1992) [hereinafter OPTIONAL RATES].
192. An earlier effort along these lines was notably unsuccessful. From the
late 1940s through the early 1970s, the federally-funded Hill-Burton program
awarded construction funds to nonprofit hospitals. See Hill-Burton Act, 42
U.S.C. § 291 (1988) (establishing federally-financed, state-administered program of grants, loans, and loan guarantees for hospital construction and modernization). Hospitals receiving aid under the Hill-Burton program were
obliged to give assurances that they would provide a "reasonable volume of [uncompensated] services to persons unable to pay." 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e)(2) (1988).
Facilities that received Hill-Burton funds, however, often failed to honor
these assurances. Lawrence A. Schneider, Comment, Provision of Free Medical
Services by Hill-BurtonHospitals,8 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 351, 351-52 (1973).
In 1974, after three decades of minimal enforcement, Congress authorized the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (now the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS)) to promulgate regulations specifying Hill-Burton
recipients' free and below-cost care obligations in financial terms. S. REP. No.
1285, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C-.AN. 7842, 7900.
The Department issued detailed regulations in 1979. 42 C.F.R. § 124.503(a)
(1994). These requirements were upheld in American Hosp. Ass'n v.
Schweiker, 721 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1983) (rejecting statutory and constitutional
challenges brought by nonprofit hospitals' trade association), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 958 (1984). The 1979 regulations also require recipients to inform patients
about the availability of uncompensated care, 42 C.F.R. § 124.504 (1994), oblige
the HHS to investigate allegations of non-compliance by hospitals, id.
§ 124.511, and permit parties to seek judicial enforcement of free-care obligations if their complaints to the H-S are dismissed or not pursued, id.
§ 124.511(a)(4).
Efforts by advocates of the poor to make effective use of these regulations
have not been successful. Despite ample evidence that violations remain widespread, e.g., Kevin O'Neill, Site Visits at21 Hill-Burton FacilitiesReveal ExtenPORT 81
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Proposals to make tax exemption contingent upon the provision of free care and/or community services have been a product
of this search. 19 3 State officials pioneered this strategy during
the mid- and late-1980s,1 94 challenging the property tax exemptions of nonprofit hospitals in state courts on the ground of failure to provide charity care.1 95 Supported by a growing body of
sive Noncompliance, 16

CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 404, 404 (1982), agency
enforcement activity has been minimal. See Michael A. Dowell, Hill-Burton:
The Unfulfilled Promise, 12 J. HEALTH POL. PoL'y & L. 153, 153 (1987) (gener-

ally discussing Hill-Burton's impact upon poor people's access to care). See also
National Health Law Program, Hill-Burton, New Developments (June 1987)
(only 38 decisions by H-S in uncompensated care cases in 1986; hospitals won
in 34 of these).
193. Another outgrowth of this effort has been the proliferation of federal
and state legislation requiring private hospitals (both nonprofit and for-profit)
with emergency departments to provide emergency care regardless of a patient's financial resources. At the federal level, the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA 85") requires hospitals receiving
payments under the Medicare program to treat any patient who has an "emergency medical condition which has not been stabilized" or is in "active labor,"
unless the patient (or a legally responsible person acting on that patient's behalf) has requested a transfer to another facility, or qualified hospital personnel
have certified that a proposed transfer's medical benefits outweigh its risks. 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1) (1988). An early assessment of COBRA 85 concluded that
potential complainants' lack of knowledge about their rights and the paltry enforcement efforts by HHS were severely limiting the law's effect. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GoVERNMENT OPERATIONS, EQUAL ACcESS TO HEALTH CARE: PATIENT
DUMPING, H.R. REP. No. 531, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1988). Many state legislatures also enacted laws in the 1980s barring the involuntary transfer or discharge of emergency patients because of their inability to pay. Geraldine
Dallek & Judith Waxman, 'Patient Dumping": A Crisis in Emergency Medical
Carefor the Indigent, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1413, 1414-15 (1986).
194. John D. Colombo & Mark A. Hall, The Future of Tax Exemption for
Nonprofit Hospitalsand OtherHealth Care Providers,2 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 1-2
(1992).
195. Id. In the pioneering case, Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care,
Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 266-67 (Utah 1985), Utah's Supreme Court upheld the revocation of a nonprofit hospital chain's property-tax exemption. The court found
that the state's charitable exemption was contingent on compliance with the
requirement of an "element of gift" to the community. Id. at 272. The hospital's
provision of only a negligible volume of uncompensated care did not meet this
requirement. Id. at 274 (free and below-cost care provided by Intermountain
during the period at issue was valued at less than one percent of the chain's
gross revenues). Most courts have been more solicitous of nonprofit hospitals
that provide minimal charity care. See, e.g., Medical Ctr. Hosp. ofVt. v. City of
Burlington, 566 A.2d 1352, 1355-57 (Vt. 1989) (nonprofit hospital not required
to prove that it offered a certain amount of uncompensated care, but rather only
that it had a policy of accepting all patients, regardless of their ability to pay);
Downtown Hosp. Ass'n v. Tennessee State Bd. of Equalization, 760 S.W.2d 954,
955 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) (hospitals' charitable exemption not contingent upon
provision of uncompensated services).
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commentary urging such linkage, 19 6 Congress began in the
1990s to consider legislation that would condition the federal exemption upon compliance with minimum charity care and/or
community benefit requirements. 1 97 Provisions to this effect
were also part of several of the comprehensive health reform
plans considered by Congress in 1994.198
I contend below that a credible case can be made for an exemption contingent upon the provision of minimum levels of free
and under-compensated care to patients who cannot pay. This
case gained strength in 1994 from the failure of President Clinton's campaign for universal health insurance. Indeed, I suggest
that the case for such a conditional exemption can be made more
powerfully (and pragmatically) than advocates for such an exemption have done thus far. Even so, I conclude that arguments
for refashioning the exemption along such lines are ultimately
unpersuasive on efficiency, equity, and other moral grounds.
I also argue that the case for conditioning the exemption
upon community benefit criteria is unpersuasive. Not only does
it encounter most of the same difficulties that beset use of the
exemption as a tool to elicit free and undercompensated care, it
poses distinct problems of definition and measurement, tied to
the fact that market-driven activity itself yields social benefits.

A.

CONDITIONING THE EXEMPTION UPON CHARITY CARE

Since 1990, Congress has been weighing proposals to condition tax exemption of non-profit hospitals upon their provision of
196. See, e.g., Simpson & Strum, supra note 4, at 633-34 (arguing for stricter
tax exemption standards that would ensure that charitable hospitals provide
sufficient community benefit); Thomas R. Barker, Re-examining the 501(c)(3)
Exemption of Hospitals as Charitable Organizations, 48 TAX NOTES 339, 350
(1990) (recommending that hospitals be required to devote 'more than an insubstantial portion of their revenues to the provision of charity care" in order to
qualify for tax exemption); GAO Report, supra note 51, at 44-45 (suggesting
that the criteria for tax exemption could be "directly linked to a certain level of
(1) care provided to Medicaid patients, (2) free care provided to the poor, or (3)
efforts to improve the health status of underserved portions of the community").
Cf. INSTrrUTE OF MEDICINE COMMITTEE ON IMPLICATIONS OF FoR-PRoFrr ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE, FOR-PROFrr ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 193-94 (Brad-

ford H. Gray ed., National Academy Press 1986) (urging "reasonable
relationship" between a nonprofit hospital's volume of charitable contributions
plus savings from tax exemption and its supply of "uncompensated service" in
the form of charity care, institutionally-subsidized educational and research
programs, and "unprofitable standby capacity").
197.
198.

See infra note 199.
See infra note 200.
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minimum levels of charity care. 19 9 In 1991, two such bills were
introduced in the House of Representatives, 20 0 prompting alarm
among nonprofit hospital managers. 20 1 Neither bill reached the
House floor, and by 1992, argument over the contours of the
charitable exemption had become subsumed within the larger
debate over health care financing reform. None of the health
care reform proposals considered by Congress in 1993 contained
language conditioning the exemption upon the provision of free
and undercompensated care. In the summer of 1994, however,
the House Ways and Means Committee reported a bill that set
forth a variety of free and undercompensated care obligations,

including the requirement that an entity claiming exemption
provide "medically necessary" care "to the extent of its financial
20 2
ability" without discrimination based upon ability to pay.
This language survived in the subsequent, ultimately unsuccessful, bill introduced by House Majority Leader Richard

Gephardt.

20 3

199. Terese Hudson, Congress MeasuresHospitals'Community Benefit, HosPITALS,

Oct. 20, 1990, at 34.

200. Both bills would have conditioned nonprofit hospitals' federal tax exemption upon their compliance with minimum uncompensated care and community service standards. See generally The Charity Care and Hospital TaxExempt Status Reform Act of 1991, H.R. 790, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)
[hereinafter Roybal 91] (introduced by Rep. Roybal and amending the "Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 to require tax exempt hospitals to provide sufficient charity care and community benefits"); H.R. 1374, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)
[hereinafter Donnelly 91] (introduced by Rep. Donnelly and amending the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 "to clarify the requirement that hospitals provide
certain emergency medical care in order to be exempt from income tax, and for
other purposes"). For a comprehensive discussion of these proposals, see Colombo & Hall, supra note 194, at 10-28. The Bush administration opposed the
minimum uncompensated care and community benefit standards contained in
these bills. Treasury Statement, supra note 32, at 35-36.
201. See Edward A. Kazemek & Michael W. Peregrine, Guarding Tax-Exempt Status Amid Legislative Scrutiny, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., May 1991, at
16 (warning that "momentum is gathering behind legislation restricting Federal tax exemption" and urging health care managers to mobilize against such
proposals).
202. H.R. REP. No. 601, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 314 (1994). The
House Ways and Means Committee bill also decreed that exempt health care
organizations must not discriminate on the basis of ability to pay when providing emergency services. Id. In addition, the bill required exempt organizations
not operating in "medically underserved" areas to provide "outreach" services at
below-cost prices to persons otherwise unable to afford them. Id. The bill also
obliged exempt organizations not to discriminate against patients insured by
government-sponsored programs such as Medicaid (which tends to compensate
hospitals for less than their average costs). Id.
203. 140 CONG. REc. H7509, H7706 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1994) (Amendment to
House Bill 3600 offered by Rep. Gephardt). The Senate Finance Committee re-
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1. Hospitals as Charities
Beyond the political attractiveness of free-care requirements as a way to shift medical costs away from publicly-funded
institutions, 20 4 the imagery of charity has moral force. Private
benevolence has always held a special place in American life,
both as an affirmation of human connectedness within communities and as a less intrusive alternative to state intervention on
behalf of the needy.20 5 More recently, the "reprivatization" of
America's social obligations has come into vogue 20 6 as a response to public sector rigidities. Even among those who hold
that government has a duty to ensure universal access to health
care, private charity is commonly regarded as a desirable element in national efforts to achieve such access. 20 7 That tax exemption should reward private benevolence in response to the
ported a bill that preserved some of the House Ways and Means Committee's
requirements. S. 2351, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). Notably absent were the
Ways and Means provisions requiring hospitals to provide medical care "to the
extent of [their] financial ability," and requiring those organizations not operating in "medically underserved" areas to provide "outreach" services to the poor
at below-cost. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. Senator Mitchell
incorporated the Finance Committee's approach to the exemption into his subsequent, ill-fated health care reform proposal. S. 2357, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994).
204. Local governments finance health care for the poor through a variety of
mechanisms, including contractual arrangements with private hospitals and
the operation of public facilities. Cost-shifting aspirations sometimes surface
openly in debate over proposals to condition the exemption upon provision of
free care. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. 42, E896 (statement of Rep. Donnelly) (urging free care requirements as a means of reducing the indigent care burden on
public hospitals). Medicaid is the primary medical cost burden for state governments. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, economic recession, federallymandated expansions in Medicaid eligibility, and continuing health care cost
inflation combined to force large annual increases in states' Medicaid expenditures. John K. Iglehart, The American Health Care System: Medicaid, 328 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 896, 898 (1993). After rising at an annual rate of about 10%
through most of the 1980s, nationwide Medicaid spending jumped 13% in 1989,
19% in 1990, 32% in 1991, and an estimated 31% in 1992. Id. Between 1988
and 1992, Medicaid spending grew at an annual compound rate of 21.6%. Id. at
897. In 1992, Medicaid cost the states an estimated $48.6 billion. Id. at 898.
205. See STEVENS, supra note 28, at 41 (affirming the historical importance
of private benevolence).
206. Uwe E. Reinhardt, UncompensatedHospital Care, in UNCOMPENSATED
HOSPITAL CARE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILrrIES 1, 4 (Frank A. Sloan et al. eds.,
1986).
207. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING

AcCEss TO HEALTH CARE 29-30 (1983) (characterizing charity as "important"
but inadequate part of society's efforts to achieve universal access to care)
[hereinafter SECURING ACCESS].
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medical needs of the poor has seemed a natural corollary for
some, whether as a matter of financial quid pro quo or symbolic
moral recognition.
Yet the imagery of charity rings hollow when it comes to
hospitals. Most obviously, the free care provided by nonprofit
hospitals is financed largely by private payers, 20 8 who are
hardly inspired by donative benevolence. The system of crosssubsidies that supports each hospital's free and below-cost care
is a product of that hospital's differential market power over its
various payers. Payers that control large proportions of patients
within a geographical area are able to exercise monopsony
power in their dealings with hospitals. 20 9 As a result, the rates
they pay often fall below their patients' average costs. 2 10 To the
extent that these monopsonistic buyers fail to cover their average costs, hospitals must (at least in the short run)2 1 1 look to
other payers to make up the difference. Hospitals do so by extracting much higher payments for the same services from insurers with little or no market power. Such payers tolerate
discriminatory pricing to preserve their access to hospitals over
which they lack monopsony power. To the extent that subscribers value this access, such insurers are under market pressure
to maintain it. Not only do these payers thereby subsidize
monopsonistic private purchasers, they also finance both free

208. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
209. Among private payers, managed-care providers (Health Maintenance
Organizations and Preferred Provider Organizations) are generally in the best
position to wield such market power, by channeling their subscribers to a small
number of hospitals. In 1990, according to the Health Insurance Association of
America, 59% of conventional insurers paid undiscounted charges to hospitals,
while only 15% of HMOs and 21% of PPOs did the same. OPrIoNAL RATES,
supra note 191, at 41. Among the discounting methods commonly employed by
managed-care organizations are diagnosis-based and capitated payment, perdiem rates, and discounted charge-per-service payment. Id.
210. See Charles E. Phelps, Cross-Subsidiesand Charge-Shiftingin American Hospitals, in UNCOMPENSATED HosPrrAL CARE: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 108, 110, 116-19 (Frank A. Sloan et al. eds., 1986) (discussing relationships
between payers' monopsony power and cross-subsidization of common costs).
211. Over the longer term, hospitals might in theory choose to reduce their
average costs (e.g., by cutting back on new capital investment) or decline to
renew their contracts with hard-bargaining monopsonists. Either course carries risks; reduced investment could diminish a hospital's attractiveness to patients (and to referring physicians), while refusal to contract with large
purchasers shrinks a hospital's pool of potential patients.
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care and services to patients covered
by below-cost public pay2 13
ers 2 12 (Medicaid and Medicare).
In 1992, private payers paid an estimated 38% more on average than their patients' costs, up from 25% in 1989.214 By
1992, cross-subsidies from private payers were financing 14% of
American hospital costs, up from 11% in 1989.215 Uncompensated care, defined as bad debt plus charity care less government subsidies to the poor, accounted for $11.9 billion of this
cost-shift in 1992.216 Another $22.7 billion in cross-subsidies
financed the difference between costs and payments for
government-sponsored programs, principally Medicare and
2 17
Medicaid.
This remarkable pattern of cost-shifting is the product of
the evolving balance of market power between hospitals and private payers. It is not the product of payers' donative inclinations. On the contrary, payers are under increasing pressure to
resist rising hospital costs while maintaining the confidence of
subscribers. Many payers are attempting to do so by concentrating their buying power on small numbers of hospitals so as to
avoid getting hit by large cost-shifts (and, if possible, to negotiate prices that fall below their own patients' average costs). Indeed, much of the appeal of managed-care systems derives from
their ability to target the purchasing power of large groups to-

212. See Phelps, supra note 210, at 112-16 (discussing hospital managers'
decisions about the use of excess revenues generated through the exercise of
monopoly power).
213. In 1990, according to American Hospital Association data, Medicaid
and Medicare reimbursed hospitals at aggregate rates of 80.1% and 89.6% of
costs, respectively. OpTIoNA RATES, supra note 191, at 40.
214. LEwN-ICF, CosT-SmrNG: A SELF-LnTNG PROCESS 12 (1992) [hereinafter CosT-SHIFTING] (reporting estimates based on American Hospital Ass'n
data). Payment-to-cost ratios vary remarkably, by payer and by employer
group. According to a 1990 survey of 58 large employers (with more than 4000
employees), employer-specific payment-to-cost ratios ranged from 89% to 168%.
Aggregated by decile, employers' payment-to-cost ratios varied from 116% to
153%. OPTIoNAL RATES, supra note 191, at 91.

215.

COsT-SHIFrING,

supra note 214, at 8.

216. The comparable figure in 1989 was $8.9 billion. Id. In 1990, according
to American Hospital Association data, operating subsidies from state and local
governments covered only 21% of hospitals' uncompensated-care costs. OpTIONAL RATES, supra note 191, at 40.
217. COST-SHIFrNG, supra note 214, at 7-8. Of this $22.7 billion, $14.4 billion covered the Medicare program's cost-to-payment gap and $8.1 billion made
up the difference for Medicaid patients. These figures were up from $6.9 billion
and $4.2 billion respectively in 1989. Id.
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ward a relatively small number of providers. 2 18 The growing
ability of health care payers to resist cost-shifting is causing concern among hospital managers, who, with good reason, fear a
breakdown in their ability to finance undercompensated care.2 19

From the perspective of payers, however, cross-subsidization
constitutes a tax imposed on those 2buyers
with the least bar20
gaining power to cover others' costs.

One might object to this benevolence-denying portrayal of
the financing of free and undercompensated care on the ground
that it disregards the role of hospitals as charitable actors. Even
if excessive payments are extracted from health care buyers by
means of raw market power, do not hospitals merit recognition
as charitable agents for choosing to spend this money on free
and undercompensated services? Characterizing cross-subsidies
as akin to taxes, which are collected and disbursed by entities
acting as governments,22 1 denies the charitable agency of hospitals. Focusing on payers, as opposed to hospitals, as putative
charitable agents, is inconsistent with the public's inclination to
view myriad other commercial sellers as charitable actors. Gifts
from corporations are widely considered charitable 2 22 even
though the wealth that finances them was accumulated in the
marketplace. Indeed, all philanthropic actors derive their funding from paying customers, from whom charitable donors are
never more than a few transactions removed. 22 3 Any charity218. See supra note 209 (noting that managed-care providers often wield
monopsony power over hospitals).
219.

COST-SHIFTING, supra note 214, at 15.

220. See Clark, supra note 187, at 1468 (criticizing hospital cross-subsidies
as taxes levied by private entities acting as non-democratic
"Ininigovernments").
221. See, e.g., COST-SHIFTING, supra note 214, at 14 (concluding that hospitals serve as "quasi-governmental bodies, imposing taxes on one set of patients
to cover the unreimbursed costs of another").
222. See, e.g., Marian Courtney, A Company with a Social Conscience, N.Y.
TuIrms, Mar. 6, 1994, § 13, at 1 (reporting on the Ben & Jerry's Ice Cream Co.
charitable giving program); Lisa Kug, Bagels Build Better World, S.F. Ex mINER, Dec. 23, 1994, at B (reporting on bakery chain's annual community grant
program); Pamela Matin, 350 Make Room for Ronald, L.A. Tms, Jan. 21,
1988, § 9, at 4 (reporting favorably on Ronald McDonald Children's Charities
which provide low-cost, temporary housing for families of seriously ill children).
223. Like hospitals, most institutional and individual donors contribute
funds which are acquired directly from goods, services, or capital markets.
Other charitable givers are more than one transaction removed from paying
customers. Examples include the United Way and other entities that receive
gifts from firms and individuals (who themselves accumulate resources via
market transactions) and in turn disburse these aggregated contributions to

other charitable recipients.
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giving entity that derives its revenues from commercial transactions and exercises market power can be alternatively characterized as an entity that imposes "taxes" on some people to finance
expenditures by others.
As regards hospitals and other commercial entities that give
away goods and services, the choice between these two portrayals is a matter of perspective. What seems charitable to such a
donor (and its recipients) may seem more like a commandeering
of private resources from the veiwpoint of the purchasers who
foot the donor's bills. There may be no Archimedean answer to
this question of characterization, but the enormity of hospital
cost-shifting weighs in favor of the hospital payers' perspective.
Were large numbers of privately-insured Americans to realize
that their insurers "reimburse" the hospital industry for at least
a third more than their patients' costs, 2 24 the "tax" metaphor

would probably appeal more widely than the imagery of "charity." It seems unlikely that a similarly large mark-up by the local power company would be widely seen in terms of charity,
even if the proceeds went toward service for the poor. Quite
apart from the question of whether such a cross-subsidy is socially desirable, its cost to individual rate-payers seems more
evocative of state coercion than of private generosity. 2 25
2.

Beyond the Imagery of Charity: Cross-Subsidies,
Compassion, and the Politics of Disingenuity

Although portraying nonprofit hospitals as charities may be
unpersuasive, a case may arguably be made for refashioning the
charitable exemption to elicit additional free and below-cost care
for the poor. Such a case would need to build on the merits of
additional cross-subsidization from private payers to finance
224. See supra text accompanying notes 124-34 (describing the overcapitalization of the nonprofit hospital industry as third-party payers shield ignorant
patients from the actual costs of medical services).
225. How we choose between the narratives of "charity" and "taxation" in
characterizing such arrangements is a question beyond the scope of this Article.
I suspect this question may be tied to the more general problem of distinguishing between autonomous and coerced actions. I suggest that such distinctions
rest on poorly visible judgments about the desirability of the arrangements at
issue. See M. Gregg Bloche, Clinical Counselingand the Problemof AutonomyNegating Influence, in HIV, AIDS, AND CHILDBEARING: PUBLIC POLICY, PRIVATE

LIVEs (R.Faden & N. Kass eds., forthcoming 1996). One might, for example, be
more inclined to see a particular cost-shift as a "tax" (evoking the imagery of
state coercion) if it seems normatively troubling for some reason, and more inclined to view it as "charity" (suggesting the imagery of autonomous action) if it
seems desirable.
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free and below-cost care. An argument to this effect can be made
more plausibly than the advocates for conditioning tax exemp-

22 6
I will
tion upon the provision of free care have done thus far.

begin with the fiscal basis for this line of argument-the link
between conditioning exemption on free and below-cost care and
hospital decision-making about the levels of such care.
a.

ConditionalExemption and Cross-SubsidizationLevels

Like any tax benefit, exemption of nonprofit hospitals constitutes a subsidy for some set of activities. Proponents of a freecare requirement often represent the exemption as payment
from the state for care given to the poor. Whatever the merits of
this portrayal as justification for a tax subsidy, the exemption
presently functions in practice as a more general subsidy for
hospital services. For a generation or more, hospital managers,
pricing, investment, and other financial matters have taken account of a federal tax subsidy that is available virtually without
restriction. 227 If the exemption suddenly became contingent
upon the provision of free or undercompensated care, further
cross-subsidization from private payers would be necessary to
finance any additionalsuch services necessary for a hospital to
qualify. In theory, one might argue, such services would arguably be paid for by the hospital's tax subsidy, which would no
longer be available to management as an unrestricted windfall.
But the immediate, practical effect of a shift from per se exemption to free and below-cost care requirements
would be an addi2 28
tional levy on many private payers.
The impact of such a shift would undoubtedly be felt unevenly by differently-situated nonprofit hospitals and payers.
Minimum free and below-cost care requirements imposed by
Congress or the IRS would almost certainly fall below the levels
of such care that some hospitals now provide. Urban facilities in
226. A parallel argument for conditioning exemption on the provision of
community services is discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 31227.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 22-31.
228. Although I characterize this levy here as an additional cost-shift to private payers, one might alternatively conceptualize it as a price increase that is
appropriately reflective of the elimination of an across-the-board hospital subsidy, with the implementation of a targeted subsidy in its place. Seen in these
latter terms, such a price increase would pay for hospital costs incurred by subscribers, as opposed to additional free or undercompensated care. On the other
hand, the fact that the current exemption's across-the-board subsidy is part of
the settled expectations of health care payers and hospital managers makes the
former characterization more realistic.
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neighborhoods with large numbers of uninsured and Medicaid
patients are paradigmatic examples. These and other high-volume free and below-cost care providers could retain their exemptions without increasing their spending on such care. Private
payers, in turn, would not be asked by these facilities to bear
of the conversion from per se
larger cost-shifts as a consequence
22 9
to conditional exemption.
On the other hand, hospitals that provide insufficient free
and below-cost care to qualify for conditional exemption would
confront a choice between increasing their levels of such care
and losing their exemptions. 2 30 Facilities that derive greater financial value from exemption than the cost of the additional free
and below-cost care needed to qualify could be expected to increase their provision of such services to attain the necessary
volume. The additional cost-shift entailed would, in turn, devolve upon private payers. 23 1 Even if the financial benefit a hospital derives from exemption is less than the cost of the
additional free and below-cost care needed to qualify, fear of the
reputation consequences of the loss of exemption could prompt
hospital managers to provide the additional services, and shift
the cost to private payers. 23 2 Some hospitals, however, may nevertheless forego exemption rather than offer the added free and
below-cost care necessary to maintain it. Such hospitals would
most likely try to pass the cost of the loss of exemption to their
payers, pushing health insurance prices slightly upwards.
b.

The PoliticalFailureof Explicit Subsidies

For the reasons just discussed, the case for conditional exemption as a tool for eliciting free and below-cost care for the
229. Indeed, if neighboring hospitals were to respond to this conversion by
increasing their provision of free or below-cost care, see infra text accompanying
notes 245-48, some high-volume providers might experience decreases in community demand for such care. In turn, some payers would be able to see reductions in the cost-shifting burdens that these providers ask them to bear.
230. This assumes an IRS enforcement program effective enough to dissuade hospital managers from betting on the prospect that failure to comply
with free and below-cost care requirements would go undetected.
231. This assumes that the hospitals involved possess enough market power
to impose this additional cost-shift.
232. The additional cross-subsidization engendered by free and below-cost
care requirements would burden different private payers to disparate degrees,
due to varying balances of market power between hospitals and payers. Analysis of the distribution of this additional cost-shift across differently-situated
payers is beyond the scope of this Article. In general, however, one might expect this burden to fall disproportionately upon those payers with the least monopsony power.
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poor is inseparable from the merits of cross-subsidization. Absent the imagery of charity, an argument can be made for promoting cross-subsidization from private payers to finance care
for the poor. Intrinsic in this argument is the persisting tension
between American's commitment to market mechanisms for allocating resources to health care, and its aspirations for egalitarian distributional results. 2 33 This tension was dramatically
illustrated in 1994, when aspirations for universal coverage
foundered on congressional reluctance to require either individ234
ual taxpayers or employers to pay for broadened coverage.
Such reluctance has repeatedly stymied efforts to institute explicit, direct public financing for medical care for the currently
uninsured. 23 5 Put delicately, public dissatisfaction with medical
market outcomes has thus far been insufficient to bring about
the mandatory redistribution needed to greatly expand access to
health care. Put less charitably, Americans of means have
proven unwilling to ante up in support of their professed desire
for universal health care. Yet, even outspoken opponents of expanded public financing blanche at the prospect of people going
23 6
without care for serious medical problems.
233. In Uwe Reinhardt's words, "[a] uniquely American phenomenon... has
been the endeavor to extract an egalitariandistribution of health care from a
delivery system still firmly grounded in libertarian principles." Reinhardt,
supra note 206, at 8 (emphasis added). As Reinhardt observes, the pursuit of
more or less egalitarian distributions of health care is common among industrialized nations, but the American degree of insistence upon free market principles is singular. Id. at 8-9.
234. Virtually all participants in the 1994 congressional debate acknowledged that some such requirement was necessary to achieve universal coverage.
Opponents of the so-called "employer mandate" took the position that universal
coverage was not an affordable goal. Adam Clymer et al., The Health Care Debate: What Went Wrong? How the Health Care CampaignCollapsed-ASpecial
Report, N.Y. Timms, Aug. 29, 1994, at Al.
235. Even Medicaid, the nation's largest-scale public initiative to pay for
medical services for the poor, evinces this reluctance. State and federal legislators have failed to fund the program sufficiently to cover its beneficiaries' full
inpatient costs, see supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text, and its eligibility requirements exclude more than half of all Americans with incomes below
the poverty line. Iglehart, supra note 204, at 897. See also Issues Relating to
Managed Care:Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Health of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 388 (1994) (statement of Diane
Rowland, Executive Director, Kaiser Commission on the Future of Medicaid).
236. See CNN News: Rep. Newt GingrichTakes Calls on Health CareReform
(CNN television broadcast, Aug. 8, 1994) (transcript on file with CNN) (thenHouse Minority Whip Newt Gingrich declared, "Ifyou're in a car wreck or if
you're in a situation where you have a sudden crisis, even if you don't have
insurance, we've got to make sure you get health care."); Larry King Live: Bob
Dole to Pres. Clinton-'Let'sMake a Deal' (CNN television broadcast, Sept. 23,
1993) (transcript on file with CNN) (then-Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole
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Cross-subsidization from private payers is easy to criticize
as a disingenuous product of the failure of our political will. As
Uwe Reinhardt explained, this type of "cost-shifting... has actually served as a fig leaf of sorts over a rather unseemly part of
the American body politic: its inability thus far to fold every
American into at least a catastrophic health insurance program."2 3 7 This unseemliness is, perhaps, more prominent in the
wake of our most recent failure in 1994. Nevertheless, the politics of conferring public subsidies is commonly obscurantist,
even deceptive. Political visibility may further the ends of efficiency and moral honesty, but at the same time, invite resistance from those asked to bear the cost.2 38 This resistance is

especially likely to hinder efforts to provide subsidies for services typically distributed via the marketplace. To a large degree,
the ingenuity of would-be architects of health care financing reform in the 1990s has focused on the crafting of institutional ar2 39
rangements that steer artfully around such resistance.
Notably, within the past few years, there has been a widening
disconnect between the academic search for efficiency or justice
for a reform
in institutional design and the political quest
2 40
scheme able to garner a legislative majority.
insisted, "You may not be covered, but you can't be turned away. You can always get care in America."). Put in economic terms, the perception of universal
access to essential, crisis-oriented medical care produces such large positive externalities (good feelings derived from the belief that all in need of such care are
receiving it, see supra note 49) that virtually no public official can afford to
openly countenance the denial of such care.
237. Reinhardt, supra note 206, at 4.
238. See Peter H. Schuck, DesigningHospitalCare Subsidiesfor the Poor,in
UNCOMPENSATED HosPrrAL CARE: RIGHTs AND RESPONSIBILITIES 72, 80-83
(Frank A. Sloan et al. eds., 1986) (contending that the politically preferable
level of visibility for subsidies is a function of public officials' need to obtain
credit from beneficiaries while disarming or even misleading cost-bearers).
239. The chief architects of President Clinton's health reform plan acknowledge that this political challenge inspired their design. See, e.g., Paul Starr &
Walter A. Zelman, A Bridge to Compromise: Competition Under a Budget,
HEALTH AFFAIRS, Supplement 1993, at 7, 8-9 (asserting that their model, based
on managed competition, purchasing cooperatives and employers, and global
budgeting, offers a decent compromise that would achieve both the federal goal
of universal coverage and the public's goal of cost containment); see also Lawrence D. Brown, Who Shall Pay? Politics, Money, and Health Care Reform,
HEALTH AFF., Spring (II) 1994, at 175 (evaluating Clinton proposal and other
financing strategies with respect to their ability to survive antagonism from
those who would pay).
240. The political fate ofAlain Enthoven's "managed competition" model is a
case in point. Although managed competition has recently been the centerpiece
of numerous proposals for achieving universal coverage and cost control, no bill
introduced in Congress has contained all of the elements that Enthoven argues
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The PoliticalAllure of Cross-Subsidization

Unlike mandatory employer contributions, the single-payer
model, or other financing schemes advocated by proponents of
universal coverage, the shifting of costs to private payers has
proven politically viable on a national scale. 2 41 Several factors
have favored this success, and they invite expanded reliance
upon cross-subsidization in the future. Indeed, cross-subsidization is in some ways uniquely suited to the American tension
between commitment to market mechanisms and aspirations for
a measure of equity, or at least basic decency, in the distribution
of medical care.
Most obviously, cost-shifting occurs apart from public budgets. Government actions that mandate or encourage cost-shifting-requiring hospitals to provide emergency care to patients
who are unable to pay, or by conditioning tax exemption upon
the provision of free services-risk incurring the wrath of hostile taxpayers. To be sure, there are limits to the political viability of such off-the-budget levies on private resources. For
example, the so-called "employer mandate," which appealed 2to
42
its advocates as an off-the-books alternative to a payroll tax,

foundered politically in the face of resistance from those being
asked to pay. 24 3 By contrast, the consumers and employers who
are essential to making managed competition work. In particular, mandatory
employer contributions and an end to the tax deductibility of insurance premiums in excess of those charged for some benchmark plan, have encountered
prohibitive opposition. Enthoven & Kronick, supra note 99, at 95-96.
Another example is a concession by two of the principal designers of President Clinton's proposal that their scheme may make more political than econonic sense:
Reform will meet fewer objections if its financing resembles the current, employer-based system of insurance premiums. A tax-based system might well be simpler, more efficient, and more progressive.
Nevertheless, converting to a tax-financed system inevitably would
create large numbers of losers as well as winners-and the losers
would be affluent and powerful. Health care reform is hard enough
without stirring upper-income taxpayers to opposition.
Starr & Zelman, supra note 239, at 16.
241. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text (discussing Hill-Burton
free-care regulations, federal and state emergency-care requirements, and charity requirements for state property tax exemption).
242. See generally Adam Clymer, Health Legislation Advances in Senate,
N.Y. TomsS, June 10, 1994, at Al (reporting on three alternative health care
reform proposals for employer mandates).
243. See, e.g., Michael Weisskopf, Delivering a Defeat for Total Coverage,
WASH. POST, July 19, 1994, at A6 (describing Rep. John D. Dingell's, chairman
of the U.S. House Energy and Commerce Committee, battle for employer mandates and the reasons for defeat). The consensus expectation among economists
is that firms burdened by an employer mandate will, in general, pass the man-
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bear the burden of hospital cost-shifting have been remarkably
tolerant of the public policies that promote it. This tolerance, in
the face of an aggregate cost-shift that now exceeds one third of
the expenses incurred by privately-insured patients, 2 44 is consistent with the tenet that political resistance to redistribution is
path-dependent. All else being equal, redistributive channels
that run through the government seem more likely to inspire
opposition than pathways cut exclusively through private
terrain.
The political success of cost-shifting is also a function of its
stealth qualities as a redistributive channel though the private
domain. In contrast to the employer mandate, which compels a
highly visible flow of resources from businesses to their workers,2 4 5 policies that encourage cost-shifting engender more submerged and diffuse movements of resources, mediated by
market transactions and much-decentralized administrative
discretion. The flow of monies in excess of average cost from
consumers (and employers) to hospitals that provide free or below-cost care is a product of bargaining between each hospital
and its payers. Multiple contests of market power between
seller and buyer thus determine the resources available to each
hospital for free and undercompensated services. Not only does
the marketplace thereby diffuse responsibility for the collection
of cross-subsidy dollars, it also lends a patina of capitalist legitimacy to hospital cost-shifting, arising from the premise that
those who accumulate wealth through the market have broad
discretion to dispose of that wealth as they see fit. The fact that
hospital managers' exercise of this discretion is much decentralized, in comparison with resource allocation done on a national
date's cost to employees in the form of lower wages. If pre-mandate wages are
sufficiently high so that passing the mandate's costs to employees reduces
wages to levels above the federal minimum wage, then such a mandate will not
(ignoring adjustment effects) increase employer costs. By contrast, if pre-mandate wages are so close to the federal minimum that a complete pass-through of
the mandate's cost to workers would reduce wages to levels below the federal
minimum, then such a mandate will increase employer costs (since a complete
pass-through would be illegal). See generally Vic Ocstrowidzki, Opposition
Grows to Employer-paid Health Care Plan:Critics Denounce Programas New
Tax, a Job Destroyer, SAN FaANcisco EXAMIER, Dec. 20, 1993, at A9 (discussing the reasons for the increasing unpopularity of the employer mandate
proposal).
244. See supra text accompanying note 224.
245. Less easily traceable (for non-economists, at least) is the "backflow" of
resources-from employees to firms in the form of compensatory wage reductions-created by employer mandates. See supra note 243 (explaining how an
employer mandate will affect wage levels).
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or regional level, adds to the political appeal of cross-subsidization as a low-profile redistributive technique. Decisions about
the use of payments in excess of average cost-such as whether
to spend on free care, community outreach services, or new technology-are made2 46
by administrators at each hospital, not some
central authority.
The low visibility of hospital cost-shifting may suffice to explain the political viability of public policies that encourage or
require it.247 However, health care payers are hardly ignorant
about cost-shifting. Increasingly on the lookout for ways to contain costs, insurance companies and large, self-insuring employers are eyeing cross-subsidization as an avoidable expense.
Indeed, concern about cost-shifting has spurred some employers
and insurers toward support for federal measures to achieve
universal health coverage. 248 Though perhaps poorly visible to
the general public (and to small employers without expertise in
health care markets), cross-subsidization is now well-known to
24 9
sophisticated health care buyers.
Yet this knowledge has not thus far translated into vigorous
political resistance by private payers toward existing public policies that promote cost-shifting. An explanation probably lies in
the collective action problems that beset such resistance. The
individuals and firms that bear the burden of cost-shifting are
distributed across diverse realms of American economic life.
Unlike individuals or firms in a particular trade or industry, the
nation's health care payers do not belong to one or a few organizations designed to marshall collective resources in the pursuit
of shared political ends. 2 50 This lack of cohesion translates into
246. Some multi-hospital systems may represent exceptions, at least to the
extent that system-wide managers constrain the discretion of each facility's administrators in this sphere.
247. Peter Schuck presents the concealment of subsidies as a critical requisite for their political success, particularly when subsidies are channeled to the
poor. Schuck interprets much about the design of subsidies in terms of how
alternative collection and distribution mechanisms obscure subsidy creation
and growth. Schuck, supra note 238, at 77-78, 80-83.
248. Kip Sullivan, Employers Should JoinDebate Over Health Care Reform,
MnuomApoLs STAR TRB., Mar. 8,

1993, at D3.

249. See RICHAnD J. ARNouLD E'. AL, CoMPAETrrIvE APPROACHES TO HEALTH
CARE REFORM 1-6 (1993) (explaining how health care providers often cut crosssubsidy charges to compete for large purchasers).
250. To an increasing degree, large employers represent an exception to the
lack of political cohesion among health care payers. Organizations such as the
National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
have begun to articulate the cost-related concerns of large health care payers.
These concerns add a new ingredient to the previously provider- and insurer-
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political weakness in the face of support for cost-shifting by such
25 1
better-organized interests as state and local governments.
Moreover, the availability of market alternatives reduces
individual payers' incentives toward creating new structures for
collective political resistance to cost-shifting. A health care
buyer can reduce or avoid its cost-shifting burden by taking contractual steps to obtain the monopsonistic upper hand in its
dealings with hospitals. Large employers can accomplish this
with relative ease, by concentrating their buying power on a
small number of hospitals. 2 52 Smaller employers can achieve
similar results by enrolling their work forces in health plans
that themselves exercise monopsony power in their dealings
with hospitals. The creation of privately-operated and government-sponsored health care purchasing cooperatives in some localities 25 3 offers even the smallest of businesses (as well as
individual consumers) contractual access to the buying power of
dominated politics of health care financing. See, e.g., Spencer Rich & Ann
Devroy, Chamberof Commerce Opposes Clinton Health Plan,WASH. POST, Feb.
4, 1994, at A12 (reporting on refusals by the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the Business Roundtable to support the Clinton Administration's health reform plan because of fears about its
cost).
251. Similar collective-action problems discourage opposition by health care
payers against vigorous government enforcement of policies that promote costshifting. With respect to the formulation of enforcement policy, the problems
are virtually the same. With respect to the exercise of case-by-case discretion
by enforcement agencies, a different problem arises: individual payers (especially the largest and most powerful among them) tend to have relatively small
stakes in the outcome of an enforcement action against a particular hospital,
since payers generally cover services at multiple hospitals and since hospitals
typically derive revenues from multiple payers.
252. They can contain costs in a number of ways, for example, by creating
their own managed health plans or by channeling employees into existing plans
that use only a small number of hospitals.
253. By the summer of 1994, 20 states had enacted legislation promoting
publicly or privately-sponsored health care purchasing cooperatives. Milt
Freudenheim, The Health Care Debate:PurchasingCooperatives, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 17, 1994, at A16. See also Lynn Wagner, GAO Study ContradictsBuying
Cooperatives'Image in Reform Debate, MODERN HEALTHcARE, June 27, 1994, at
84 (discussing a General Accounting Office study of private and public purchasing cooperatives in California, Florida, Minnesota, Ohio, Washington, and Wisconsin); Mike Oliver, Cooperative Makes Way for Alliance: Florida Health
Access Weans off Clients, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 4, 1994, at B13 (discussing
Florida's move from a state-wide government-sponsored purchasing cooperative
to voluntary and privately-organized purchasing alliances as part of the state's
health care reform); Rogers Worthington, Health Pools Lure Insurance Agents,
CHICAGO TRm., Mar. 31, 1994, at N4 (discussing a private purchasing alliance
created by insurance agents in Iowa, and the skepticism surrounding its ability
to promote consumer interests and health care reform).
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large plans. As a rule, it would appear, individual health care
buyers can more efficiently resist cost-shifting via non-cooperative, contractual mechanisms than through collective political
opposition.
Cross-subsidization, in short, has singular political advantages as a means of financing care for the uninsured absent the
political support needed to create explicit subsidies. Its viability
is a function of its low visibility, the collective action problems
that dampen payers' political resistance, and the existence of
market mechanisms by which individual payers can non-cooperatively escape cost-shifts. To be sure, there are limits to the
political (and financial) potential of cost-shifting. The larger the
number of payers that contract out of cost-shifts, the smaller the
remaining pool that can be tapped to sustain cross-subsidization. As this pool shrinks-and the burden of cross-subsidization falls on a smaller number of insureds and/or their
employers-the per capita cost of a given cross-subsidy level
rises, prompting more payers to seek contractual means of escaping from cost-shifting, and dissuading some employers and
consumers from buying insurance. 254 This combination of the
contractual avoidance of cross-subsidy burdens and the decisions by employers and consumers to exit the insurance market
places a ceiling on the sustainable volume of cost-shifting.
Moreover, as advocates for expanded health care access begin to
realize the role that cost-shifting plays in a purchaser's decision
to exit the insurance market, policies that promote cross-subsidization could lose some of their current favor among such
advocates.
For the time being, however, the political appeal of public
policies that rely on cross-subsidization to finance care for the
uninsured appears undiminished. Indeed, in 1994, an ideologically diverse group of Congress members embraced a strategy
for expanding access to insurance that would achieve federal
budget neutrality through a large new cost-shift. This strategy
entailed the financing of federal subsidies for the purchase of
private insurance through reductions in the growth of Medicare

254. Cost-shifting, in other words, feeds the process of adverse selection.
The resulting increase in the number of uninsured persons, and consequently,
in the demand for uncompensated care, raises the specter of a destructive, positive-feedback loop. See infra notes 259-81 and accompanying text (arguing that

cross-subsidization fails to promote the needs of the "beneficiaries" and, instead, distorts the health care and insurance markets).
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payments to doctors and hospitals. 2 5 5 Unless accompanied by a
corresponding decrease in the overall growth of medical spending (an unlikely prospect absent cost control measures more vigorous than those seriously considered in 1994), such reductions
would result in further cost-shifting from the Medicare program
to private payers. The additional cost-shifting that would result
from conditioning the charitable exemption upon provision of
free or below-cost care may be modest by comparison.
3.

The Case Against Cross-Subsidization

The tolerance for disingenuity that inheres in the case for
cross-subsidization is troublesome to the degree that honesty
about allocative choices counts as a virtue. If one accords honesty trump value over other concerns about such choices, 2 56 then
policies that promote cross-subsidization as a means of financing
free and below-cost care are categorically objectionable. If disingenuity does not rate trump significance-if honesty counts,
but not for everything 2 57 -then an adequate evaluation of policies that promote cross-subsidization requires fuller exploration
of its virtues and vices. 25 8 The solitary virtue of such policies is
that just discussed-the superior political viability of cross-sub255. See Robert Pear, The Health Care Debate: The Compromise-Diverse
Elements Criticize 7Miainstream'Senate Plan; N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1994, at A30
(reporting on bipartisan Senate "mainstream" proposal for Medicare and Medicaid cutbacks to finance federal subsidies for people with incomes below 200% of
the poverty line).
256. Kant takes the position that truth-telling is an absolute duty and that
deception can never be justified by consequentialist arguments. Immanuel
Kant, On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives, in ABSOLUTIsM AND
rrs CONSEQUENTAMIST CRITICS 15, 15-19 (Joram Graf Haber ed., 1994); see also
CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 7-29 (1978) (categorically rejecting consequentialist justifications for lying). Even some utilitarian theorists contend
that all forms of deception should be proscribed. E.g., J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD
WILLIAMS, UTILITARiAmISM: FOR AND AGAiNST 82-104 (1973).

257. An expanding literature illuminates the pervasiveness of indirection
and subterfuge in the making of allocative decisions. See generally CAIABRESI
& BoBrrr, supra note 137. Were one to categorically oppose all allocative
mechanisms that employ a measure of disingenuity to circumvent opposition,
one would eventually have to reject much of the redistributive activity engaged
in by the modern welfare state. The discussion that follows stems from the
premise that such absolute insistence on explicitness and directness is, however
noble, unrealistic, and that one should weigh disingenuity with other costs and
benefits when evaluating subsidy schemes.
258. Such is the case whether one adopts a utilitarian (e.g., economic) model
for the evaluation of such policies or whether one pursues some other evaluative approach. Peter Schuck suggests, to the contrary, that economic approaches to the evaluation of subsidy mechanisms must accord trump
significance to explicitness. He argues:
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sidization by comparison with more visible (and public) redistributive mechanisms. Arrayed against this virtue, I shall
argue, are multiple disadvantages. These are understandable in
terms of economic efficiency, distributive justice, and moral and
political symbolism.
a. Mismatches Between Resources and Needs
Most obviously, policies that promote cross-subsidization
are poorly targeted to the health needs of those whom advocates
of these policies wish to aid. This problem takes several forms,
most of which have been addressed elsewhere, and therefore I
will discuss them only briefly here. Policies that encourage or
require hospitals to provide free or below-cost services will not
tend to foster comprehensive health programs for recipients of
such services. Absent regulations that specify in detail how
cross-subsidy dollars must be spent, hospitals will likely provide
the same services they offer to their paying customers. Inpatient care and some outpatient specialty programs are likely to
dominate this service mix. Primary care and prevention-oriented programs are likely to be underprovided, relative to inpatient and specialty care. 25 9 This suboptimal allocation of crosssubsidy funds is the predictable product of institutional inertia:
hospitals have no incentive to stray from their usual patterns of
production when employing resources garnered via cross-subsidization. 2 60 In theory, it might be possible to promote a more
efficient mix of free and below-cost services by regulating in detail how cross-subsidies are spent.2 6 1 But in practice, such regu[Rational social choice (ifthere be such a thing) requires that society
decide how it wishes to allocate socially controlled resources in light of
its collective purposes .... To the extent that a society conceals from
itself both what it wishes to do and what it in fact does, it relinquishes

policy control and increases the risk of botching the job.
Schuck, supra note 238, at 81. To the economist, however, this hazard is something finite, and to be weighed along with other costs and benefits. These may
include the moral price of public disingenuity and the countervailing risk that
insistence on explicitness might, via interest group dynamics explainable in
terms of public choice theory, yield allocations that do not optimally serve collective purposes (assuming that such purposes are discernible).
259. See Schuck, supra note 238, at 77 ("If free hospital care is available but
free ambulatory care is not, for example, the patient will tend to use the former
even if the latter would be superior and less costly.").
260. Since comparable cross-subsidization does not occur for primary care
and preventative services provided in non-hospital settings, the beneficiaries of
hospital cross-subsidization will tend to have less access to these services than
to inpatient and other hospital-based services.
261. Alternatively, one might give hospitals an incentive to pursue an optimal mix of free and below-cost services by requiring them to assume compre-
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lation is likely to be
exceedingly difficult to fashion 26 2 and
2 63
expensive to enforce.
Policies that promote cross-subsidization will also tend to be
poorly targeted to the communities most in need of financial
support to make medical care accessible. A hospital's capacity to
shift costs to private payers will, in general, be inversely related
to its proportion of uninsured (and underinsured) patients. Facilities that serve very small numbers of these patients, such as
community hospitals in wealthy areas, will on average have an
easier time generating revenues in excess of average cost from
private payers. 26 4 Meanwhile, the hospitals most in need of
such a surplus-those that treat large numbers of the uninsured
and underinsured-will tend to have the most difficulty accumulating it since they have proportionately fewer privatelyinsured patients to draw upon. 26 5 This variation in hospitals'
cost-shifting needs and capacities creates the potential for a destructive, positive feedback dynamic. Facilities with high indigent care burdens may be unable to offer private payers the
hensive responsibility for the health needs of any recipient of free or below-cost
care.
262. A regulator would have to conduct a comprehensive, normatively-laden
examination of the health needs of each hospital's potential cross-subsidy beneficiaries and of ways in which each facility's resources might be marshaled to
meet these needs. The inevitably controversial results of this inquiry would
then need to be translated into detailed directives to each hospital. Such comprehensive health service planning via regulatory authority has proven both
politically and legally problematic in the U.S. See, e.g., Matt Clark, HealthCare Battle, NEwSWEEK, May 28, 1979, at 28 (describing how diverse interest
groups successfully defeated a tough 1978 proposed regulatory bill which would
have set strict cost increase ceilings as a prerequisite to receiving certain federal fimds); CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CASE LAW & PoLIcY 923-24, 937-66
(Foundation Press, Inc. 1988) (explaining how regulations requiring a certificate of need before constructing an acute-care facility can result in complex and
paralytic litigation).
These problems would be compounded if this process were conducted by
regulators unschooled in the substance and politics of health care delivery, such
as I.R.S. officials charged with administering a charitable exemption made conditional on the provision of free or below-cost care.
263. Enforcement would require extensive monitoring of the range of services provided to cross-subsidy beneficiaries. Moreover, imposing of sanctions on
violators would be politically costly for regulators because of the power and
prestige of the hospital industry.
264. Exceptions might arise when hospitals that are heavily dependent on
one or a few large payers agree because of competitive pressures to discount
rates for these payers to levels below average cost.
265. Some jurisdictions have attempted to adjust for this problem by creating uncompensated care pools into which health insurers and self-insured employers must pay via hospital reimbursement surcharges, and from which
hospitals with high uncompensated care burdens can obtain disbursements.
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same discounts given by facilities with low indigent care burdens. In turn, private payers may avoid high indigent care hospitals, further reducing the ability of these facilities' managers
to shift uncompensated care costs.
The problem of poor targeting also appears at a "micro"
level, within individual hospitals. Free and undercompensated
care requirements impose few constraints on hospital managers'
discretion to determine who benefits from cross-subsidies. As
Peter Schuck notes, managers obligated to provide a given dollar
amount of uncompensated care may be indifferent to the distributional and efficiency implications of decisions about who receives this benefit. 2 66 Indeed, managers focused on the fiscal
well-being of their institutions can be expected to employ crosssubsidies to serve institutional needs at the expense of the financially (and medically) neediest.
They might, for example, engage in only cursory assessment
of free-care claimants' financial status so as to minimize the administrative cost of compliance with uncompensated care obligations. 2 67 Along similar lines, they might represent uncollected
accounts receivable from non-indigent patients as charity care to
satisfy free care obligations. 268 They might also engage in lessthan-zealous debt collection from patients able to pay,2 69 figuring that this will lend plausibility to the characterization of bad
debt as charity care. To the extent that a hospital can count
financially able patients' unpaid debts toward its free and undercompensated care obligations, it can reduce the amount of
free care it must provide to the medically indigent. In addition,
hospitals that contract for below-average-cost reimbursement
from some private payers might try to claim services provided
under these contracts as undercompensated care for purposes of
compliance with below-cost care obligations.2 7 0 The common effect of these administrative and accounting practices is to chan266. Schuck, supra note 238, at 77-78 (noting that the hospital need only
provide enough uncompensated care to fulfill its obligation).
267. I assume here, as is generally the case for existing uncompensated care
obligations, that such administrative costs cannot be counted toward fulfillment
of these obligations.
268. Hospital administrators will be facilitated by a lack of consensus
among accounting professionals and others regarding the distinction between
charity care and uncharitable bad debt. This absence of agreement reflects
both the difficulties involved in determining patients' ability to pay and the
wide variation in hospital practices with respect to this distinction.
269. Such debts arise largely from unpaid deductibles and coinsurance.
270. See generally Sullivan & Moore, supra note 11 (describing the problematic nature of free care requirements for tax-exempt hospitals).
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nel cross-subsidies away from the financially neediest and
toward beneficiaries with weaker claims, such as financiallyable deadbeats, patients who misrepresent their economic status, and subscribers to insurance plans that obtain below-average-cost prices. These practices (and this effect) are rendered
less visible, and thus more politically viable, by the decentralized nature of the administrative discretion they entail-a factor that contributes greatly to the political feasibility of cross27
subsidization as a redistributive technique. '
All of these mismatch problems could be ameliorated by
public subsidies fashioned to confer health care purchasing
power upon needy beneficiaries 2 72 or upon agents with some incentive to attend to the welfare (however conceived) of such beneficiaries. 2 73 But even if resources for such subsidies were
secured via cost-shifting to private payers, 27 4 program designers
would still confront tasks of explicit, politically visible definition,
including specification of eligibility standards and allocation of
clinical decision-making authority among consumers, providers,
and other parties. To the extent that the political viability of
hospital-based cross-subsidization depends on avoidance of such
visibility, the above-discussed mismatch problems may be part
of the price of feasibility.
b. Insurance Market Distortions
Policies that promote cross-subsidization influence the functioning of insurance markets in a manner that leads to adverse
271. See supra text accompanying notes 241-46.
272. Such subsidies could take the form of vouchers for the purchase of insurance (or clinical services), tax credits or deductions for medical spending (including the purchase of insurance), or public provision of health services at
below-market prices.
273. This paternalistic approach to administering subsidies might take the
form of grants to case managers for the purchase of comprehensive care for
beneficiaries or enrollment of beneficiaries in managed care plans. One might
object to such paternalism and to the risk of managers' less than perfect performance as fiduciaries for their patients, but despite the power of these objections, such managers would seem more likely to pursue some plausible
conception of patient well-being than the hospital officials who administer costshifting.
274. This could be accomplished in various ways. One option is a tax on
hospitals to support public subsidies for the medically indigent. See, e.g., Donald Baker, Hospital in Alexandria Cited in Wilder's Bid for Tax: Mismanagement Causing Costs to Soar, Government Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1992, at
B5 (reporting on Virginia's 1992 proposal to levy a tax on hospitals to cover part
of the state contribution to its Medicaid obligations). In theory, hospitals themselves could administer such subsidies by, for example, issuing vouchers to beneficiaries for the purchase of health services.
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efficiency and distributional consequences. Cross-subsidization
burdens private payers in roughly inverse proportion to their
ability to exercise monopsony power when bargaining with hospitals. Indeed, payers with sufficient market power may actually benefit from cross-subsidization by negotiating
reimbursement rates below hospitals' average costs for some
services. 27 5 So long as a hospital retains enough monopoly
power over other payers to burden them with more than their
share of its fixed costs, it may be profitable for it to accept belowaverage-cost payments from a monopsonistic payer. To generate
net surplus for the hospital, such payments need only cover the
incremental (or variable) costs incurred on behalf of patients insured by this payer, plus any portion of these patients' fixed
costs that cannot be shifted to payers with less market power.
Health plans without the monopsony power necessary to
strike such deals will pay above-average-cost prices. Paymentto-cost ratios vary enormously among payers, 2 76 a fact that
probably reflects large differences in payers' market power ver-

275. See Milt Freudenheim, To Economists, Managed Care Is No Cure-All,
N.Y. Tnms, Sept. 6, 1994, § A, at 1, 17 (reporting that some managed care organizations pay hospitals less than half of what traditional insurers pay for many
procedures and that managed care organizations sometimes obtain across-theboard, below-cost rates from hospitals). The calculation of average costs for
hospital services is infinitely complicated by the huge variety of services and
the occurrence of many common (or joint) capital and operating costs. See
Phelps, supra note 210, at 117-18 (discussing the complexities of categorizing
billable activities and calculating the incremental, common (joint), and average
costs). Absent simplifying assumptions, estimation of average costs for hospital
services would be impossible. See, e.g., WILLA J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 32-36 (rev. ed. 1988). I
employ the notion of average cost (and the similarly unrefined concept of incremental or variable cost) in the above text merely to convey, in qualitative terms,
the relationship between payers' market power and their prospects for becoming cross-subsidy contributors versus recipients.
276. Insurer-specific payment-to-cost ratios are virtually impossible to come
by, since neither payers nor hospitals are inclined to release this competitively
sensitive data. Nevertheless, a recent study of payment-to-cost ratios for 58
large, self-insured employers, conducted by a hospital claims data processing
firm, finessed this problem by reporting aggregate ratios for groups of employers divided (by ratio) into deciles. Aggregate inpatient payment-to-cost ratios
ranged from 1.14 (for employers in the lowest decile) to 1.53 (for firms in the top
decile). The study also calculated and aggregated payments and costs for individual inpatient claims, then reported the resulting payment-to-cost ratios by
decile. These ratios varied even more widely, from 0.79 for the bottom decile to
2.00 for the highest. OInoNL RATES, supra note 191, at 87-91 (reporting on
study conducted by MEDSTAT, a claims data handling firm, for the Prospective
Payment Assessment Commission).
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sus hospitals. 277 This variation contributes to inter-firm differences in employee medical spending. These differences, in turn,
are reflected in firms' production costs and thus, in the pricing
and quality of myriad goods and services. 2 78 Even without policies that promote cross-subsidization to finance care for the
needy, some distortion along these lines would occur due to the
just-discussed dynamics of differential monopsony power. But
such policies push hospitals to press their monopoly power to its
what they might do if driven only by
limits, or at least beyond
27 9
market dynamics.
277. The connection between payment-to-cost ratios and payers' market
power over hospitals has not been quantitatively studied. Research along these
lines would greatly enhance our understanding of the relationship between payers' market power and hospitals' ability to shift costs. Absent such research, it
seems reasonable to infer, from the premise that payers wish to minimize their
own expenses, that variation in payer-specific payment-to-cost ratios results
from differential market power.
278. The conventional wisdom holds that employers pass all of their fringe
benefit costs (including health insurance expenditures) on to their employees in
the form of lower wages. See Clinton Health Care Plan Will DiscourageSmall
Business Job Creation,Says NationalSmall Business United, PR Newswire Assoc., Inc., Wash. Dateline, Oct. 15, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
PRNews File (noting that the increased cost of the employee increases incentives to lower wages). Minimum wage laws, according to this conventional wisdom, represent the only constraint on the full pass-through of fringe benefit
costs. Consequently, employees who receive wages well above the statutory
minimum will bear the entire burden of cost-shifting (or reap the entire benefit
of below-average-cost pricing). As wages approach the statutory minimum,
some of this burden remains with the employer, but firms can fully adjust for
this by reducing the medical benefits they offer.
Thus it would seem, on first inspection, that inter-firm variation in payment-to-cost ratios should not affect firms' total costs of production, or the
prices they charge for goods and services. This rationale, however, neglects the
effect of such variation on firms' comparative purchasing power in labor markets. All else being equal, competing firms with different payment-to-cost ratios will incur different costs for the same employee compensation package
(wages plus medical and other fringe benefits). This cost differential translates
into differences in competitiveness that are not related to production efficiency.
Managers who confront this competitive disadvantage can either match rival
firms' compensation packages and charge higher prices to their customers, or
hold down their costs (and prices) by offering compensation packages inferior to
those of their rivals. In other words, all else being equal, managers must choose
between price and quality disadvantages (assuming that inferior compensation
draws lower quality employees). Either way, this market distortion results in
social welfare loss.
279. Cf. Phelps, supra note 210, at 116 (suggesting that American hospitals
typically hold unexercised monopoly power, in part because the nonprofit structure legally prohibits the continual accumulation of surplus). The notion that
nonprofit hospitals hold unexercised monopoly power is a corollary of the idea,
Hansmann, Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 9, at 844, that the non-distribu-
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In addition to the social welfare loss arising from this economy-wide distortion, cross-subsidization begets adverse efficiency and distributional effects upon medical consumers by
discouraging the purchase of insurance. Payment-to-cost ratios
greater than one accelerate the dynamic of adverse selection by
pushing insurance premiums to levels above those appropriate
to risk-pool experience. Some individuals and firms that would,
absent cost-shifting, purchase health insurance otherwise will
refrain from doing so because of the price distortion created by
cost-shifts. 28 0 This price distortion is likely to be most pronounced for individuals and small employers because they tend
to be the least well-positioned to reap the benefits of monopsony
power vis-a-vis hospitals. The resulting welfare losses from failure to purchase insurance (that would be rational to buy at
prices undistorted by cost-shifting) thus fall disproportionately
on employees of small firms and self-employed or unemployed
28 1
individuals.
c. Regressivity
Contrary to common belief,28 2 cross-subsidization from private payers is a highly regressive means of financing free and
undercompensated care according to the available evidence. A
tion constraint reduces the incentives of those in charge of nonprofit institutions to engage in exploitative behavior.
280. Some individuals and firms probably respond to this price distortion by
opting for more modest coverage packages than they would choose in a market
without cost-shifting. In the case of employer-provided coverage, this response
may enhance the efficiency ofresource use by compensating for excessive spending on health benefits generated by the exclusion of such benefits from employees' taxable income. In effect, the cost-shift (a "hidden tax") functions as a tax
on employer-provided health benefits. How precisely cost-shifting compensates
for the tax exclusion's effect on the level of employer-provided health benefits is
a question without a ready answer. Complicating factors include the wide variation in cost-shifting burdens and uncertainty about the price elasticity of demand for medical insurance at various income levels. For a lucid overview of
problems that confound assessment of the efficiency effects of excluding employer-provided health benefits from taxable income, see GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, REPORT TO THE JOINT COMrTTEE ON TAXATION, U.S. CONGRESS, TAx
POLIcY: EFFECTS OF CHANGING THE TAx TREATIENT OF FRINGE BENEFITS 71-78
(1992).
281. People with incomes below the poverty line and members ofhistorically
disadvantaged minority groups fall disproportionately into these categories.
See Dorothy P. Rice, Health Status and NationalHealth Priorities, 154 W. J.
MEDICINE 294, 298-99 (1991) (noting large racial and ethnic disparities in insurance status).
282. See, e.g., Wilder, supra note 171, at 139 (asserting that the burden assumed by private payers falls upon the "insured non-poor" and is "progressive
with regard to income").
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recent study (which this author directed) sought to compare, for
six different household income brackets, the proportions of
household income diverted by the hospital industry to pay for

free and undercompensated care. 28 3 Because of limitations in

the available data, the study looked only at household income
channeled to hospitals via consumers' direct payments to hospitals and contributions toward health insurance premiums; employer contributions toward employees' health benefits were not
examined. 2 84 For each income bracket, average direct payments
to hospitals 28 5 and estimated disbursements to hospitals made
from consumers' contributions toward insurance 28 6 were
summed, then multiplied by the fraction of private payments to
hospitals attributable to cross-subsidization. 28 7 The resulting
figures (the average cost of cross-subsidization to consumers in
each income bracket) were divided by the mean pre-tax incomes
for each bracket to yield cross-subsidization burdens for households in each bracket, expressed as fractions of mean pre-tax incomes. These fractions were then adjusted to take account of
burdens
the tax benefits accruing from these cross-subsidization
28 8
by virtue of the federal medical expense deduction.
The resulting figures sketch a striking profile of tax regressivity. Households earning between $10,000 and $15,000 per
year "spent" an average of 0.44% of their income to subsidize
free and undercompensated hospital care, compared with only
283. Robert A. Carolina & M. Gregg Bloche, Payingfor Undercompensated
Hospital Care:The Regressive Profile of a "HiddenTax," 2 HEALTH MATRIX 141
(1992).
284. The study relied upon data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' 198889 Consumer Expenditure Survey, which reports on per-household consumer
spending, including payments to hospitals and health insurers, by income
bracket. The Consumer Expenditure Survey neither includes employer contributions toward health insurance as personal income nor counts these contributions as consumer spending. Unfortunately, the study's authors were unable to
locate data on the value of these contributions, broken down by personal income
bracket. Id. at 152-54.
285. Average direct payments to hospitals from consumers in each bracket
were taken from the 1988-89 Consumer Expenditure Survey. Id. at 152.
286. These disbursements were estimated by multiplying average consumer
payments to private insurers (drawn from the 1988-89 Consumer Expenditure
Survey) by the fraction of total private health insurance premiums paid to settle hospital claims in 1988, according to American Hospital Association data.
Id. at 151-52.
287. This fraction (22%) was drawn from a Prospective Payment Assessment Commission study which concluded that hospital revenues received from
private payers in 1990 equaled 128% of covered patients' costs (28/128 = approximately 22%). Id. at 150-51 (citing O1TIoNAL RATES, supra note 191, at 40).
288. Id. at 148-50, 154-55, 164-65.
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0.10% for households earning more than $50,000 per year. For
households in the four intermediate brackets ($15,000 to
$20,000, $20,000 to $30,000, $30,000 to $40,000, and $40,000 to
$50,000) the respective figures were 0.35, 0.26, 0.17, and
0.16%.2s9 Since employer contributions toward workers' health
benefits were not studied, these numbers present an incomplete
picture of the cross-subsidization burden's distribution across
income brackets. On the other hand, there is good reason to believe that inclusion of employer contributions would not qualitatively change this picture. Expressed as a percentage of
employee compensation, employer contributions almost certainly fall as employee income rises.2 9 0 Assuming that the fraction of insurance premiums channeled toward crosssubsidization remains roughly constant across income brackets, 2 9 1 employer contributions diverted to cross-subsidization
likely represent a decreasing proportion of employee compensation as income rises.
One might quibble with concerns about regressivity in this
context on the grounds that American society tolerates comparable distributive patterns in other cases of corporate and individual giving. 29 2 As noted earlier, firms and individuals support
many activities through charitable contributions that ultimately
flow from buyers of goods and services. 2 93 If spending on a
firm's products, as a proportion of personal income, declines with
289. Id. at 165 (percentages rounded-off).
290.

Id. at 153-54 & n.61 (citing employment cost data, broken down by job

description, showing that employers make greater contributions, expressed as
fractions of mean income for each job description category, toward insurance
benefits for workers in categories with lower mean incomes). There are no published data on employer contributions toward health insurance alone, broken
down by employee income bracket. See supra text accompanying note 284 (explaining that the Consumer Expenditure Survey does not include employer contributions towards health insurance as personal income).
291. See supra note 278 and accompanying text (discussing inter-employer
variation in payment-to-cost ratios). Although this fraction varies widely from
firm to firm, there is no reason to suspect large aggregate variation across income brackets.
292. See supra note 223 and accompanying text (discussing the nexus between consumer activity and charitable giving).
293. The fiscal connection between such contributions and revenue derived
from market transactions is immediate for donations by business enterprises.
The connection is less direct for contributions from individuals, whose philanthropic resources can generally be traced back to sales of goods and services.
My point here is not that charitable giving necessarily raises market prices.
Indeed, corporate giving is often a substitute for advertising and other promotional spending, and, as such, affects neither a firm's total cost of doing business
nor its pricing policy.

378

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:299

rising income, donations derived from the firm's revenues are
as a regressive way to pay for the recipopen to characterization
2 94
ients' activities.
A thorough discussion of whether such regressivity is sometimes or always problematic lies beyond the scope of this Article.
I limit myself here to the observation that giving by commercial
entities is widely lauded and that any associated regressivity is
tacitly tolerated. Without casting general doubt on our acceptance of such regressivity, hospital-based cross-subsidization can
be distinguished on two grounds. First, the large proportion of
private payments diverted by hospitals to finance free and undercompensated care contrasts with the small fraction of total
revenues that firms more typically donate to charity. 2 95 At least
arguably, regressive financing of corporate charity is rendered
unproblematic by its tiny volume, relative to donors' revenues. 29 6 Second, hospitals effect cross-subsidization by exercising their market power over private payers. 297 Hence, there
may be more reason to look behind the institutional veil to the
profile of generosity financed by monopolistic pricdistributive
ing.2 98 One important such reason may be the likelihood that
294. See Pamela Matin, 350 Make Room for Ronald, L.A. TmEs, Jan. 21,
1988, pt. 9 at 4 (describing a benefit for Orange County's Ronald McDonald
House). A fast food chain that donates money to programs for the families of
sick children can be said to finance such programs regressively if the proportion
of consumers' incomes spent on fast food declines with rising income.
295. In 1993, U.S. corporations collectively contributed a total of $5.92 billion to charity, approximately 1.3% of their pre-tax profits (and thus a much
lower proportion of their total revenues). Jeff Harrington, Corporate Giving
Begins at Home... But Should it Stay There?, CINc NsATI ENQUIRER, Sept. 18,
1994, at H1; see also John Oslund, Top CorporateGivers Unchanged,MINEAPOLIS STAR Tam., Apr. 3, 1995, at 2D (discussing the charitable giving of Minnesota's 100 largest corporations).
296. I am not persuaded that the ratio of corporate giving to donors' revenues ought to be decisive with respect to whether such regressivity should be
tolerated; I merely note it as a possible basis for making a distinction.
297. See supra text accompanying note 260.
298. This basis for selective attention to regressivity is not limited to hospital-administered cross-subsidization, but encompasses all monopolistically-financed giving. It is linked to the first distinction in that only enterprises with
substantial market power are likely to accumulate the funds needed to commit
more than a tiny fraction of revenues to charitable activities. Aside from the
problem of regressivity, the monopolistic basis of cross-subsidy financing (and
the market distortions that result) represents an independent reason for concern about public policies that promote cross-subsidization. See supra note 278
and accompanying text (asserting that competitive disadvantages, resulting
from inter-firm variation in hospital payment-to-cost ratios, force affected managers to choose between reductions in price or quality, with a resulting loss in
social welfare).
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giving by monopolistic nonprofit firms represent an additional
extraction of wealth from customers rather 29
than
a substitute for
9
advertising or other promotional spending.
4. The Case Against Charity
Beyond the above-discussed concerns about cross-subsidization, the ideal of charity is problematic as a premise for broadening access to health care. Apart from whether the imagery of
charity aptly characterizes cross-subsidization, the logic of charity has two troubling aspects.
a. The Double Edge of Voluntarism
First, provision of medical care as a matter of charity fits
awkwardly with the premise that all persons have a moral claim
to such care as a matter of right. 30 0 The virtues of charity are
tied to the voluntariness of giving,30 1 which in turn derives
moral import from the expectation that giving will better people's lives. If what is given is a universal entitlement (that is, a
thing available to all persons from the state as a matter of
right), then giving cannot materially affect the lives of recipi299. Absent market power, nonprofit firms facing price competition might
engage in some reputation-building promotional activities, including the provision of free services. Yet these firms would have to supply such services in lieu
of other organizational spending. They could not pass the cost of free services to
customers in the form of increased prices (or diminished quality) except to the
extent that the reputational effects of such services would achieve sufficient
product differentiation to offset adverse price or quality changes.
300. By "right," I refer not only to the idea that all persons are entitled to
health care (regardless of ability to pay) but also to formulations that eschew
rights language in favor of other ways of saying that every individual has a
personal moral claim vis-a-vis society. One need not speak in terms of rights in
order to claim an individual entitlement, although the difference between rights
talk and other modes of asserting personal entitlement may be largely semantic. See, e.g., John Arras, Retreat From the Right to Healthcare:The President's
Commission and Access to Healthcare, 6 CARDozo L. Rev. 321, 327-40 (1984)
(observing that the formulation chosen by President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research-that society has an "obligation" to provide adequate health care to its
members-is open to either strong interpretation as an assertion of individual
entitlement or a weak reading as a statement of social duty unaccompanied by
personal entitlement). In any event, the proposition that all persons are morally entitled to some basic level of medical care, however defined, is a widelyaccepted least common denominator.
301. See RicHARD Trrufuss, THE GiFT RELATIONSHIP: FRoM HUmAN BLOOD TO
SociAL POLIcY, 209-36 (1971) (arguing that voluntary donation strengthens
bonds of community); see also WALZER, supra note 158, at 93-94 (drawing an
analogy between voluntary giving and democratic politics as ways to give "concrete meaning to the union of citizens").
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ents,3 0 2 and the act of giving loses its moral force. If the thing
that is given ought to be a universal entitlement but is not, then
charitable provision is at best an imperfect response to social
injustice and at worst a self-indulgent diversion from the quest
for social justice. Either way, the virtues of charity coexist awkwardly with the claims of justice. Moreover, to the extent that
the case for public provision of a thing rests on the general belief
30 3
that access to it is an attribute of membership in a society,
degrades recipients by castvoluntaristic provision of the3 thing
04
belonging.
their
on
doubt
ing
One response to these concerns about the double edge of voluntarism is that charity care requirements render such care less
gift-like and thus less inimical to the idea of health care as a
right. This argument has considerable force, given the proliferation of such requirements, and conditioning federal tax exemption upon provision of free or below-cost care would add to this
force. Indeed, the accretion of such requirements lends to private giving the color of public provision, effected via state actions similar to regulatory takings. To the extent that this nonvoluntaristic picture persuades, the frayed imagery of charity
that surrounds cross-subsidization is further undone. Even if
one overlooks the non-voluntaristic dynamics of hospital costshifting, institutional giving in compliance with the state's mandates and prerequisites hardly seems a matter of generosity.
b.

The Politics of Culpability

Beyond the awkward conceptual fit between provision of
health care as a matter of charity and as a matter of right, the
idea of charity works against public support for expanding access to care through the use of public funds. The rhetoric of
charity structures listeners' perceptions, inviting people to understand gaps in access to care as a problem to be solved by pri302. Private giving in such circumstances will reduce the state's burden,
similar to a taxpayer's donation to the IRS in excess of her tax obligation, but it
will not affect recipients' access to the thing given. More speculatively, the oftnoted shrinkage of the realm of charity with the rise of the welfare state may be
best understood as a consequence of declining opportunities for private donors
to materially affect access to life's most basic necessities.
303. See WALZER, supra note 158, at 64-91 (arguing that societies recognize
varying sets of "wants" as "needs" and then differentiate members from nonmembers through political decisions about the scope of"communal provision").
304. More precisely, the donor's discretion, so critical to the perceived virtue
of private charity, itself degrades recipients by rendering their membership less
than certain. Id. at 62.
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vate action rather than public intervention.3 0 5 Promotion of
charitable provision casts hospitals as responsible agents, culpable for society's failure to achieve universal access and capable of
ameliorating this failure.3 0 6 Were charitable provision able by
itself to ensure universal access to care, this turn away from the
idea of public responsibility could perhaps be dismissed as a
matter of ideological taste. The resources that American hospitals now devote to free care, however, represent only a small
fraction of what is needed to achieve universal access to basic
care. 30 7 In view of the growing challenge to the market power of
hospitals now being mounted by monopsonistic health care payers,30 8 a large increase in the volume of free care provided by
hospitals seems unlikely. Indeed, the hospital industry's ability
to sustain current levels of free care in the face of private payers'
growing monopsony power is doubtful.3 0 9 Thus, the rhetoric of
charity represents at best a fractional and, at worst, an illusory
answer to our national failure to achieve universal access to
health care.
5.

Summing Up
For many reasons, the idea of charity is deeply problematic
as a way to characterize the financial arrangements by which
hospitals provide free and undercompensated care. Nevertheless, a creditable case can be made for the role of charitable imagery in making these arrangements politically palatable.
Indeed, these arrangements have proven more palatable than
have myriad proposals for the public financing of care for the
305. See STEVENS, supra note 28, at 319 (discussing the dichotomy between
state-mandated and entrepreneurial solutions to the problems of health care
access); see also id. at 43 (distinguishing voluntarism and charity).
306. Many proponents of charitable provision also hold that public financing
of medical services for the needy is necessary to achieve universal access. This
Article does not assert that advocacy of charitable provision (as a second-best
strategy) is logically inconsistent with advocacy of public financing, but rather
that emphasis on hospitals as culpable agents diverts attention from the state's
responsibility for our failure to achieve health care access for all.
307. Projections of the additional medical spending necessary to achieve
universal access to care vary widely and are a subject of much controversy.
However, there is general agreement that coverage for the nation's approximately forty million uninsured would dramatically increase this population's
utilization of both outpatient and hospital care. See generally M. Susan Marquis & Stephen H. Long, The UninsuredAccess Gap: Narrowingthe Estimates,
31 INQUIRY 405 (1995).
308. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
309. See COST SHFrnTrG, supra note 214, at 15 (warning that "cost-shifting's
days may be numbered" because of increasing market pressure from price-conscious purchasers).
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needy.3 10 Such success cannot be lightly dismissed, even if
achieved with the aid of a measure of disingenuity. This success
rests the best case for conditioning charitable exemption upon
the provision of free and undercompensated care, and for other
efforts to promote such provision.
However, this case is seriously undermined by the problematic effects of cross-subsidization. Poor targeting of resources to
needy beneficiaries, socially wasteful insurance market distortion, and remarkably regressive financing make cross-subsidization inferior to public financing as a means of providing health
services to the uninsured poor. In addition, apart from the
problems inherent in cross-subsidization, the language of charity is troublesome in its own right. The ideal of voluntarism is
inconsistent with moral commitment to a universal, personal entitlement to health care. Moreover, the rhetoric of charity
presents the problem of inadequate access to care as a matter of
private responsibility. It thereby diverts attention from the
political necessity of mobilizing public resources if universal access is to be achieved. The promotion of charity care, via conditions on the charitable exemption or via other regulatory means,
is defensible as a last resort, once one presumes that public financing is a political impossibility. 3 11 So long as public provision remains a serious possibility, however, free and
undercompensated care requirements represent a dubious response to the American dilemma of inadequate health care access.

B.

CONDImoNmnG THE EXEMPTION UPON COMMUNITY BENEFIT

The 1969 revenue ruling that put an end to the charity care
requirement characterized hospital services for paying patients
as "beneficial to the community as a whole" even though mediindigent community members do not partake of this benecally
fit.3 12 This language had doctrinal significance because the
common law of charitable trusts, upon which the ruling purported to rest, required that an activity be found beneficial to the
310. See supra notes 234-40 and accompanying text (discussing the interplay between charitable imagery and political exigencies).
311. If one rejects the notion that the state has any obligation to ensure
access to medical care for those unable to afford it, the promotion of charity care
is defensible in terms of voluntarism. On the other hand, to the extent that the
state's promotional activities such as free-care requirements for charitable exemption create economic incentives for "giving," the ideal of voluntarism may be
subverted by these activities.
312. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, 118.
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community in order to meet the charitable purpose requirement.3 13 The ruling's declaration that the provision of care to
paying patients and the operation of an emergency room open to
all persons as passing the community-benefit test

31 4

ensured

that a finding of community benefit would be automatic for the
vast majority of nonprofit hospitals. More recently, however, the
Treasury Department has signaled an interest in closer community-benefit scrutiny. A 1983 revenue ruling eliminated the
emergency room requirement for some specialized hospitals,3 1 5
yet suggested that "[other significant factors" could serve as
community benefit criteria. 3 16 During President Bush's term,
departmental criticism of proposed free-care requirements invoked a variety of community service activities, including health
education, screening, and preventative care, as potentially pro317
bative of community benefit.
In 1992, the IRS issued new audit guidelines requiring nonprofit hospitals to document the services they provide to their
communities. 3 18 Most recently, President Clinton's ill-fated
health reform proposal included language amending § 501 to require exempt medical care providers to annually assess community health care needs and develop plans to address these
needs. 3 19 Nonprofit hospital industry leaders have espoused
313. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 368 cmt. b, § 372 cmts.
b-c; 4 SCOTT ON TRUSTS §§ 368, 372.2 (1967)).
314. Id.
315. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94, 95 (announcing that hospitals offering services "limited to special conditions unlikely to necessitate emergency
care" need not maintain emergency rooms). The ruling also stated that general
hospitals need not operate emergency rooms when state health planning authorities determine that such facilities would produce unnecessary duplication
of services. Id. at 94-95.
316. The IRS specified several such factors but left open the possibility of
others. The factors identified in the ruling were "a board of directors drawn
from the community, an open medical staff policy, treatment of persons paying
their bills with the aid of public programs... and the application of any surplus
to improving facilities, equipment, patient care, and medical training, education, and research...." Id. at 95.
317. See, e.g., Treasury Statement, supra note 32, at 27 (outlining those factors indicative of community benefit).
318. Announcement 92-83, 1992-22 I.R.B. 59 (instructing auditors to review
hospitals' documentation of community service standards).
319. H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7601(a) (1993). The reform proposals introduced in 1994 by Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell and House
Majority Leader Richard Gephardt contained similar language plus a requirement that exempt health care organizations provide "outreach services" pursuant to their assessments of community need. S. 2357, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 7301(a)(n)(1)(b) (1994); H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3685(b)(4) (1994).
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such language 320 and have even proposed more detailed community service criteria 32 1 as an alternative to free-care requirements.3 2 2 Proponents of closer community-benefit scrutiny rely
upon two underlying, often vaguely described justifications for
exemption: substantive benefits accruing to communities and
local participation in planning and governance. Implicit in these
justifications is a quid pro quo conception of exemption as something earned via some sort of community service. Neither justification is convincing, for reasons that I will presently review.
1. Substantive Benefits
Aside from the treatment of disease, many kinds of community benefit have been claimed as justifications for charitable exemption.3 23 They include the economic impact of hospitals as
employers and as purchasers of goods and services 32 4 and myriad community outreach programs emphasizing health education, diagnostic screening, and other health promotion
320. The Clinton plan's community-needs provision was consonant with
similar proposals by nonprofit hospital industry leaders. See, e.g., J. David

Seay, Tax-Exemption for Hospitals: Towards an Understandingof Community
Benefit, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 35, 45-47 (1992) (advocating requirements that exempt hospitals undertake community health care needs assessment, set specific
community health improvement goals, and design community benefit plans).
321. Several nonprofit hospital trade associations, including the Voluntary
Hospitals of America and the Catholic Health Association, have developed detailed community benefit assessment and reporting programs. See Terese Hudson, HospitalsStrive to Provide Communities with Benefits, HOSPiTALS, July 5,
1992, at 102 (describing hospital-sponsored community benefit initiatives).
322. Industry backers of closer community benefit scrutiny have been candid about their hope that more detailed community benefit reporting will deflect
pressure for the institution of free and undercompensated care requirements.

Id. See also Clark W. Bell, HospitalsMust Clearly Measure Charity Care and
Other Benefits, MODERN HEALTHCARE, June 22, 1992, at 53 (asserting that hospitals must document their charity programs in order to maintain credibility);
Timothy Eckels & Julie Trocchio, Model Refines Quantification of Community
Service, HFALTHoARE FIN. MGmT., Feb. 1992, at 34-38 (reporting on efforts to
quantify community benefits in order to preserve tax exemption); Jay Greene,
Systems' CharityCare Tells Only Partof Story, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Jan. 11,
1993, at 27 (describing hospitals' untabulated charity expenditures); Karen Pallarito, Economic-Impact Study Seen as Vehicle to Spur Growth, DeterTax, MODERN HEALTHcARE, Dec. 7, 1992, at 38, 39 (maintaining that a loss of tax exempt
status would force hospitals to cut their community service expenditures).
323. Arguments to the effect that the provision of medical care to paying
patients may justify exemption are considered and criticized above. See supra
text accompanying notes 14-21.
324. Pallarito, supra note 322, at 38-39 (describing results of economic-impact study covering southeastern Pennsylvania).
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activities.3 25 The economic impact argument is plainly implausible as a basis for exemption because it does not distinguish
nonprofit hospitals from for-profit firms (including hospitals)
that play large roles in local economies. 3 2 6 Community outreach
programs present a more difficult question. Such programs may
serve marketing and other promotional purposes for hospitals,
just as sponsorship of sporting events or the arts does for many
for-profit corporations. Distinguishing between commercially
inspired outreach activities and those engendered by community-oriented benevolence is complicated by hospital managers'
efforts to describe virtually all such activities in the latter
terms.3 27 It would be overly cynical to ascribe commercial purposes to all community service programs. But the promotional
potential of these programs is undeniable. Not only can such
activities as health screening and education attract paying pa325. Examples of outreach activities cited as grounds for exemption include
blood pressure and cholesterol screening, educational efforts aimed at preventing the spread of HIV, immunization campaigns, transportation for patients,
housing for families of patients, senior citizen day-care, and even "positivethinking" classes. See GAO Report, supra note 51, at 37-43 (summarizing survey results detailing the types of activities hospitals provide as benefits to their
communities); Eckels & Trocchio, supra note 322, at 36 (giving these and other
examples of outreach programs); Hudson, supra note 321 (describing hospitals'
community benefit programs).
326. Enterprises such as factories, shopping malls, theme parks, and major
league athletic teams often receive special tax and other benefits from local governments anxious to attract and keep them. These public subsidies may yield
economic development that makes them worthwhile from a social welfare perspective, but such development has never been a basis for federal or state charitable exemption. Singling out the nonprofit hospital industry for special
treatment in this regard would represent a radical departure from longstanding
tax principles. If federal tax policy favored patterns of economic development
affected by the hospital industry, credits and deductions available to both the
nonprofit and for-profit sectors would be a more acutely targeted and traditional means.
327. A growing cadre of consultants, attorneys, and hospital trade association officials is urging nonprofit hospital managers to report on outreach activities to tax authorities and the public in non-commercial, community-oriented
terms to deflect challenges to tax-exempt status. See Eckels & Trocchio, supra
note 322; Terese Hudson, Attorney: Business Image Can Hurt Hospitals,HospiTALs, Aug. 5, 1990, at 68; Sandy Lutz, VHA Releases Its Own List of Standards
to Help Members Show Value to Community, MODERN HEALTHcARE, Apr. 13,
1992, at 14. The potential for disingenuity in claims of community-oriented benevolence is driven home by the proliferation of advice to hospital managers
urging that community service programs be developed and marketed with an
eye to boosting institutional competitiveness by strengthening reputation. Cf.
Joseph M. Inguanzo, Communicating Mission: Research is Vital, HosprrALs,
Aug. 5, 1991, at 45 (urging use of market research and assertive public relations strategies to devise and promote community service programs).
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tients directly, they can also enhance a facility's
reputation and
3 28
thereby boost marketing efforts indirectly.
To the extent that community outreach activities are market-driven, they are no more plausible a basis for exemption
than are the advertising and public relations efforts of for-profit
enterprises. On the other hand, to the extent that outreach programs constitute benevolence beyond that generated by market
incentives, they pose many of the issues presented by hospital
provision of free and below-cost care. Like free and below-cost
care, outreach programs that are not fully financed by fees from
users are financed by shifting costs to paying patients. 3 29 The
problems of disingenuity, mismatches between services and
need, insurance market distortion, and regressive financing (addressed above in connection with free and below-cost care) make
cross-subsidization no less problematic as a way to finance community outreach activities. The above discussions of disingenuity, insurance market distortion, and regressivity are
equally germane to all community-oriented programs financed
by revenues from paying patients. Problems of mismatch between services and community needs differ only slightly for free
care and for community outreach programs. 3 30 As is the case for
efforts to expand access to care, these many difficulties make direct public subsidies preferable to nonprofit sector benevolence
as a means of providing community-oriented screening, educa-

328. See Inguanzo, supra note 327, at 45-46 (describing how communicating
a hospital's community programs can boost that hospital's reputation in the

community).
329. Some of the cost-shifting that pays for outreach programs can be explained in market terms as investment in product promotion and institutional
reputation. My focus here is on cross-subsidization of outreach activities, at
higher than market-supported levels, in pursuit of non-market objectives set by
hospital managers.

330. The problem of mismatch between cross-subsidy availability and community needs is similar in two contexts; those hospitals most able to afford outreach programs and free care tend to be located in communities least in need of
them. See supra text accompapying notes 264-65. Also, mismatch problems
arising from managerial preoccupation with institutional well-being, and the
resulting indifference to other indicia of community need, are similar in both
contexts. See supra text accompanying notes 262-63. A significant difference,
however, lies in the greater importance of marketing and other promotional
considerations when hospital managers plan community outreach programs.
To the extent that the promotional value of some programs is disproportionate
to the need for them (understood from a public health or other, more neutral
perspective), promotional considerations may distort the planning of outreach
programs, yielding undesirable distributional and efficiency consequences.
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tion, and other health promotion programs. 33 ' Absent the supposition that public subsidies are a political improbability, the
case for exemption as a means of inducing private provision of
such outreach services is thus weak.
2. Process-Oriented Criteria and Community Participation
An alternative model for closer community benefit scrutiny
emphasizes the process of institutional governance. Proponents
of this model assert that substantive criteria for community benefit would "devoluntarize" nonprofit hospitals, undermining
their distinctive virtues as privately-governed, community-oriented institutions. 33 2 In place of substantive requirements, advocates of this approach urge the adoption of process-oriented
criteria aimed at encouraging facilities to plan for community
needs with the participation of community representatives.
Central to this model is the premise that institutions rooted in
the community can be relied upon to discern and respond to
community needs. When joined to community-rootedness, the
model holds that voluntarism is desirable both intrinsically and
instrumentally (as virtuous in itself and as a means of responding to community needs). Among the process-oriented criteria
urged by proponents of this model are community representation on hospital governing bodies, 33 3 community involvement in
the development of plans to meet local health needs, and various
3 34
reporting requirements for community service programs.
Insofar as this approach rests on the claim that the intrinsic
virtues of voluntarism deserve tax exemption, it is unconvincing
331. This conclusion is open to the criticism that processes by which public
subsidies are designed are also open to allocative distortion as private actors
pursue their own interests through legislative and administrative means. I
grant that this criticism has some validity, but the greater visibility of legislative and administrative determinations, in comparison with the decentralized
discretion of hospital managers, would result in less such distortion. A comprehensive assessment of the distortions that might affect the design of public subsidies lies beyond this Article's scope.
332. E.g., Seay, supra note 320, at 45-46.
333. The audit guidelines issued by the IRS in 1992 include criteria along
these lines. See Announcement 92-83, supra note 318, at 59-60 (instructing
IRS auditors to inquire into whether hospital governing boards include local
civic leaders and whether minutes of board meetings suggest that such board
members play active roles).
334. Seay, supra note 320, at 47 (proposing that the IRS inquire into
whether hospitals undertake community medical needs assessments, set health
improvement goals, involve their communities in the development of plans to
pursue these goals, and report on their financial support for community service
programs).
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for reasons discussed earlier, in connection with the case for per
se exemption of nonprofit hospitals.3 35 Insofar as this approach
relies upon voluntarism's instrumental potential, as a means of
engendering private initiative on the community's behalf, it
grounds tax exemption based on behavior not readily distinguishable from that engaged in by well-functioning for-profit institutions. 3 36 As critics of process-oriented criteria have noted,
for-profit entities attuned to their markets develop business
plans responsive to community needs, 3 37 at least to the degree
that these needs are supported by purchasing power.3 38 Where
community need is a matter of local knowledge, input from community members is essential to commercial success.3 3 9 For hospitals, as for other enterprises that subsist on revenue from
paying customers, the development and implementation of plans
to meet local needs are in large measure market-driven. Rewarding such market-oriented strategic planning with tax exemption makes no more sense for nonprofit hospitals than it
would for investor-owned entities.
To the extent that such planning is market-driven, exemption in exchange for it constitutes a government give-away, indefensible on quid pro quo or other grounds. To some critics of
process-oriented criteria, community-oriented planning by nonprofit hospitals is indistinguishable from market-driven planning by for-profit firms and, as such, plainly does not deserve
exemption. 3 40 Yet reality in this regard may be more complicated. The still-considerable market power exercised by hospitals enables them to channel some resources toward community
service activities in accordance with a sense of mission that is
not purely market-driven. Clearly, the growing market power of
335.

See supra text accompanying notes 181-86.

336. See supra text accompanying note 183 (asking why, on the basis of virtue, exemptions should be restricted to nonprofit hospitals).

337. E.g., John D. Colombo, Health CareReform and Federal Tax Exemption: Rethinking the Issues, 29 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 215, 265 (1994).
338. Id.
339. This input can take a number of forms, including the hiring of managers drawn from the community and the use of market research techniques, such

as surveys and focus groups. The latter methods, of course, do not entail the
sort of community participation in governance envisaged by advocates of process-oriented community benefit criteria for exemption. Yet from an instrumental vantage point, one that values community involvement as a means for
devising programs which meet community needs, this difference is
unimportant.
340. See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 337, at 265 (proclaiming it "somewhat
bizarre... to base exemption on conduct that for-profit entities must engage in
virtually daily as a result of market competition").
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health care payers is shrinking hospital managers' residual discretion to pursue non-market purposes. Such discretion, however, remains a fact of hospital economic life, and there is some
evidence that nonprofit hospital managers are more inclined
than their for-profit counterparts to use it to offer outreach services for low-income people.3 4 1 This evidence hardly suffices to
compel the conclusion that community-oriented planning by
nonprofit hospitals yields different results than avowedly market-oriented planning by for-profits. Still, it points to the possibility that nonprofit hospital managers employ their monopoly
power-and their consequent discretion to pursue non-market
aims-on behalf of conceptions of community service distinct
from those pursued by investor-owned facilities.
If so, then exemption on the basis of process-oriented criteria cannot simply be dismissed as a give-away to nonprofits for
behaving exactly like for-profits as regards community need.
Yet the case for process-oriented criteria would be dubious even
if it could be clearly shown that some nonprofit hospitals do pursue distinctive, public-regarding conceptions of community need.
Scrutiny that focuses exclusively on planning mechanisms and
local involvement lacks the fine-grain resolution necessary to selectively reward institutional behavior that is said to justify an
exemption on community service grounds. Facilities that conceive of community need in purely market-driven terms can easily portray their strategic planning processes as efforts to
discern and address community needs. And community participation, even community representation on governing bodies,
hardly immunizes hospital managers from pressures to pursue
market-based conceptions of need.
The inability of process-oriented criteria to select for the
public-regarding behavior said to justify exemption opens the
341. A national survey of hospitals conducted by the U.S. General Accounting Office found that on average individual nonprofit hospitals provided community outreach services to twice as many people as did similarly sized forprofit hospitals in 1988. GAO Report, supranote 51, at 38. Of the 522 facilities
surveyed, 68% of the nonprofits but only 39% of the for-profits reported that
they "targeted" at least one such service to low-income people. Id. at 19, 40. In
contrast, nonprofits were more likely than for-profits to recover (by charging
fees) the costs of providing particular community services. Id. at 38, 42. To the
extent that nonprofit hospitals are more inclined than similarly situated forprofits to offer subsidized community outreach services to low-income people,
the picture for such services differs from that for subsidized inpatient care. See
supra text accompanying notes 49-55 (discussing evidence that comparably-situated nonprofits and for-profits provide similar volumes of uncompensated
care).
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way to pointless give-aways of public resources. To the extent
that hospital managers are able to portray market-oriented
planning in a manner that meets these criteria, determination
of charitable purpose on this basis is functionally equivalent to
per se exemption. Attempts to make process-oriented inquiry
more discriminating by adding a measure of substantive community benefit scrutiny would encounter the panoply of
problems presented by reliance on such benefit. 3 42 Finally, success in exempting only those hospitals that provide community
service beyond that engendered by market forces would reward
some facilities for activities they would have undertaken without exemption. Indeed, the marginal spending on community
service precipitated by such an exemption might prove small in
comparison to total spending on non-market-driven community
service, 343 and to the cost of the exemption itself. If so, then
even such a selective exemption would represent, for the most
part, a give-away from the public fisc. 344
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The multiple rationales for exemption considered above attempt to explain its existence in the current form, and to justify
one or another vision of the form that it ought to take. I have
argued herein that these rationales fail on both accounts. The
Treasury Department's defense of per se exemption as a subsidy
for the provision of services that produce positive externalities is
equally unsatisfying as a teleological explanation and normative
justification. Likewise, the case for per se exemption as a social
welfare-enhancing capital subsidy where purchasers cannot
monitor outputs is unpersuasive as either explanation or prescription. By contrast, the argument for per se exemption as
recognition for the virtues of voluntarism has some merit as an
account of beliefs about nonprofit hospitals that have kept the
exemption politically viable in its current form. However, recent
developments in the hospital industry increasingly strain these
beliefs, making the virtue argument less plausible.
Proposals to condition exemption upon the provision of free
and below-cost care or other services deemed beneficial to the
342. See supra text accompanying notes 318-31.
343. The likelihood that such community service spending is today largely
supported by hospitals' market power over payers lends force to this hypothesis.
344. In theory, the give-away component of selective exemption could be
eliminated by identifying and rewarding only marginal expenditures on community service induced by exemption. This would be exceedingly difficult to
accomplish in practice, however.
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community are no more persuasive. A case can be made for returning the exemption to its charitable roots by applying it only
to that fraction of a hospital's income traceable to the value of
donated resources. This approach, however, would eliminate
most of the exemption's value to hospitals, which rely almost entirely on revenues from paying customers. The persistence of
the exemption and the reliance on it by powerful institutions invite continued efforts to justify more generous approaches. Such
efforts are unlikely, however, to prove more persuasive than
those discussed herein, as long as more direct (and precisely
targeted) public subsidies for desired activities exist as a viable
alternative.
In short, the tax exemption of nonprofit hospitals lacks a
convincing justification, either in its current form or as a benefit
made conditional upon institutional behavior deemed socially
desirable. Nor can the exemption's persistence be plausibly accounted for by the teleological, functionalist explanations considered herein. Yet the exemption has endured, and will
probably persist for years to come. Calls for its demise remain
beyond the political pale. Free care or community service requirements sufficiently onerous to prompt substantial numbers
of nonprofit hospitals to opt out of exemption are almost equally
unlikely. The community benefit conditions inserted into several of the leading health care reform proposals in 1993 and
1994 would not have required substantial changes in hospital
behavior. On the contrary, they were supported by nonprofit
sector advocates with an eye toward relieving pressure for more
demanding requirements. As regards the exemption, nonprofit
hospitals today constitute a politically potent, actively engaged
interest group with inertia of rest on its side.

A. FUNCTIONALIST AccouNTs AND STmucTuRAL CoNsTRAmTs
This political reality points to a critical failing shared by
functionalist explanations for the exemption's persistence. In
postulating that exemption advances some end toward which
law or society somehow naturally tends, such explanations disregard the import of structural constraints. Inattention to
structural constraint is hardly a categorical sin: proponents of
functionalist accounts of legal phenomena can often ignore
3 45
structural matters without much loss of explanatory power.
345. The economic analysis of law provides many classic examples, such as
the disregard of transaction costs that takes place when two well-informed parties bargain over a simple matter, or the disregard of buyers' or sellers' market
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However, structural factors loom large with respect to the tax
exemption of hospitals. The ability of nonprofit hospitals to influence legislative and agency decision-making is a central factor. The Treasury Department's elimination of free-care
requirements in 1969 is directly traceable to industry lobbying
efforts,3 46 and any serious effort to eliminate the exemption or
attach onerous conditions to it would draw formidable opposition from well-positioned industry representatives.3 47 Indeed,
the persistence of the exemption is probably better explained in
terms of models of interest group pressure developed by public
choice theorists than by functionalist or teleological theories like
those discussed above.
The intensity with which the nonprofit hospital sector defends the exemption reflects not only its economic value, but also
the power of settled expectations.3 48 Having come over many
decades to rely upon the exemption as a stable feature of their
fiscal environments, nonprofit hospital managements are loathe
to give it up, especially in light of growing insecurity about future revenues.3 49 Increasingly monopsonistic and cost-conscious
power when market concentration falls below some threshold level. Democratic
political theory offers other examples including the neglect of agenda sequencing and cycling problems (of the sort described by Arrow, supra note 85) when
the outcomes of decision-making processes are being analyzed.
346. See supra text accompanying note 12.
347. During the 1993-94 struggle over health care reform, political action
committees substantially increased their donations to congressional campaigns. Dana Priest, Health Plan Worries Spur PACs; Industry Group Donations Up 20%, WASH. POST, July 14, 1993, at A19 (citing statistics from
Consumer Group Citizen Action). The American Hospital Association, representing 5000 hospitals, of which 3100 are nonprofit and 1400 are public,
doubled its 1992 contributions to $123,250. Id.
348. The significance of settled expectations in this context is an instance of
the general observation that persons place a higher subjective value on resources they already possess than on otherwise equivalent resources that they
might obtain in the future. See PAUL ANAND, FOUNDATIONS OF RATIONAL
CHOICE UNDER RISK 3-5, 135 (1993).
349. Insecurity about future cash flow may engender irrationally high industry resistance to the loss of particular subsidies, including tax exemptions,
by prompting hospital managers to treat each such potential loss as a broader
threat to public support. In effect, skittish managers may react to complex and
uncertain fiscal environments by adopting highly simplified decision rules, such
as a requirement that any objection to a particular subsidy be taken as a larger
challenge to public support. This cognitive response to complexity and uncertainty reflects a number of underlying concerns. These concerns include the
costs entailed in making multiple determinations of the importance of resistance and the fear that failure to effectively oppose any particular subsidy loss
will be habit-forming, thereby setting the stage for subsequent failure to protect
other cash flows. Cf. George Ainslie, Beyond Microeconomics: Conflict Among
Interests in a Multiple Self as a Determinant of Value, in THE MULTIPLE SELF
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health care payers can hardly be counted upon to cushion hospitals against the fiscal perturbations that would result from elimination of the exemption or attachment of onerous conditions.
The webs of institutional and community reliance on the exemption run deep and wide. Hospitals are large economic players at the local level, both as employers and as purchasers of
goods and services from other firms. Thus, the fiscal tremors
they suffer send seismic waves through their communities.
Such economic shocks are felt with extra intensity in socio-economically marginalized communities, which tend to offer fewer
alternative job opportunities to the low-skilled workers that hospitals employ in large numbers.3 50 Moreover, where hospitals
that teeter on the edge of fiscal oblivion are the sole providers of
care for some populations, continued access to care for these
populations could depend on survival of the exemption in something akin to its current form.
Thus, the sudden disappearance of the exemption (or the attachment of restrictive conditions) would disrupt current arrangements. Measured against one or another static conception
of social desirability, these arrangements seem neither normatively preferable nor teleologically explicable. On the other
hand, understood dynamically in terms of the logic of path dependence and structural constraint, these arrangements-and
the exemption's current form-make evolutionary sense. Had
stringent free-care conditions been enforced early in this century, as nonprofit hospitals were transforming themselves from
mostly charitable to largely commercial institutions, use of the
exemption might have gradually diminished-with little institutional or community disruption. Alternatively, had exemption
been withdrawn per se from nonprofit hospitals in the early
1900s as the industry first took on a commercial character, the
resulting disruption of arrangements would have been far less
than what would occur now, owing to the much-expanded role of
health care in our economy today. Our understanding of the exemption's persistence would be much-enhanced by examining
nonprofit hospitals' dependence on it over time, their advocacy
efforts in Congress and before the IRS, and the extent to which
133, 158-62 (Jon Elster ed., 1986) (proposing that irrationally high valuations
of money be understood as the product of "private rules" of perception that link
particular gains or losses to longer-term patterns of gain or loss).
350. See generally WILLIAM J. WILSON, TIE TauLY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CrrY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND

PuBLic PoLiCY (1987) (addressing growing mis-

match between jobs being created by the U.S. economy and the preparedness of
inner-city residents to compete for them).
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other important political actors pressed opposing (or sympathetic) views. Such work would shed light on the emergence and
operation of structural constraints that have played critical
roles in shaping the exemption's evolutionary path.
A historical inquiry along these lines lies beyond my scope
here. Nevertheless, an appreciation of the current significance
of such constraints points the way toward a pragmatic normative approach to the exemption's future. Such an approach
should begin by recognizing that failure to take account of structural constraints when formulating recommendations about the
exemption's future is both analytically problematic and politically unrealistic. If scholars are to provide plausible guidance to
those with authority over the exemption's fate, they will need to
think not only about preferable end states, but also about navifrom present circumstances to desired
gable pathways
351
endpoints.
B.

SOCIAL COSTS, STRUCTURAL BARRIERS,

AND THE FUTURE

SCOPE OF THE EXEMPTION

1. Hospital Services
How should this pathway-sensitive approach play out with
respect to the exemption? Rather than assuming an Olympian
vantage point with respect to the question of what should be
done, I will adopt the situated perspective of a public-regarding
policymaker attuned to the costs entailed in surmounting structural obstacles to change.3 52 To begin with, such a policymaker
ought to recognize that the current per se exemption of nonprofit
hospitals cannot be justified absent consideration of structural
constraints arising from settled expectations and webs of reliance. Likewise, the case for conditioning exemption upon provision of free care or undersupplied community services is weak,
351. More generally, the tendency of legal scholars to prefer the former sort
of inquiry to the latter may limit their impact in fields of regulation within
which structural constraints play a large role.
352. Put differently, I assume that policy formulation is a product of both
public-regarding efforts and interest group pressures, and that scholarship can
contribute usefully to the former by presuming an audience of legislative and
administrative actors with public-regarding aspirations, and political and other
structural constraints. The hypothetical public-regarding policymaker might
sit either within Congress or the Executive Branch, including positions in the
IRS, Treasury Department, or White House. Although her institutional authority and political capacities (and vulnerabilities) will differ in these settings,
these variations are beyond my scope in this Article. The following discussion
applies to both legislative and administrative policy formulation regarding the
exemption.
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as long as more direct public support for such services remains
an alternative. Elimination of the exemption, in short, represents a preferable end state if one disregards the costs of travel3 53
ing the path from here to there.
On the other hand, these costs are large, and any calculus
that neglects them is of doubtful relevance as a guide to action.
Legislative or administrative policymakers must spend political
capital to counter resistance from potent interest groups committed to the current exemption. For a public-regarding policymaker with limited political capital, payment of this price may
be irrational. Progress toward other potential end states, such
as universal health care coverage or effective cost-containment,
may yield greater social gains per quantum of political cost than
would a campaign to end the exemption for nonprofit hospitals.
If so, and if a public-regarding policymaker lacks the political
capital to achieve these things, then it would be wise for her to
defer efforts to end the exemption pending the pursuit of objectives with higher ratios of social benefit to political cost.
In fact, the 1993-94 struggle over health care reform suggests that the ratio of social benefit to political cost entailed in
terminating the exemption may be less than it is for other reformist objectives. The current exemption went untouched or
only slightly altered in proposals that confronted nonprofit hospitals with such painful prospects as price regulation, Medicare
cutbacks, and increased payer monopsony. Faced with a scarcity of political capital, reformers of many stripes may have
made a common calculation that challenging the hospital industry on matters central to the design of proposals for enhanced
health care access and cost containment was more important
than tapping revenues forgone due to the exemption.3 5 4 Calculation of this sort can be rational from a social welfare perspective even when it leads to the survival of policies that seem
wasteful from a functionalist vantage point.
This political calculus reflects the patterns of institutional
dependence and settled expectations alluded to above. Absent
these patterns, nonprofit hospitals and other affected interest
groups would not be motivated to channel their limited political
assets toward defense of the exemption. To be sure, the link be353. The costs referred to here are two-fold: first, the political capital a reformist actor must expend to surmount structural barriers (such as opposition
by potent interest groups), and second, the social welfare costs incurred by disruption of settled expectations and arrangements.
354. Alternatively, of course, reformers may have genuinely believed in the
exemptions rationality.
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tween the social welfare significance of settled expectations and
the political power wielded in the exemption's defense is distorted by the kinds of dynamics catalogued in public choice
scholarship and other work on collective action. On the other
hand, a public-regarding policymaker should keep in mind that
political resistance from affected interest groups does, to some
degree, reflect concerns that ought to count in the calculus of
public interest.
Thus, our public-regarding policymaker should take account
of two types of transition costs typically disregarded by commentators who focus on socially desirable ends. At the political process level, she should weigh the costs of challenging adversely
affected interests, and she should be prepared to defer pursuit of
desirable end results to make wise use of her limited political
assets. At the social welfare level, she should keep in mind the
transition costs that arise from settled expectations and patterns of reliance. As a practical matter, it will generally be
much easier for her to assess costs of the former type than the
latter, since self-regarding interest groups are hardly reticent
about the political prices they are prepared to exact.3 5 5 As long
as political costs at least crudely reflect transition costs arising
from settled expectations and patterns of reliance, a calculus
that focuses on the political process level can be relied upon to
take reasonable account of transition problems. Our public-regarding policymaker should, however, attempt to adjust this pogroup activity gives short
litically-based calculus when interest
3 56
shrift to important social concerns.
For reasons mentioned earlier,3 5 7 this calculus of structural
constraint supports the conclusion that an effort to eliminate the
exemption would currently be unwise. If, as suggested above,
the ratio of social benefit to political cost is lower for efforts to
abolish the exemption than for pursuit of some other health policy ends, then these other ends ought to receive higher priority.
355. In contrast, direct assessment of settled expectations and patterns of
reliance within an industry or other field of endeavor will usually be difficult
(and costly) for policymakers not intimately familiar with the field. This prob-

lem looms especially large for economically complex endeavors like health care
financing.
356. For example, interest group activity in the health policy sphere can be
expected to undervalue the needs of poor and uninsured persons, relative to the
concerns of health care payers and providers. A public-regarding policymaker
should attempt to compensate for such distortions when addressing problems
that bear upon interest group concerns. Pursuing policies that are informed by
such adjustments will, however, often prove politically impossible.
357. See supra text accompanying notes 345-50.
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Given our public-regarding policymaker's limited political resources and our national failure thus far to achieve universal
health care access or control of costs, toleration of the current
3 58
exemption for the time being seems prudent.
On the other hand, elimination of tax exemption for non3 59
profit hospitals ought to be kept in mind as an ultimate goal.
As part of a comprehensive, long-term plan for the reform (and
stabilization) of American hospital financing, gradual phase-out
of the exemption may someday be possible without sharp disruption of settled expectations and webs of reliance. Such a phaseout would be politically easier to achieve after the implementation of health care financing reforms that leave hospital managers more secure about their future revenues. Universal
coverage, for example, would diminish the fiscal vulnerability of
hospitals that now serve large numbers of uninsured patients.
More generally, reforms that make hospital financing more predictable should reduce managerial anxiety over the loss of particular subsidies.

358. Were the IRS (rather than Congress) to discontinue the current exemption for nonprofit hospitals, legislative inaction doctrines could present a legal
barrier. Hospitals seeking to challenge their loss of exemption might make two
related claims: congressional failure to overturn Revenue Ruling 69-545 constitutes legislative acquiescence to their per se exemption, and that repeated congressional rejection of proposals to tighten requirements for the § 501(c)(3)
exemption of hospitals amounted to legislative ratification of per se exemption.
Hospitals could buttress these legislative inaction arguments by pointing to
their reliance interests in preservation of the per se exemption. See generally
William N. Eskridge, Jr., InterpretingLegislativeInaction, 87 MICH. L. REv. 67,
71-78, 84-89 (1988) (examining the "acquiescence" and "rejected proposal" doctrines). On the other hand, judicial hostility to tax exemptions not explicit in
statutory language, along with the principle of broad deference to agencies'
statutory constructions, weigh against the possibility that courts might block
administrative repeal of the per se exemption by invoking legislative inaction.
See United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 356-59 (1988) (rejecting
the argument that Congress's "decision" not to include express limitation of the
estate-taxation exemption demonstrates an intent to exempt Appellees's type of
property from estate tax, in light of the presumption against implied tax exemptions); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 865 (1984), reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984) (upholding a governmental agency's construction of a statutory provision on the basis that when a
construction is permissible, federal judges have a duty to respect the legitimate
policy choices of agencies to which Congress has delegated policy-making
responsibilities).
359. To avoid breaking with the American tradition of exemption for charitable giving, one might plan on retaining the hospital exemption in fractional
form by tying it to the value of donated resources. See supra text accompanying
notes 184-85, 199-207.
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Vertical Integration and Medical Risk-Bearing

This pathway-sensitive approach to the exemption points
the way toward another, more urgent recommendation. When
the future emergence of efficiency-blocking structural constraints can be anticipated, averting such development should
be a high public priority. Once patterns of expectation and reliance crystallize around a public entitlement, political resistance
to its elimination is likely to be fierce. If, however, the prospect
of a new entitlement can be detected before such patterns come
into being, the political and social costs of preemptive action are
more likely to be manageable.
A rare window of opportunity for such prevention is now
open. The American health care industry is in the midst of extraordinary transformation, marked by the advent of myriad organizational forms that integrate the provision and financing of
medical services. Large insurers 3 60 and for-profit hospital
chains 3 6 1 have played the leading roles in this transformation,
developing and marketing institutional arrangements that aim
to limit clinical spending via varying combinations of reimbursement rules and provider incentives.3 62 In the last several years,
however, nonprofit hospitals have begun to respond to this new
competitive challenge with integrated health plans of their own.
They have joined together with other hospitals and with networks of participating clinicians to offer health care coverage
that vies with plans being marketed by more traditional insurers.3 63 In so doing, they have sought to expand the reach of the
charitable exemption to encompass their risk-bearing activities.
Confronted with the impossibility of arguing that the sale of
insurance in itself warrants exemption, 3 64 advocates for these
360.

Erik Eckholm, While Congress Remains Silent, Health Care Trans-

forms Itself, N.Y. TamEs, Dec. 18, 1994, § 1, at 1, 34.
361. Bloche, Corporate Takeover of Teaching Hospitals, supra note 44, at
1078-85 (discussing efforts by for-profit chains during the 1980s to integrate
health care delivery and financing).
362. The literature on such arrangements is vast and growing. I shall not
attempt to review it here. For a critical discussion of these arrangements and
their cost containment potential, see Symposium, Managed Care:Key to Health
InsuranceReform?, HEALTH AFFAmS, Winter 1991, at 7.
363. Leading nonprofit hospitals that have begun to develop networks of
community hospitals and physicians in anticipation of marketing prepaid coverage include the New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center and the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center. Elsa Brenner, Moving Ahead at Medical
Center, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1994, § 13WC, at 1, 4.
364. A "quid pro quo" argument for exempting nonprofit health insurers
might in theory be made based upon the claim that they are less inclined than
for-profit health insurers to engage in vigorous risk selection, thereby providing
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new, risk-bearing health plans have piggy-backed their case for
such expansion on the boilerplate "promotion of health" justification for the exemption of hospitals. They have argued, in the
main, that risk-bearing merits exemption because it ensures
paying customers' access to care and thereby confers a community benefit. They have also, at times, pointed to research and
educational programs conducted by participating hospitals, as
well as to free and undercompensated health care offered at
these facilities. Thus constructed, the case for exempting riskbearing activities incorporates all the failings, discussed herein,
that beset the case for exempting hospitals.
An early United States Tax Court decision, Sound Health
Ass'n v. Commissioner,365 invited nonprofit, risk-bearing health
plans to make arguments along these lines. In Sound Health,
the court invoked the IRS's treatment of nonprofit hospitals to
support its decision to confer § 501(c)(3) exemption upon a prepaid health plan. In so doing, the court rejected the agency's
contention that the risk-bearing function served by prepaid
plans does not further a charitable purpose. 3 66 The court concluded, in effect, that risk-bearing by health plans is charitable
because the provision of medical care is charitable, as per hospital precedent. The court dismissed the IRS's objection that riskbearing performed for a price benefitted too small a class of persons (the plan's subscribers) to qualify as charitable. On the
contrary, said the judges, the class of persons "eligible" to subscribe to the plan-and thereby "potentiallybenefitted" by its
risk-bearing function-was "for all practical purposes, the class
of members of the community itself."3 67 The court finessed the
awkward fact that not all "eligible" persons could afford to suba measure of public benefit beyond that generated by for-profit insurers. Yet
even assuming that aggressive medical risk selection is socially undesirable (a
proposition not without controversy, though I believe it to be correct) this argument founders on the reality that vigorous risk selection by some drives similar
behavior by all. Insurers that fail to match their competitors' risk selection efforts will be stuck with more expensive risk pools (and higher prices for
equivalent coverage) that undermine their efforts to maintain their market
share. For-profit and nonprofit insurers alike have been caught in this downward risk selection spiral. See HENRY J. AARON, SERIOUS AND UNSTABLE CONDITION 8-37 (1991). Indeed, recognition that for-profit and nonprofit health
insurers do not differ in this regard played an important role in Congress's 1986
decision to eliminate the tax exemption of Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans.
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1012 (b)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 239192 (1986) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 833 (1988)).
365. 71 T.C. 158 (1978), acq. 1981-2 C.B. 2.
366. Id. at 189-91.
367. Id. at 185 (emphasis added).
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scribe by pointing to the IRS's treatment of nonprofit hospitals:
"If the charitable hospital can, except for emergency cases, restrict its treatment to paying patients, [a prepaid health plan]
3 68
should be able to restrict itself to paying members."
The plan at issue in Sound Health was a staff-model
HMO-a single corporate entity that employs health care providers, delivers clinical services, and bears financial risk. Myriad
other institutional forms that link the financing and delivery of
health care are now being developed and marketed. Whether
the courts will go along with industry efforts to apply Sound
Health to these new risk-bearing and managed care arrangements is an important and unanswered question.
Two years ago, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit made an initial foray into this unmapped territory. To the
consternation of advocates for risk-bearing, nonprofit plans, a
Third Circuit panel declined to extend the Sound Health approach. The panel held, in Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner ("Geisinger P'), 3 69 that risk-bearing on behalf of
subscribers able and willing to pay did not by itself satisfy the
charitable purpose requirement. The prepaid plan at issue in
GeisingerI neither employed health care providers nor delivered
clinical services. Rather, it contracted with separately incorporated entities, such as hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies, for the
provision of services to plan subscribers. On the other hand, the
plan and these separately incorporated contractors were affiliates of a single, umbrella entity-the Geisinger Foundationcreated to oversee their operation as parts of a coordinated
health care system.3 7 0 Nevertheless, the court considered the
plan's risk-bearing and health care purchasing activities as a
venture distinct from the actual provision of health services.
The court thereby averted the force of hospital precedent and
the implication that medical risk-bearing must be charitable.
371
Without openly disapproving of the holding in Sound Health,
368. Id. at 187.
369. 985 F.2d 1210 (3rd Cir. 1993) [hereinafter Geisinger 1], aff'd, 30 F.3d
494 (3rd Cir. 1994) [hereinafter GeisingerIll.

370.

Id. at 1213. The Geisinger Foundation, a nonprofit firm, controlled all

of these affiliated entities, principally through its power to designate their directors. GeisingerII, 30 F.3d 494 (3rd Cir. 1994). The Foundation organized
the prepaid plan as a separate corporation (rather than as a component of one
of the entities that delivered health services) in part to escape the need to comply with certain state regulations. Id. at 497.
371. The Third Circuit panel construed the holding in Sound Health as the
HMO in question benefitting a large enough class of persons to satisfy the community-benefit test for charitable exemption, resting on the HMO's operation of
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the court opined that medical risk-bearing for a price "benefits
no one but ... subscribers," and thus fails to benefit a large
enough class of persons to qualify as charitable.3 72 The court
said the same about health care purchasing by a prepaid plan on
3 73
its subscribers' behalf.
The Third Circuit thereby departed sharply from Sound
Health with respect to the § 501(c)(3) treatment of medical riskbearing. Yet Geisinger I left a doctrinal opening for plans that
bear risk but do not themselves provide health services. Rather
than merely dismissing the petitioner's bid for charitable exemption, the court remanded the case to the United States Tax
Court for a determination of whether the plan at issue qualified
for exemption as an "integral part" of a qualifying service delivery system. 374 The court characterized the "integral part doctrine" as "a means by which organizations may qualify for
exemption vicariously through related organizations, as long as
they are engaged in activities which would be exempt if the related organizations engaged in them, and as long as those activities are furthering the exempt purposes of the related
37 5
organizations."
On remand, and in a subsequent appeal to the Third Circuit, Geisinger Health Plan asserted that this formulation required its prepaid plan to be treated as though it were part 7of6
3
one of the care-delivering entities in the Geisinger system.
Geisinger Health Plan relied upon Sound Health for the proposition that the health care financing functions performed by the
prepaid Geisinger plan should be exempt if so treated. Both the
United States Tax Court and the Third Circuit rejected this argument, albeit on different doctrinal grounds. In GeisingerII,
the tax court held that the prepaid plan would produce unrelated business income if absorbed by one of the Geisinger sysa subsidized dues program, provision of some free care, and conduct of research
and educational programs. GeisingerI, 985 F.2d at 1219. The Sound Health
court's stated basis for its holding, however, was broader; the court clearly
stated that the offering of a medical risk-spreading plan to all persons able to
pay benefited a large enough class to satisfy the community benefit standard.
Sound Health, 71 T.C. at 185. This permissive stance was plainly at odds with
Geisinger !'s negative view of risk-bearing.
372. GeisingerI, 985 F.2d at 1219-20.
373. Id. at 1220.
374. Id. at 1221.
375. Id. at 1220.
376. GeisingerII, 30 F.3d at 498-99.
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tem's care-providing entities.3 7 7 On appeal, a Third Circuit
panel charted a more circuitous doctrinal path. Declaring that
"we are not bound by the description of the integral part doctrine set forth in dicta in Geisinger!,-378 the court announced a
further condition: the "relationship" between the entity at issue
and an exempt organization must "somehow enhance" the former's "own exempt character to the point that, when the boost
provided by the [latter] is added to the contribution made by the
[former], the [entity at issue] would be entitled to § 501(c)(3) status."3 7 9 The panel then held that Geisinger's prepaid plan failed
to meet this requirement. The plan's link to Geisinger's hospitals and clinics supplied no "boost," the court said, because this
relationship did not "increase the portion of the community for
a
which [the plan] promotes health-it serves no more people as
380
part of the [Geisinger] System than it would serve otherwise."
As an empirical matter, this last claim rests on uncertain
ground. Quite possibly, the integration of health care financing
and delivery within a single system can achieve efficiencies that
enable a plan not only to expand its market share but also to
draw previously uninsured consumers into the medical services
market. 38 1 Nonetheless, the practical effect of Geisinger II, in
tandem with GeisingerI, was to caution risk-bearing, nonprofit
health plans that the easy route to exemption mapped out in
Sound Health had become an uncertain proposition.
To be sure, the Third Circuit panel in Geisinger11 avoided
the destabilizing effects of an open repudiation of Sound Health
by eschewing the Tax Court's characterization of risk-bearing as
an unrelated business. Had the Third Circuit endorsed this
characterization, the nonprofit, staff-rhodel HMOs that now rely
on Sound Health's treatment of medical risk-bearing as charita377. Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 394, 404-06 (1993).
The United States Tax Court reasoned that the plan's coverage of health services provided by non-Geisinger system entities would require treatment of the
plan as an unrelated business, were it to be absorbed by one of the system's
hospitals or clinics.
378. GeisingerII, 30 F.3d at 499.
379. Id. at 501.
380. Id. at 502. The Third Circuit panel thereby avoided addressing the
merits of the United States Tax Court's determination that the plan would generate unrelated business income if absorbed by one of the Geisinger systems
hospitals or clinics.
381. The question of whether some integrated financing and delivery systems achieve efficiencies not attainable when insurers and health care providers transact at arms length is a matter of intense dispute, and is beyond the
scope of this Article. The readiness of the GeisingerlI court to presume its own
answer to this complex question is both surprising and disheartening.
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ble when performed by firms that integrate health care financing and delivery would have confronted the threat of loss of
exemption. By taking a different doctrinal track, the Third Circuit managed to preserve Sound Health as precedent for an established industry sector-nonprofit, staff-model HMOs-while
declaring its intention to deny exemption to an emerging sector:
prepaid, managed plans created by nonprofit health care providers as organizationally distinct entities. Taken together, Geisinger I and Geisinger11 stand for the proposition that medical
risk-bearing should not be treated as a charitable endeavor, at
least when engaged in by organizations that do not themselves
deliver health services.
Whether the Third Circuit's approach will be adopted in
other circuits remains, as of this writing, a matter of speculation.38 2 Assessed in terms of analytic clarity, the conclusory doctrinal formulations relied upon in Geisinger I and Geisinger 11
hardly make for a model worth emulating. 38 3 Yet the Geisinger
results are consistent with the approach urged in this article:
strategic tolerance for existing patterns of expectation and reliance, conjoined with preemptive action to arrest the development of such patterns when their future emergence, can be
foreseen. By leaving the holding in Sound Health intact as regards staff-model HMOs, GeisingerI and GeisingerH avert the
disruption of settled expectations within an established market
sector. By declining to exempt risk-bearing by more loosely integrated health plans like the entity at issue in the Geisinger series, the Third Circuit's approach, if widely adopted, would
forestall the development of a wasteful new entitlement before
its would-be beneficiaries come to rely on it. Failure to act
preemptively along these lines would allow the development of
structural constraints (arising from patterns of reliance) that
would make future elimination of this entitlement politically
and socially more costly.

382. As of the beginning of 1995, Sound Health, GeisingerI, and GeisingerII
represented the only judicial statements on the federal tax treatment of riskbearing by nonprofit health systems that integrate financing and service
delivery.
383. To be sure, the Third Circuit's reliance upon such unrevealing terms as
"exempt purpose" and "promotion of health" reflect the centrality of these terms
in established doctrine. The court's failure to set forth a plausible analytic basis for its choices between boilerplate formulations, however, rendered the Geisinger opinions disappointingly opaque. Moreover, Geisinger Ii's convoluted
"boost" test could give rise to yet another tangle of unrevealing doctrine.
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The IRS and reviewing courts should thus seize the opportunity for prevention offered by the process of integration that is
today transforming the health care industry. The charitable exemption should not be expanded to encompass the risk-bearing
activities of the new, still-emerging generation of provider-sponlitsored, integrated health plans. The outcome of the Geisinger
38 4
igation points in the right direction in this regard.
CONCLUSION
The current federal tax exemption of nonprofit hospitals is
neither explicable nor justifiable in terms of the logic of efficiency or reward for virtue. Proposals to condition the exemption upon provision of free care or community services are
likewise poorly supported by efficiency, distributional, or other
moral arguments. The persistence of the exemption today, and
its probable survival for the foreseeable future, are best explained in terms of the combined logic of interest group politics
and structural constraint, tied to patterns of expectation and reliance. To avoid painful transition costs (both political and social), the federal government tolerates a wasteful tax
expenditure.
Absent such structural barriers, immediate elimination of
exemption for nonprofit hospitals would be desirable. Given the
reality of these constraints, the exemption's demise is implausible as a near-term goal, but phase-out of the exemption ought to
be a long run tax (and health) policy aim. Elimination of the
exemption would be made less costly, both politically and socially, by stabilization of today's chaotic health care financing
environment. In particular, guaranteed universal coverage
would make hospitals in socio-economically distressed areas less
vulnerable to the fiscally disruptive effects of the exemption's demise. Meanwhile, in the near term, the IRS and reviewing
384. There is room for argument over whether the approach advocated in
this article counsels tolerance, for the time being, for the exemption enjoyed by
nonprofit, staff-model HMOs. On the one hand, as noted above, these entities
constitute an established market sector with a reliance interest in the exemption dating back at least to the Sound Health ruling. On the other hand, the
ongoing rapid growth of this sector makes its continued exemption an increasingly expensive proposition. The political and social costs of terminating the
HMO exemption today would be considerable, but they should be balanced
against the prospect that failure to do so could lock in an escalating, wasteful
entitlement to public resources. This complex calculus of present versus future
costs is inherently subjective and open to dispute. Its emphasis on institutional
realities, however, distinguishes it favorably from the boilerplate formulations
endemic to the law governing exemption of health care organizations.
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courts should eschew industry efforts to broaden the exemption
to encompass the risk-bearing activities of integrated health
care financing and delivery systems. The rapid proliferation of
such systems today makes this a critical period in the development of the tax policy and law that affects them. By denying
exemption for medical risk-bearing before patterns of expectation, reliance, and structural constraint crystallize, the IRS and
the courts can avoid locking in a wasteful, potentially huge new
federal entitlement.
Academic models of the exemption have not paid sufficient
heed to structural limitations of the sort that have decisively
shaped its evolution in the health care context. These models
tend toward functionalist explanation-toward the interpretation of existing institutional and doctrinal forms as optimal (or
at least good) adaptations to some simple and elegant purpose.
This characteristic is shared not only by the economic models
considered herein but also by accounts of the exemption as a
moral just desert for institutional virtue. Indeed, it is arguable
that the aesthetic preference for functionalist elegance within
the academic community has engendered a market failure of
sorts as regards the explanatory power of scholarship on this
subject.
Interpretive accounts that are more attentive to the development of structural barriers and to their blocking effects upon
functional adaptation would enrich our understanding of myriad
legal and institutional forms that defy efforts to infer purpose.
Scholarly efforts along these lines might also contribute more to
the achievement of desired functional adaptations than the preoccupation with the search for social purposes served by current
arrangements.

